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ABSTRACT
ARE CONSUMPTION TAXES BETTER THAN LABOR INCOME TAXES?
THEORETICAL AND QUANTITATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHOICE OF
TAX BASE
Kristin D. Shaw
Petra Todd
In many standard models, taxes on labor income and taxes on consumption are
outcome-equivalent. However, this is not the case when taxes are non-linear and
households differ with respect to wages and earnings. In this dissertation, I evaluate how consumption-based and earnings-based tax systems differ in the presence of
wage heterogeneity and progressive rate schedules. To understand the macroeconomic
implications of the choice of tax base, I study two versions of a dynamic consumptionsavings model, one analytically and the other numerically. I begin with a tractable
two-period framework and show that the theoretical advantages of consumption taxation are twofold. First, it eliminates an intertemporal distortion on labor supply. Second, consumption is more strongly correlated with lifetime resources, which matters
for the distributional impact of the tax system. To assess the quantitative implications, I construct a standard overlapping generations model with incomplete markets
and elastic labor supply. After calibrating the model to the U.S. economy, I replace
a progressive labor income tax with an equally progressive consumption tax, taking
into account post-reform transition dynamics. This reform produces moderate gains
in physical capital (1.9%), output (1.3%), consumption (1.5%) and welfare (0.9%).
Most of the benefits stem from improvements in labor efficiency that follow from the

v

mitigation of distortions on work decisions. Because baseline progressivity is suboptimal for both tax bases, I also perform a best-on-best comparison by numerically
characterizing the welfare-maximizing tax code under both regimes. The quantitative conclusions from this exercise are broadly unchanged from the simple reform.
A progressive consumption tax is most easily implemented by adopting a cash-flow
consumption tax, as described by Kaldor (1955) among others. Since the administration of a cash-flow tax is more complicated than that of a pure labor income tax,
my quantitative results provide novel guidance for policy-makers discerning between
the two tax bases.
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CHAPTER 1 : Introduction

When the people are weary of any one sort of Tax, presently some Projector propounds another, and gets himself audience, by affirming he can
propound a way how all the publick charge may be born without the way
that is.
William Petty, A Treatise of Taxes and Contributions (1662)

1.1. Statement of the Research Question
Tax system design has two core problems. One concerns the rate of taxation: should
rates vary between individuals or across time? And if so, how? These are critical
questions and many fruitful efforts have been made to answer them. An even more
fundamental question concerns the choice of tax base. What should be taxed? After
all, fiscal instruments must be selected before they can be calibrated.
This dissertation focuses on the choice between the taxation of labor income and the
taxation of consumption. Specifically, I ask whether there are utilitarian grounds to
prefer one base over the other.
Several papers in the public finance literature have asked the same question and
concluded that consumption taxation is better than labor income taxation (Auerbach
et al., 1983; Coleman, 2000; Correia, 2010; Motta and Rossi, 2019). But consumption
taxes only deliver efficiency gains in these models because they substitute for missing
fiscal instruments. In particular, consumption taxes are used to mimic a levy on initial
assets, an inelastic resource that can be taxed without distortion. If tax planners
could also use appropriate capital taxes, the differences between the two tax bases
would disappear. Because the conclusions of these analyses depend crucially on the
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exclusion of standard fiscal instruments, one is justified in asking: are consumption
taxes really better than labor income taxes?
A more instructive point of departure is Erosa and Gervais (2002). Using a standard
life-cycle growth model, they prove that when goverments have access to four fiscal
policies—namely debt plus proportional taxes on consumption, labor income and
capital income—one of them is redundant. In other words, “it is possible to eliminate
either consumption taxes or labor income taxes from a given fiscal policy without
affecting the allocation being implemented...This observation applies whether taxes
are allowed to be conditioned on age or not.”1
Consequently, the tax base question is meaningful only in settings that deviate in
some way from Erosa and Gervais (2002).2 Their model features homogenous agents
and linear taxes, raising the question of how things might change in environments
with heterogeneous agents and non-linear taxes. As Conesa and Krueger (2006) and
others have emphasized, progressive taxation plays a potentially beneficial role in such
settings by redistributing resources from the rich and lucky to the poor and unlucky.
The optimal choice of tax base likely turns on whether one system achieves that
objective more efficiently than the other. The aim of this dissertation is to determine
how consumption-based and earnings-based tax systems differ in the presence of wage
heterogeneity and progressive rate schedules.

1.2. Summary of Methods and Findings
To understand the macroeconomic implications of the choice of tax base, I study
two versions of a dynamic consumption-savings model, one analytically and the other
1

Andres Erosa and Martin Gervais, 2002, “Optimal Taxation in Life-Cycle Economies”, American Economic Review 90(1), p. 347.
2
The aforementioned studies deviate by excluding certain fiscal policies from consideration.
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numerically. The model economies are populated by finitely-lived agents who differ
with respect to wages and make endogenous labor supply and savings decisions. In
both versions, the tax planner’s problem is formulated as a Ramsey-style optimal
taxation problem in which the government selects a tax-and-transfer scheme from a
given parametric class. The functional form I adopt for the tax code is taken from
Benabou (2000) and Heathcote et al. (2017), among others.
The Ramsey tradition of tax design, which optimizes tax policy over an exogenously
specified set of fiscal instruments, stands in contrast with the Mirrlees approach, which
restricts neither the tax base nor the shape of the rate schedule. Mirrleesian tax design
proceeds by formulating an appropriate social planner’s problem, characterizing the
constrained-efficient allocation, and then reverse-engineering a tax code to implement
it. The inevitable distortions are not imposed from without; they arise endogenously
from the trade-off between insurance and incentives. The disadvantage of the Mirrlees
approach is practical. The tax systems it recommends are usually quite complicated
and generally depend on the entire history of labor earnings (Kocherlakota, 2005).
Although the ad hoc restrictions of Ramsey tax design are theoretically unfounded,
they are simple enough to embed into richer models and more easily translated into
applied policy advice. It has also been shown in some cases that the Mirrlees solution
offers only small welfare gains over a simple Ramsey-style tax code (Heathcote and
Tsujiyama, 2020). For these reasons, the Ramsey approach still dominates quantitative public finance, with progress made by exploring increasingly sophisticated tax
instruments in increasingly sophisticated environments.3 Some papers are directly inspired by insights drawn from the Mirrleesian literature. One example is Kitao (2010),
who lets the capital tax rate vary with labor income in accordance with the standard
3

Two areas of active research include wealth taxes (e.g. Guvenen et al., 2019; Kaymak and
Poschke, 2020) and universal transfers (e.g. Luduvice, 2019; Daruich and Fernández, 2020).
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Mirrleesian result that capital taxation and labor supply are negatively correlated.
My analysis begins in Chapter 2 with a tractable two-period framework that abstracts from physical capital. Agents draw heterogeneous wage profiles and transfer
resources across time using a risk-free bond. I use this model to illustrate the key
qualitative differences between the candidate tax structures. The theoretical advantages of consumption taxation are twofold and arise from the fact that wages and
earnings fluctuate over time whereas consumption is endogenously smoothed through
borrowing and lending. As a result, lifetime resources are more strongly correlated
with consumption than with earnings. If the ultimate target of redistribution is lifetime resources, as some writers argue, then consumption becomes an attractive choice
of tax base for period-by-period tax systems.4
Along similar lines, progressive taxation generates an intertemporal distortion whenever it is linked to a volatile choice variable. To grasp the intuition, consider an agent
whose wages change (deterministically) over time. This agent optimally chooses a
higher level of work effort in the higher-wage period. This intertemporal effect is
dampened, however, if earnings are subject to a progressive labor income tax. Because marginal tax rates increase with earnings, the agent’s incentive to tilt hours
in the direction of the high-wage period is reduced. Consequently, she flattens her
life-cycle labor supply profile and generates lower lifetime earnings. By selecting a
relatively smoother base, namely consumption, tax authorities can minimize or even
eliminate this type of distortion.

4

See, e.g., Mirrlees et al. (2011): “The redistributive impact of a tax system is often judged
by looking at how much tax individuals pay relative to their income over a relatively short time
period–rarely more than a year. But people’s incomes tend to change over their lives, which means
that this approach can be a poor guide to how progressive the tax system is relative to a person’s
lifetime income...Ideally, we should judge the distributional impact of the tax system over a lifetime
rather than at a point in time.” pp. 23-24.
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These two differences, which I call the redistribution channel and the efficiency channel, are not enough to definitively favor consumption taxes over labor income taxes.
Changes in the tax base trigger changes in average tax rates to maintain government
budget balance. Because these tax rate adjustments have different impacts on agents
of different abilities, a simple conversion of the tax system from an earnings base to a
consumption base may not improve welfare. I present a sufficient condition on the underlying wage process that guarantees welfare-superiority of progressive consumption
taxation in this environment.
In Chapter 3, I turn my attention to the feasibility and administration of a non-linear
consumption tax. The most common consumption taxes in the world today are the
retail sales tax (in the U.S.) and the value-added tax (most everywhere else). But
these indirect forms are blunt tools and ill-suited for building progressive tax systems. Alternatively, a direct tax on household expenditures can be levied according
to any arbitrary rate schedule. The administration of a direct scheme was considered
infeasibly difficult for a long time, despite academic support dating back to at least
Hobbes (1651). It was not until the middle of the twentieth century that economists
recognized the cash-flow tax as a suitable implementation, thanks largely to the work
of Irving Fisher (1937) and Nicholas Kaldor (1955). The logic of the cash-flow tax
is easily grasped once one observes that household consumption can be derived by
subtracting the sum of contributions to savings accounts and other non-consumption
tax outflows from the sum of earnings and other realized monetary inflows. This
residual approach to calculating consumption dramatically reduces record-keeping
requirements and compliance costs, relative to the direct summation of all consumption transactions. Nor is it entirely unfamiliar, as this is precisely the way the existing
U.S. tax code treats tax-deferred retirement accounts.

5

That said, the cash-flow consumption tax is certainly more complicated than a labor
income tax. There are also non-trivial concerns around the treatment of durable goods
and certain tax evasion schemes (Seidl, 1990). On adminstrative grounds alone, then,
an earnings base must be preferred to an expenditure base.5 Only if the relative
merits identified in Chapter 2 are quantitatively significant can a persuasive case for
consumption taxation be made.
Chapter 4 address this quantitative question. Agents in this economy face idiosyncratic labor market shocks in addition to ex ante differences in ability. Yet they
still have access to just a single financial instrument—the one-period risk-free bond—
which they trade for self-insurance purposes as in Huggett (1993) or Aiyagari (1994).
The government finances its expenditures using three sources of revenue: flat taxes
on consumption and capital income and a non-linear household tax that is initially
assessed on earnings. Additional model ingredients include retirement, mortality risk,
accidental bequests and a strict borrowing constraint.
After calibrating the model to the U.S. economy, I perform a series of tax reform experiments. To begin, I assess the macroeconomic effects of converting the non-linear
household tax from a labor income base to a consumption base, holding progressivity
constant. By applying this simple reform only to future generations, I avoid the windfall gains and losses that often complicate welfare assessments along the transition.
This reform leads to non-trivial long-run gains in physical capital (1.9%), output
(1.3%) and consumption (1.5%). Most of the benefits stem from improvements in labor efficiency that follow from the mitigation of distortions on work decisions. Using
a standard utilitarian welfare criterion, I compute a consumption-equivalent steadystate welfare gain of 0.9%. Because of how I structure the tax experiment, transitional
5

Political concerns have also plagued cash-flow tax proposals. See Bank (2003) for details.
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generations experience similar welfare gains to long-run generations. Pre-reform cohorts are subject only to general equilibrium price effects and are largely unaffected.
This justifies the use of steady-state comparisons to evaluate the impact of the tax
reform.
Because baseline progressivity is almost certaintly sub-optimal for both tax bases, I
then perform a best-on-best comparison by numerically characterizing the welfaremaximizing tax code under both regimes, with all tax experiments proceeding along
the same lines as the simple reform. Although the utilitarian gap narrows somewhat,
the optimal consumption tax still holds a long-run welfare advantage of 0.7% when
comparing optima. The main quantitative result, and chief contribution of this paper,
still stands: adopting a progressive consumption tax generates moderate welfare gains
relative to a progressive labor income tax.
In a closely related paper, Conesa et al. (2020) quantify the replacement of both labor
and capital income taxes with a dual-rate indirect consumption tax system. In their
model, infinitely-lived agents allocate expenditures between two different consumer
goods, each of which is subject to its own flat-rate tax. If expenditure shares for these
two goods vary with total expenditure, then a rate-differentiated system can generate
some degree of progressivity. However, they find that such schemes reduce welfare
both in the new steady state and along the transition.
I perform a similar exercise by extending my quantitative model to include basic
and non-basic consumer goods. Using a calibrated version of the extended model,
I compare two distinct tax reforms: the simple cash-flow reform from before, and a
dual-rate indirect tax reform as in Conesa et al. (2020). I find that the cash-flow tax
generates positive welfare gains but the dual-rate system generates substantial welfare
losses. By levying different taxes on different goods, the dual-rate system deviates
7

from the principle of uniform commodity taxation (Deaton, 1979), distorts relative
prices, and erodes any advantage of systemic progressivity. These results suggest that
policy-makers seeking to enact a progressive consumption-based tax system should
adopt the cash-flow structure over the rate-differentiated structure.

1.3. Relationship to the Literature
To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to quantify the implications
of non-linear cash-flow taxation in a model of heterogenous agents and incomplete
markets. But many papers have quantified the shift from income taxes to linear
consumption taxes, including Summers (1981), Auerbach et al. (1983), Altig et al.
(2001), Nishiyama and Smetters (2005), Lehmus (2011) and Kitao (2011). This literature offer three important methodological lessons for the present study. First, the
analyst must carefully consider the induced transition, especially the path of government debt. An increased reliance on consumption taxation in a life-cycle setting
tends to increase household demand for assets. But it also increases the government
supply of debt, which largely crowds out the accumulation of physical capital. If
this is not properly accounted for, the results will grossly overestimate the long-run
welfare gains of reform.
Second, the papers cited above study the wholesale replacement of an income tax
system with a flat consumption tax. Consequently, their numerical results largely
reflect the elimination of taxes on capital income. To properly evaluate the relative
merits of consumption taxation over against labor income taxation, it is essential that
saving incentives not be directly modifired in any of the policy experiments.
Third, it is vital that the analyst carefully consider the treatment of existing wealth.
A newly imposed consumption tax mimics a lump-sum tax on pre-existing wealth

8

while a labor income tax produces the opposite effect. To insulate the numerical
results from bias of this sort, the reform must be designed to minimize windfall gains
and losses. The implicit capital levy effect appears prominently in Coleman (2000)
and Correia (2010) as well.
Several recent contributions have explored the implications of consumption taxation
for non-standard economic environments. Motta and Rossi (2019) evaluate the power
of consumption taxes to substitute for missing taxes on monopoly rents. Nakajima
and Takahashi (2020) study the effectiveness of consumption taxation jointly with
a lump-sum transfer program in a model of indivisible labor. Two recent papers
investigate the macroeconomic effects of greater reliance on consumption taxes in the
presence of multiple consumer goods. Conesa et al. (2020) numerically characterize
the optimal dual-rate consumption tax for an environment with two distinct nondurable commodities. Li (2020) introduces a durable into a standard incomplete
markets model, and finds that a shift to consumpion taxes is welfare-decreasing since
it effectively tightens the borrowing constraint on young and poor households.
My study is closely linked to research that posits lifetime income as the ultimate
objective of redistributive fiscal policy and therefore focuses on tax structures that
mimic, as much as possible, a direct tax on lifetime resources. One way of achieving
this goal is the cumulative assessment method famously championed by William Vickrey (1939, 1947, 1969, 1992). Although he was mainly motivated by considerations
of horizontal equity6 it has been shown that tax-smoothing of this sort is optimal
in settings where the disutility of work is isoelastic and wages, while heterogeneous,
grow at the same rate for all workers (Werning, 2007; Diamond, 2006). Quantitative
6

Vickrey (1939, p. 379): “It has long been considered one of the principal defects of the graduated
individual income tax that fluctuating incomes are, on the whole, subjected to much heavier tax
burdens than incomes of comparable average magnitude which are relatively steady from year to
year.”

9

assessments of a hypothetical lifetime taxation system include Huggett and Parra
(2010) for the U.S. and Haan et al. (2019) for Germany. A tax on annual expenditures like the one studied here approximates a tax on lifetime earnings, at least to
the extent that households smooth consumption over time through borrowing and
saving.7
I also contribute to ongoing research on the optimal degree of tax progressivity. In
several recent contributions to this literature the welfare-maximizing tax schedule is
found to be steeply-sloped (İmrohoroğlu et al., 2018; Brüggemann, 2021; Kindermann
and Krueger, 2021). In contrast, Boar and Midrigan (2020) consider a wider range of
possible tax codes and find that a flat income tax combined with a large lump-sum
transfer is close to optimal. The cash-flow tax I study in this paper represents a
middle ground. It mitigates the distortion on labor supply in a similar fashion to the
flat tax but still allows for flexibility in setting the overall progressivity of the system.
The value of that additional flexibility will determine the ultimate usefulness of the
cash-flow tax as a fiscal policy.
A final strand of literature that merits discussion is the sizable body of research
on tax-favoured saving plans like IRAs and 401(k)s. Many empirical studies have
documented the impact of these programs on household savings behaviour. A central
concern is whether contributions to retirement accounts constitute ‘new saving’ (as
found by Poterba et al., 1995) or merely substitution from pre-existing accounts (as
found by Attanasio and DeLeire, 2002). The same question has been investigated in
quantitative frameworks by İmrohoroğlu et al. (1998), Love (2006) and Fehr et al.
(2008), with similarly conflicting results. Because tax-favoured retirement accounts
7

The link between annual consumption and lifetime earnings in the context of tax design has
been noted by McCaffery (2005) and Mirrlees et al. (2011), but given little formal attention in the
literature.
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shield assets from ongoing taxation on realized returns, but cash-flow taxation does
not (at least not in the form I study), my analysis deviates from these other studies
by abstracting from changes in saving incentives. Instead, I focus attention on how
tax-smoothing impacts redistribution and intertemporal labor supply.
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CHAPTER 2 : The Qualitative Case for Consumption Taxation

The best taxes are those which are levy’d upon consumptions.
David Hume, Political Discourses (1752)

The case for consumption taxation has a rich intellectual history, dating back to
at least Hobbes and comprising contributions from many notable academics and
policy-makers. The literature is dominated by two standard arguments, one ethical—
consumption taxation is fair —and the other economic—consumption taxation is efficient. In this chapter, I briefly outline the standard formulations of these arguments,
hopefully lending some context to the consistent popularity of consumption taxation
among reformers.
I also explain why the standard arguments fail to demonstrate the alleged superiority
of consumption taxation. The rhetorical failure stems from the misattribution to
consumption taxes of certain equity or efficiency effects that are more properly linked
to the presence or absence of other tax provisions. For instance, it is not uncommon
to find that arguments couched in terms of consumption taxes are in fact arguments
for zero capital income taxes. But these are different fiscal instruments, and it is does
not follow that tax systems must be consumption-based even if one stipulates that
the ideal tax rate for capital income is zero. Neither is it uncommon to find results
that favor consumption taxes only because they mimic exogenously excluded levies on
existing wealth. The ubiquity of these confusions means that much of the literature
is orthogonal to the particular merits (or demerits) of consumption taxation, at least
vis-à-vis labor income taxation.
To properly assess the question at hand, we must therefore take care to formulate
12

the tax design problem so that the results do not hinge on the exclusion of certain
fiscal instruments from the policy choice set. I perform an analysis of this sort within
the framework of a simple overlapping generations model. Unlike Erosa and Gervais
(2002), households in my model vary with respect to wages and earnings. I show
how this difference, along with non-linear taxation, breaks the equivalency between
consumption taxation and labor income taxation. In so doing, I provide an economic
rationale for consumption taxation that does not suffer from the weaknesses of the
standard arguments.

2.1. Fairness
The classical theorists were chiefly concerned with notions of tax fairness. It is only
with the advent of modern economic theory in the 20th century that attention turned
primarily to positive arguments. Even still, a concern for fairness continues to motivate many contemporary discussions of taxation, within both academia and the
political arena. The relevant literature highlights three principal concepts of fairness.
2.1.1. Fairness as Justice
One version of the fairness argument posits consumption as the only equitable basis
for assessment because consumption measures a person’s withdrawal from society’s
pool of resources whereas income measures his contribution. From this standpoint,
income taxes are unfair precisely because they penalize work, wealth-creation and
thrift. Importantly, this is not an economic argument about incentives and elasticities.
It is not wrong to penalize work, wealth-creation and thrift (just) because they are
economic goods; it is (also) wrong because they are moral goods. In the words of this
perspective’s seminal advocate:
The Equality of Imposition consisteth rather in the Equality of that which
13

is consumed, than of the riches of the persons that consume the same.
For what reason is there, that he which laboureth much, and sparing the
fruits of his labour, consumeth little, should be more charged, then he
that liveth idlely, getteth little, and spendeth all he gets; seeing the one
hath no more protection from the Common-wealth than the other? But
when the Impositions are layed upon the those things which men consume,
every man payeth Equally for what he useth: Nor is the Common-wealth
defrauded by the luxurious waste of private men.1
The principle of rewarding (or at least not punishing) pro-social behaviour, thereby
promoting virtuous relationships between members of society, has been re-formulated
by many subsequent thinkers, including economists, legislators and legal scholars.
The logic is easily grasped and appealing in its moral simplicity: tax profligacy,
not prudence. Because the Hobbesian norm aligns well with moral intuitions about
cooperation and fairness, it is not surprising that many consumption tax advocates
instinctively endorse it.2
The force of the ‘common pool’ argument is diminished, however, by the inexorable
bind of the taxpayer’s budget constraint.

Taxpayers cycle through the roles of

‘spender’ and ‘saver’ throughout their lives, and status as one or the other is as
much a product of age, need and random fluctuations in circumstances as it is of
underlying characteristics of taste and temperment. Whatever is earned is eventually
spent, and he who augments the Common-wealth today returns tomorrow to deplete
it.
Thus, even if one affirms the “Natural Justice that every man should pay according
1
2

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651), Pt. I, Ch. 30, para. 181.
For copious examples, see Appendix A.1.
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to what he actually enjoyeth”3 , it is not obvious why the principle applies to arbitrary
subintervals of time, rather than the entire lifespan. From a lifetime perspective, it
makes little difference whether one selects consumption or earnings as the taxable
stream, as these are (to a first approximation) equal in present value. Whatever
difference remains is mostly due to patterns of inheritance, and these can be accounted
for with appropriate taxes on estates and bequests. Because the distinction between
earner and spender is fuzzy, the Hobbesian concept of fairness bears less on the
question at hand than first supposed.
2.1.2. Fairness as Neutrality

John Stuart Mill endorsed consumption taxation on somewhat different grounds.
While his concern lay also with the differential treatment of savers and spenders, he
did not frame the issue in moralistic terms, as a set of judgments about the relative
moral value of different activities. Rather, he was concerned that the tax system be
impartial between taxpayers with different intertemporal preferences. For Mill, it was
unfair that a person be taxed twice on the same part of his resources, once when it
was earned and invested, and again when it yielded a financial return. Because a
future sum consisting of principal and accumulated interest is equal in present-value
terms to the principal alone, the non-exclusion of savings introduces an unjustified
bias against savers, no different than if a heavier sales tax were arbitrarily imposed
on one kind of widget but not on others. Mill was especially mindful of non-wealthy
taxpayers who had no means to provide for retirement or for dependents except by
saving out of current earnings. As such, “no income tax is really just from which
savings are not exempted.”4
3
4

William Petty, A Treatise of Taxes and Contributions, (London: N. Brooke, 1662), p. 75.
John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy (1848), Book V, Ch. 11, section 4.
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The problem of ‘double taxation’ galvanizes many political arguments in favor of
consumption taxes. But intertemporal neutrality doesn’t necessitate a consumptionbased tax system. Mill’s concerns could be allayed just as easily with an earningsbased tax system. The pivotal choice is the inclusion or exclusion of capital income.
As such, the Millian concept of fairness does little to elucidate the choice between
consumption and labor income, which is the topic at hand. Questions about the
proper role of capital income taxation fall outside the scope of this study.
2.1.3. Fairness as Ability-to-Pay
In The Wealth of Nations, moral philosopher Adam Smith set out four maxims of
a sound tax system, the first of which requires that taxes be levied according to a
person’s ability to pay. That is, each taxpayer’s contribution ought to be a function
of the resources “which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state.”5
But what measurable quantity best encapsulates a person’s ability to pay, income or
consumption?
One approach lets revealed preference settle the matter. In his proposal for an expenditure tax in the United Kingdom, Kaldor (1955, p. 47) writes:
Accruals from the various sources cannot be reduced to a common unit of
spending power on any objective criteria. But each individual performs
this operation for himself when, in the light of all his present circumstances and future propsects, he decides on the scale of his personal living
expenses. Thus a tax based on actual spending rates each individual’s
5

Smith’s other three maxims are: (2) “The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to
be certain, and not arbitrary”; (3) “Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner, in
which it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it”; and (4) “Every tax ought to
be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible
over and above what it brings into the public treasury.” See The Wealth of Nations (1776), Bk. V,
Ch. ii.
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spending capacity according to the yardstick which he applies to himself.
According to Kaldor, the normative case for consumption taxation does not depend
on moral judgments about net contributions to collective prosperity (as in Hobbes) or
the putative inequity of double taxation (as in Mill). It is enough that consumption
taxation discerns each person’s taxable capacity from the decisions she freely makes
for herself. Put another way, the tax system should judge a person’s ability to pay for
public goods and services by her demonstrated willingness to pay for personal goods
and services. In this Kaldor echoes one of Hobbes’s contemporaries, Sir William Petty
(1662, p. 71), who argued that a “man is actually and truly rich according to what
he eateth, drinketh, weareth, or any other way really and actually enjoyeth; others
are but potentially or imaginatively rich.”
Not all agree. Some maintain that income, as a proxy for potential consumption, is
indeed the correct measure of ability to pay (Goode, 1980). If two individuals, A and
B, have $100 each, and A spends only half while B spends it all, is it really correct to
say that A is less able to pay taxes? Others hold that consumption mismeasures ability
to pay by ignoring valuable non-consumption attributes of wealth such as security,
status and power (Aaron and Galper, 1985). Still others defer to “the person in the
street” who, apparently, endorses income as the best indicator of taxable capacity
(Pechman, 1990, p. 6). Ultimately, the answer to the ability-to-pay question depends
on what one thinks is most indicative of a taxpayer’s economic status: what she could
do, or what she does do.

2.2. Efficiency
Beginning in the early twentieth century, the study of public finance pivoted away
from abstract notions of fairness and toward concrete notions of economic efficiency
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(e.g. Ramsey, 1927). This paradigm shift furnished consumption tax advocates with
new arguments, particularly the claim that consumption taxes generate fewer aggregate distortions than income taxes. This line of reasoning has two strands, one
explicit and the other implicit. The explicit argument takes Mill’s concern for neutrality between savers and spenders and re-casts it as a formal argument about capital
formation and intertemporal choice. The implicit argument relies on the ability of
consumption taxes to mimic missing fiscal instruments. I discuss both arguments in
turn.
2.2.1. Savings Neutrality
The neutrality argument is straightforward and familiar: by exempting savings from
the tax base, a consumption-based tax system eliminates intertemporal distortions
on saving and investment, thereby encouraging capital accumulation and stimulating
long-run economic growth. Numerous consumption-tax proponents have advanced
this argument in support of their proposals (e.g., Seidman, 1989; McCaffery, 2002;
Frank, 2005; Bankman and Weisbach, 2006; Carroll and Viard, 2012), often appealing
to classic results in the public finance literature (e.g., Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976;
Judd, 1985; Chamley, 1986).
And the reformers may be correct on this point.6 But this is not so much an argument
for consumption taxes as it is an argument against capital taxes. Indeed, it is perfectly
feasible for a tax system to consist of a tax on capital income in addition to a tax on
earnings or consumption. Whether the former is a bad idea or not is an important
question (Atkeson et al., 1999; Conesa et al., 2009; Fehr and Kindermann, 2015), but
not pertinent to the choice between a labor income base and a consumption base.7
6

They may also be incorrect. See Straub and Werning (2020) for a critical re-evaluation of the
Judd-Chamley result.
7
The literature’s conflation of consumption taxation with zero capital income taxation is ubiq-
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The standard efficiency argument, then, has little to say about consumption taxation
qua consumption taxation, particularly in comparison with and as an alternative to
labor income taxation. Perhaps because of this, the distinction between the two is
often dismissed and sometimes ignored altogether. Instead, they are cast as economically equivalent approaches for achieving savings neutrality. Some tax reformers that
couch their arguments in consumption-tax terms end up proposing a straight labor
income tax instead, arguing that since the two systems differ only in the timing of tax
payments the administratively simpler wage tax is superior (e.g. Hall and Rabushka,
2007).
But are all other things really equal? With homogeneous households, complete markets and linear taxes, perhaps (recall Erosa and Gervais, 2002). The question remains
open, however, for settings with heterogenous agents, uninsurable risk or non-linear
taxation.
Consider the unique contribution made by Krusell et al. (1996). They augment the
neoclassical growth model with household heterogeneity and a political process for
endogenously determining linear tax rates on consumption and/or income. Because
the decisive median voter is a low-wealth type by assumption, equilibrium tax rates
are higher whenever the scope for redistribution is broadest, namely when taxation
is consumption-based. As a result, steady-state output is lower in a consumption tax
regime compared with a labor income tax regime.
Another area where the distinction between consumption taxation and labor income
taxation has been duly recognized is the treatment of supernormal returns on investment. As noted by Mirrlees et al. (2011), an earnings tax leaves excess returns
(and losses) untouched while a consumption tax effectively makes the government a
uitious. See Appendix A.2.

19

silent partner in its taxpayers’ investments, enjoying a share of both windfall gains
and windfall losses. There is some debate in the literature as to whether investment
risk alone breaks the equivalence between labor income taxation and consumption
taxation, with some arguing yes (Ahsan, 1989; Ahsan and Tsigaris, 1998) and others
no (Zodrow, 1995).
Supernormal returns do not arise in the models studied here. Political mechanisms
play no role either. Instead of investment risk or political interests, it is the presence
of non-linear taxation and idiosyncratic labor market risk that generates differences
in outcomes between the two systems. I study the choice between non-linear labor
taxes and non-linear consumption taxes independently of the decision to tax capital
or not, paying special attention to any effects on the intertemporal substitution of
labor effort.
2.2.2. Implicit Capital Levy
The standard practice in the literature is to model tax reforms as unanticipated onceand-for-all changes to the tax code. In these experiments, consumption taxes hold
a significant advantage over labor income taxes because they target not just future
streams of earnings but also the existing stock of wealth, which is inelastically supplied
and can therefore be taxed without distortion. It is natural, therefore, for consumption taxes to outperform labor income taxes in standard optimal taxation problems, a
point emphasized by Auerbach et al. (1983), whose quantitative results suggest that
the implicit capital levy accounts for the entire difference between consumption taxes
and wage taxes.
The implicit capital levy is also the key to understanding Coleman (2000), Correia
(2010), and Motta and Rossi (2019), three papers that examine the tax base question
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analytically as well as numerically. While consumption taxes dominate labor income
taxes in each of these studies, the theoretical results depend critically on the use of
new consumption taxes to indirectly target existing wealth. In the case of Motta and
Rossi (2019), consumption taxes also serve as an indirect means of taxing monopolistic
rents.
But as with the savings neutrality argument, the implicit capital levy argument is
not really about consumption taxes per se. In the cited examples, consumption taxes
are favored because and only because they mimic missing fiscal instruments in a way
that labor income taxes cannot. If the labor tax alternative were augmented with an
explicit capital levy (and, in the case of Motta and Rossi (2019), also a tax on profits),
then then the relative benefit of consumption taxes as indirect levies on wealth and
rents would disappear, restoring equivalency between the two tax bases. To properly
assess the relative merits of consumption taxes and labor income taxes, it is necessary
to formulate the tax design problem in such a way that the results are not affected
by incompleteness in the set of admissible fiscal policies.

2.3. The Qualitative Model
In this section, I construct a theoretical model in which the standard arguments
do not apply. Agents are homogenous in preferences and neither leave nor receive
bequests, so there is no scope for claims about fairness. The economy is capitalfree and competitive, so there are no capital taxes for consumption taxes to mimic.
Instead, tax-base equivalency breaks down because agents are heterogeneous in wages
and taxes are non-linear.
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2.3.1. Basic Environment
Households The economy is populated by agents who live for J periods (and hence
by J overlapping generations) and who are endowed with one unit of time at every
age. A continuum of new agents is born in each period, each of whom draws an idiosyncratic productivity profile w = (w1 , w2 , . . . , wJ ) from some distribution F . Each
generation is identical to the next, meaning that the cross-section of productivities is
time-invariant. Because all uncertainty is resolved at the moment of economic birth,
each household acts with full knowledge of its future.
Labor is the sole input into a linear production technology. An agent with productivity w who works h hours generates output y = wh. Under the assumption of
competitive labor markets, an agent’s productivity w can be taken as her wage rate
(hence the notation).
At each age j, the agent chooses hours hj and consumption cj . Households can freely
save and borrow subject to a lifetime budget constraint. For simplicity, I set the
discount rate and the interest rate equal to zero. I relax this assumption in Section
2.5.
Preferences over streams of consupmtion and leisure are assumed to be time-separable,
with a period utility function given by:

u(c, h) = log c − φ

h1+γ
1+γ

(2.1)

The parameter φ > 0 represents disutility of work effort while the parameter γ > 0
governs the elasticity of labor supply. In particular, the static Frisch elasticity is γ1 .
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The household’s maximization problem is therefore:

U (w; T̂ ) = max

{cj ,hj }

(H)
s.t.

J
X
j=1
J
X

h1+γ
j
log cj − φ
1+γ

!

(wj hj − cj − T̂ (cj , wj hj )) ≥ 0

j=1

where T̂ (·) denotes the household’s tax liabilities, which can depend on both consumption and labor earnings. Since this is a capital-free economy, there is no capital
income and therefore no capital income taxes. Though not essential to the results,
the absence of phyiscal capital in the model helps focus attention on consumption
taxation as an alternative to labor income taxation specifically, independently of how
the return to savings is treated.
Government The government implements a tax-and-transfer scheme to accomplish
two goals: (1) finance exogenous per capita expenditures g; and (2) redistribute
resources between households. The government’s motivation is utilitarian: it seeks
to maximize average lifetime utility. Although there are overlapping generations,
the stationarity of the environment means that each generation is effectively selfcontained.
The tax-and-transfer scheme under consideration takes the following form8 :

z 0 = λz 1−τ

λ≥0 τ ≤1

where z and z 0 are the pre- and post-tax quantities of whatever financial category
comprises the tax base, and λ and τ and are fiscal parameters. Taxes are then defined
8

This functional form is well-established in the public finance literature. Its use dates back to
at least Feldstein (1969) and was popularized by Benabou (2000). For recent examples of its use in
models with heterogeneous agents, see Guner et al. (2016), Heathcote et al. (2017) and Wu (2021).
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as:

T (z) = z − λz 1−τ

(2.2)

The parameter τ governs the progressivity of the tax. A negative value renders the
tax system regressive, while τ = 0 implies a proportional tax with flat rate 1 − λ. I
direct my attention, however, toward progressive systems. A tax regime is deemed
progressive whenever τ > 0. In this case, marginal tax rates increase with z, a
fact that follows from the convexity of the tax function.9 The tax code becomes
confiscatory as τ → 1: all agents are left with exactly λ regardless of their measured
tax base.
The parameter λ scales the tax function and determines the cut-off between those
who pay taxes and those who do not. The break-even point is z0 = λ1/τ . All agents
with z < z0 receive a positive net transfer.
While the tax function has two parameters, the government can only choose τ freely.
It must set λ to satisfy a balanced budget constraint:

E[z] = E[z 0 ] + g

⇒

λ=

g
E[z]
−
1−τ
E[z ] E[z 1−τ ]

The Ramsey problem facing the government is thus to choose τ so that the resulting
allocation maximizes a social welfare function derived from the household’s value
function. Given the government’s utilitarian motive, we can write this problem as

The tax function’s first two derivatives are T 0 (z) = 1−λ(1−τ )z −τ and T 00 (z) = λτ (1−τ )z −(1+τ ) .
Notice that the second derivative is striclty positive for τ ∈ (0, 1).
9
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follows:
Z
max
τ

(R)

U (w; τ, λ)dF (w)

s.t. λ =

g
E[z]
−
1−τ
E[z ] E[z 1−τ ]

I consider two possibilities for the tax base. First, labor income, so that z and z 0 are
properly thought of as pre-tax earnings and post-tax earnings. Second, consumption,
so that z and z 0 are properly thought of as gross expenditure and consumption.
Before moving on to the analysis, I will describe in fuller detail two special cases
of the model, namely the one- and two-period versions, since this is all we need to
address the qualitative differences between the two candidate tax bases.
2.3.2. One Period Version
Consider first the case where J = 1. There is no reason to distinguish between
consumption taxation and labor income taxation in this case since it is trivially true
that expenditures and earnings are equal. But it will prove useful in what follows to
develop some notation. The static version of the household’s problem is:

U 1 (w; τ, λ) = max
c,h

log c − φ

h1+γ
1+γ

s.t. c = λ(wh)(1−τ )

Substituting for consumption, we can rewrite this as:

U 1 (w; τ, λ) = max log λ + (1 − τ ) log w + (1 − τ ) log h − φ
h
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h1+γ
1+γ

Let h̄ denote the solution to this maximization problem. After taking first-order
conditions, we easily obtain an expression for the the optimal static labor supply:
1

h̄ = [(1 − τ )φ−1 ] 1+γ

Notice that hours are independent of wages. This should not surprise as it is well
known that the income and substitution effects arising from variation in wages exactly
offset when utility is logarithmic. By substituting the solution back into the objective
function we obtain the associated value function:


1

U (w; τ, λ) = log λ + (1 − τ ) log w +

1−τ
1+γ


[log(1 − τ ) − log φ − 1]

(2.3)

It follows that the Ramsey problem in the static environment can be written as:

max
(R1)

τ,λ

log λ + (1 − τ )E[log w] +

1−τ
1+γ


[log(1 − τ ) − log φ − 1]

s.t. E[w]h̄ − λE[w1−τ ]h̄1−τ − g = 0

2.3.3. Two Period Version
Now consider the case where J = 2. Earnings and expenditures are generally not
equal period-by-period in this case, which, as we will see, has important implications
for the government’s choice of tax base.
To begin with, suppose that households are subject to both consumption and labor
taxes, each belonging to the parametric class (2.2). Let λc and τc denote the consumption tax parameters and λl and τl denote the labor tax parameters. The household’s
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problem is then written as:

U 2 (w; τc , λc , τl , λl ) =

log c1 + log c2 − φ

max

x1 ,x2 ,h1 ,h2

h1+γ
h1+γ
1
−φ 2
1+γ
1+γ

s.t. x1 + x2 = λl (w1 h1 )1−τl + λl (w2 h2 )1−τl
cj = λc xj1−τc

j = 1, 2

Here, xj denotes expenditure in period j, which is equal to consumption grossed up to
include applicable taxes. Since there is a one-to-one relationship between expenditure
and consumption, the problem can be formulated using either x or c as a choice
variable.
Letting µ denote the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint, the first-order
conditions are given by:

xj :

0 = (1 − τc )x−1
j −µ

hj :

0 = −φhγj + µλl (1 − τl )wj1−τl hj−τl

It follows immediately that the household’s optimal consumption path is (unsurprisingly) constant: c1 = c2 = c. The intertemporal ratio of hours is:


h1
=
h2



w1
w2



1−τl
γ+τl



(2.4)

Observe that the allocation of labor effort across time depends on the wage ratio
and the elasticity parameter γ (naturally), but also the labor tax parameter τl . The
consumption tax parameter τc , by contrast, is absent. This marks the first important
difference between the two tax regimes.
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Some further algebra yields expressions for optimal hours;






h∗j = 2(1 − τl )(1 − τc )φ−1 1 +



w−j
wj

(1−τl )

1+γ
γ+τl

1
 −1  1+γ

j = 1, 2

 

(2.5)

for the household’s value function under a pure labor income tax;

L

U (w; λl , τl ) = 2 log λl + 2 log



(w1 h∗1 )1−τl + (w2 h∗2 )1−τl
2



∗(1+γ)

∗(1+γ)

h
h
−φ 1
−φ 2
1+γ
1+γ

(2.6)
and for the household’s value function under a pure consumption tax:

C

U (w; λc , τc ) = 2 log λc + 2 log



w1 h∗1 + w2 h∗2
2

1−τc !

∗(1+γ)

∗(1+γ)

h
h
−φ 1
−φ 2
1+γ
1+γ

(2.7)

Recall that in the static version of the model, the government’s set of fiscal instruments was effectively limited to a single policy parameter, namely τ . In the multiperiod model, the government is also free to choose the tax base. Thus, we have two
competing Ramsey problems, one that implements a labor income tax and another
than implements a consumption tax. The next subsection explores the relative merits
of these two approaches.

2.4. Labor Tax v. Consumption Tax
The fundamental tax design problem in models with heterogeneous agents is that
certain relevant information (typically the household’s underlying skills, as here) is
known only to the agents themselves. Since the government is unable to condition the
tax code directly on these hidden exogenous characteristics, it must resort to taxes
levied on observable endogenous characteristics. So, for example, instead of taxing
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potential earnings, the government must settle for taxing actual earnings.
The question, then, is this: which observable endogenous quantity should we tax,
earnings or consumption? Is there any reason for the tax designer to prefer one base
over the other? In the life-cycle model of Erosa and Gervais (2002), the answer is
no. If an allocation can be implemented using a labor income tax, then it can also be
implemented using a consumption tax, a result that obtains whether or not the tax
code is conditioned on age.
But we get a different answer here. Indeed, the main theoretical implication of this
thesis is that there are economic grounds for preferring the consumption base. Two
features of the model drive this result. First, underlying productivity varies over
the life cycle, resulting in household earnings that fluctuate from period to period.
Second, taxation is allowed to be progressive, so households face time-varying marginal
tax rates whenever they are subject to graduated tax rates on labor income. Since
marginal tax rates adversely affect work incentives, this means that an agent’s labor
supply is most distorted when she is most productive, and least distorted when she
is least productive. By flattening the rewards from work across time, a progressive
labor income tax generates a double distortion. Not only is the overall level of effort
distorted, but also the allocation of effort over the life cycle.
Fundamentally, the problem with the progressive labor tax is that it applies a graduated rate schedule to a fluctuating tax base. To avoid the resulting intertemporal
distortion, the tax designer must either abandon progressivity or find an alternative tax base, one that does not fluctuate from period to period. Fortunately, there is
such an alternative, one that is smoothed endogenously by the households themselves:
consumption.
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And so we arrive at the first reason to favour consumption taxes. By breaking the link
between when income is earned and when tax is assessed, a consumption-based tax
reduces the distorting effects of progressive taxation, leading to more efficient work
decisions and higher lifetime output. This effect is not present in Erosa and Gervais
(2002) because their model admits ony linear taxes. These insights are formalized in
the following two lemmas.10
Lemma 1. Progressive taxation (that is, τ > 0) distorts the level of lifetime labor
effort whether it is levied on labor income or consumption. In fact, the severity of the
distortion is equal. But a progressive tax on earnings also distorts the allocation of
effort across time. Thus, a progressive labor tax imposes a greater distortion than a
progressive consumption tax.
Proof. Let v denote the lifetime disutility of labor effort. It is given by:
∗(1+γ)

∗(1+γ)

h
h
+φ 2
v=φ 1
1+γ
1+γ




 −1
 −1 
1+γ
1+γ
 (1−τl ) γ+τ
 (1−τl ) γ+τ
l
l
2(1 − τl )(1 − τc ) 
w2
 + 1 + w 1
 
=
1+
1+γ
w1
w2
=

2(1 − τl )(1 − τc )
1+γ

where I use (2.5) and the fact that

1
1+ ab

+

1
1+ ab

= 1. Note that τl and τc are inter-

changeable in this expression. Thus, both tax types have the same impact on lifetime
labor effort. However, only the consumption tax leaves the optimal ratio of hours
across time undistored, a fact that follows directly from (2.4).
10

Note that an analogous argument can be made against the consumption base. Specifically, if
consumption fluctuates from period to period (say, because there are shocks to marginal utility) then
a progressive consumption tax would distort the intertemporal allocation of consumption spending.
But this problem does not arise in the current environment because the optimal consumption path
in the model is flat (by construction). Consequently, marginal rates do not fluctuate in equilibrium
when taxes are levied on expenditure.
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Lemma 2. Consider household outcomes under two different tax regimes: a pure
labor tax and a pure consumption tax. Suppose both regimes are similarly progressive,
i.e., set τc = τl . Without loss, let w1 > w2 . Then:
L
L
C
1. hC
1 > h1 > h2 > h2
L
L
C
2. hC
1 + h2 < h1 + h2
C
L
L
L
3. y c = w1 hC
1 + w2 h2 > w1 h1 + w2 h2 = y

That is, the household works fewer lifetime hours under the consumption tax, but
allocates more of them to the high-wage period, leading to higher lifetime output. If
wages are constant, change all inequalities to equalities.
Proof. Parts 1 and 2 are corollaries of Lemma 1. Since momentary disutility of labor
is convex in hours (γ > 0) and the hours ratio is steeper under the consumption tax,
then the stated pattern of hours is the only way for lifetime disutility of labor effort
to be equal under the two regimes. Part 3 says that despite lifetime hours being
lower under the consumption tax, lifetime output is higher, thanks, of course, to the
superior allocation of effort. The proof for this is relegated to the appendix.
The rationale for favouring consumption taxes over labor taxes strengthens when we
remember why we desire progressivity in the first place. Recall the two potentially
beneficial functions of progressive taxation. First, to help equalize the distribution of
resources between different classes of households (ex ante redistribution). Second, to
help insure against idiosyncratic household risk in the absence of complete markets
(ex post insurance). Both these functions are best served by adopting consumption
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as the tax base.11
To see why, it is helpful to think of the tax system as a mechanism in which taxpayers send signals to the government, who in turn assigns tax liabilities based on
those signals. For the mechanism to implement an effective ex ante redistribution
program or an effective ex post insurance program, it is essential that these signals be
informative about the unobserved characteristics of the taxpayers. Consider the case
of a household that generates low annual earnings. What kind of household is this?
Is it a poor household in a typical year? Or a rich household in an atypical year? If
the latter, are its low earnings anticipated or unanticipated? If unanticipated, is the
shock transitory or persisent? It is difficult to answer these questions with just a single
data point. Current earnings are not very informative; what we need is information
about lifetime earnings. Indeed, one important lesson from the theoretical literature
on dynamic optimal taxation is that constrained-efficient tax codes generally depend
on an agent’s entire history of labor earnings (see Kocherlakota, 2005).
But such schemes are usually inadmissible in Ramsey-style tax problems, where the
planner is constrained not just to a parametric class of tax schedules, but also by
the implicit requirement that these schedules be functions of current variables only.
Of course, it could be argued that this latter restriction is a feature, not a bug.
Actual tax codes often do depend only on current variables. In this sense at least, the
Ramsey approach reflects the tax planner’s problem more closely than the Mirrleesian
approach.
Faced with this temporal restriction, the tax planner must determine which current
tax base embodies more information about a household’s lifetime tax base. With
11

Because there are no unanticipated productivity shocks in the current framework, only the ex
ante redistribution motive technically applies here. But the discussion and reasoning is relevant to
both concerns, and certainly both apply to the quantitative model described in Sections 4.1.
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that in mind, let y denote lifetime earnings and observe that:

y=

X

yj =

X

cj

Because consumption decisions follow a simple smoothing rule, a single observation
reveals the entire consumption path, and is therefore perfectly informative about
lifetime resources. Consequently, assigning tax liabilities according to periodic consumption is equivalent to assigning tax liabilities according to lifetime resources. The
same cannot be said about earnings. In general, we cannot infer y2 from y1 or y1 from
y2 , at least not exactly. Current earnings are only partially informative about lifetime
resources. These insights are formalized in the following sequence of results.12
Lemma 3. The consumption-based dynamic Ramsey problem is isomorphic to the
static Ramsey problem.
Proof. From (2.7), the value function for the household under a progressive consumption tax is:


C

U (w; λ, τ ) = 2 log λ + 2 log

w1 h∗1 + w2 h∗2
2

1−τ !

∗(1+γ)

∗(1+γ)

h
h
−φ 2
−φ 1
1+γ
1+γ

After some algebra, we obtain:

C



C

U (w; λ, τ ) = 2 log λ + (1 − τ ) log(w ) +



1−τ
1+γ




[log(1 − τ ) − log φ − 1]

= 2 · U 1 (wC ; τ, λ)

12

If unanticipated productivity shocks are introduced, consumption is no longer perfectly informative about lifetime resources, merely more informative. The basic intuition remains.
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where wC is the agent’s “pseudo-static” wage:
"
w C = w1 + w2



−1
# 1+γ
  1+γ
 γ1 # "
γ
−γ
w2
w2
1+
2( 1+γ )
w1
w1

The “pseudo-static” wage is the constant wage that is welfare-equivalent to the agent’s
actual wage profile. In other words, the agent is indifferent between her actual wage
profile (w1 , w2 ) and the alternative wage profile (wC , wC ). Notice that when w1 =
−γ
−1
w2 = w̃, the pseudo-static wage collapses to wC = (w̃ + w̃)(1 + 1)( 1+γ ) 2( 1+γ ) = w̃. In

contrast, when w1 6= w2 , then wC >

w1 +w2
.
2

The government’s Ramsey problem is:




1−τ
C
max 2 log λ + (1 − τ )E[log w ] +
[log(1 − τ ) − log φ − 1]
τ,λ
1+γ

s.j. 2 E[wC ]h̄ − λE[(wC )1−τ ]h̄1−τ − g = 0

(RC)

This problem is identical to R1 except that w is replaced by wC .
Lemma 4. The earnings-based dynamic Ramsey problem is not isomorphic to the
static Ramsey problem.
Proof. From (2.6), the value function for the household under a progressive labor
tax is:

L

U (w; λ, τ ) = 2 log λ + 2 log



(w1 h∗1 )1−τ + (w2 h∗2 )1−τ
2



∗(1+γ)

∗(1+γ)

h
h
−φ 1
−φ 2
1+γ
1+γ

After some algebra, we obtain:





1−τ
L
[log(1 − τ ) − log φ − 1]
U = 2 log λ + (1 − τ ) log Ω(w, τ )w +
1+γ
L
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where wL is the agent’s “pseudo-static” wage:
−1

"
wL = w1 + w2



)(1+γ) # 1+γ
 1−τ # "
  (1−τ
(τ +γ)
−γ
w2 γ+τ
w2
1+
2( 1+γ )
w1
w1

and Ω is defined as follows:
1


 1−τ
"   1−τ #1−τ 
1−τ !−(1−τ )
 
  γ+τ
γ+τ
1
w2
 w1 + w2 w2

Ω(w, τ ) =  τ w11−τ + w2
2
w1
w1

The function Ω has the following form:

p

p−1

Ω =2

p

p

(a + b ) (a + b)

−p


=

ap + b p
2



a+b
2

−p


≤

a+b
2

p 

a+b
2

−p
=1

where the inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality. Thus, Ω is less than unity for
all wage paths, holding strictly whenever wages are not constant.
The government’s Ramsey problem is
(RL)





1−τ
L
max 2 log λ + (1 − τ )E log Ωw +
[log(1 − τ ) − log φ − 1]
τ,λ
1+γ
o
n
L
L 1−τ 1−τ
s.j. 2 E[
w ]h̄ − λE[(Ωw ) ]h̄
−g =0
This problem is not identical to the static analogue. It looks very much like R1 but
with w replaced by ΩwL , except that the Ω is mising in one spot (the red rectangle).

Proposition 1. A period-by-period tax can replicate a progressive tax on lifetime
earnings if it is based on current consumption but not if it is based on current earnings.
Proof. This follows directly from Lemmas 3 and 4.
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The analysis so far has yielded two reasons for preferring a consumption base over a
labor income base. First, consumption taxes do not distort intertemporal work decisions. Households work fewer lifetime hours, but allocate their efforts more efficiently
so that lifetime output is higher. Second, a consumption tax allows the government
to assign tax liabilities according to lifetime resources. As a result, the government’s
redistributive aims can be pursued in a more targeted fashion. On both fronts—
incentives and redistribution—the case for a progressive consumption tax appears
strong.
Strong, but incomplete. While a tax on consumption is indeed equivalent to a tax
on lifetime earnings, a tax on lifetime earnings is not equivalent to a tax on the path
of earnings. There is information in the parts that is lost in the whole.13 If a labor
income tax manages to exploit that information in some way, then that must be
balanced against the aforementioned advantages of consumption taxation.
Lemma 5 shows that under a certain restriction on the distribution of wage profiles
F , it can be shown that switching from an earnings base to a consumption base is
welfare-improving.
Lemma 5. Let Assumption 1 be satisfied (see below). Then a consumption tax with
progressivity τ is strictly superior to a labor income tax with progressivity τ , for all
τ > 0.
Proof. Consider again the tax planner’s problem under a consuption tax (RC) and
a labor income tax (RL). Using the government budget constraint to eliminate λ
13

Recall again the lesson from Kocherlakota (2005) and related literature that optimal taxes in a
given period usually depend on the household’s labor income in that period and all previous periods.
There are circumstances in which a cumulative lifetime tax is sufficient (Werning, 2007), but these
are not general.
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(leaving just one free tax parameter, viz., τ ), we can express social welfare as a
function of tax progressivity. Respectively for the two tax bases:
 

E[wC ]h̄ − g
V (τ ) = 2 log
+ (1 − τ )E[log wC ]
E[(wC )1−τ ]h̄1−τ



1−τ
+
[log(1 − τ ) − log φ − 1]
1+γ

 
E[wL ]h̄ − g
L
+ (1 − τ )E log (ΩwL )
V (τ ) = 2 log
E[(ΩwL )1−τ ]h̄1−τ



1−τ
+
[log(1 − τ ) − log φ − 1]
1+γ
C

Let ∆(τ ) denote the (halved) difference in social welfare between the two tax regimes
given a common choice of τ . Eliminating common terms, we obtain:

∆(τ ) =



log(E[wC ]h̄ − g) − log(E[(wC )1−τ ]) + E[log wC1−τ ]

−



log(E[wL ]h̄ − g) − log(E[(ΩwL )1−τ ]) + E[log(ΩwL )1−τ ]

Since log(·) is an increasing concave function, and E[wC ] > E[wL ], we have:


∆(τ ) > log E[wC ] − log E[wC1−τ ] + E log(wC1−τ ) − log E[wL ] − log E[(ΩwL )1−τ ])
+ E log(ΩwL )1−τ

= {log E[wC ] − log E[wL ]} + E log(wC1−τ ) − log E[wC1−τ ]

− E log(ΩwL )1−τ − log E[(ΩwL )1−τ ]


> E log(wC1−τ ) − log E[wC1−τ ] − E log(ΩwL )1−τ − log E[(ΩwL )1−τ ]

Jensen’s inequality and the strict concavity of the log-function imply that both bracketed differences are negative. To go further, recall that wC ≥ wL ≥ ΩwL for all w,
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holding with equality if and only if the wage path is constant. Thus, for any wage
path, we can write ŵ = wC1−τ and (ΩwL )1−τ = κŵ, where 0 < κ ≤ 1. Adopting this
simplified notation:

∆(τ ) > {E log ŵ − log Eŵ} − {E log(κŵ) − log E[κŵ]}


= {E log ŵ − log Eŵ} − E log κ + E log ŵ − log E[κ]E[ŵ] + Cov(κ, ŵ)
± log Eŵ

= log E[κ]E[ŵ] + Cov(κ, ŵ) − E log(κ) − log E[ŵ]

If Cov(κ, wC ) ≥ 0 then:


∆(τ ) ≥ log E[κ]E[ŵ] − E log κ) − log Eŵ = log E[κ] − E log(κ) > 0

where the final inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality. Under these conditions, a
consumption tax with parameter τ is superior to a labor income tax with the same
parameter. In fact, there must exist some δ > 0 so that the result goes through as
long as Cov(κ, wC ) > −δ.
Proposition 2. Let Assumption 1 be satisfied (see below). Then an optimal progressive consumption tax is welfare-superior to an optimal progressive labor income
tax.
Proof. Let τL∗ denote the optimal progressivity of a labor income tax. It follows
directly from Lemma 5 that social welfare would be higher under a consumption tax
with progressivity τL∗ . A fortiori, an optimized consumption tax must be better than
an optimized labor income tax.
The proof for Lemma 5 relies upon the following assumption.
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Assumption 1. Cov(κ, wC ) ≥ 0, where κ and wC are defined as above.
What does it mean for Cov(κ, wC ) to be non-negative? Note that wC reflects undistorted lifetime earnings capacity while κ ∈ (0, 1] reflects the combined penalty imposed on households with uneven wage profiles when earnings are subject to progressive taxation. The covariance is positive when higher pseudo-static wages are
associated with lower penalties. Thus, Assumption 1 means that low-wage profiles
must not be especially flat compared with high-wage profiles.
Too see why this matters, imagine that there are two classes of households. Low-type
households earn the same low wage in both periods. High-type households earn high
but variable wages. In this world, low-wage profiles are flat wage profiles, implying
that Cov(κ, ŵ) is negative. Assumption 1 is not satisfied.
What happens when the government switches the tax base from labor income to consumption, keeping tax parameters fixed ? The impact on low types is nil. Since their
wages are constant over time, they neither borrow nor save and consume what they
earn in each period. Consequently, they are unaffected by the change in the statutory tax base. In contrast, high-type households benefit from improved incentives
and insurance, leading to higher pre- and post-tax lifetime earnings. But because tax
liabilities tend to fall when the tax base is smoothed—as it is for high types in this
example—it is possible if not likely that government revenues will fall. The only way
to re-balance the budget without changing τ is to lower λ. And this makes the low
types strictly worse off, which is especially bad from a social welfare perspective.
The problem here is that the tax penalty imposed on agents with fluctuating productivity changes the effective progressivity of the tax. In particular, when uneven wage
profiles tend to be high wage profiles, there are two ways to amplify the redistributive
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function of the tax code: (1) increase τ ; and (2) tax earnings instead of consumption.
In principle, the government could maintain budget balance by adjusting τ instead of
λ, or by adopting a more flexible tax function. But these strategies, however sensible
in practice, would make the problem altogether intractable and preclude any possibility of establishing a result like Lemma 5. Assumption 1, then, should be thought
of as a sufficient condition to obtain a stronger-than-needed result. It bears little
if at all on the essential intuition underlying the appeal of progressive consumption
taxation.

2.5. What if Consumption Is Not Constant?
It is no accident that optimal consumption paths in the model are constant; this was
by design. A critical reader may wonder if any of the results rely upon this abstraction.
In this section, I generalize the model to allow for upward- and downward-sloping
consumption paths and show how the tax planner can accomodate for age-varying
expenditure patterns when designing a progressive consumption tax.
2.5.1. The Household’s Modified Problem
Let β denote the household’s discount factor. In the benchmark model I imposed β =
1, leading to constant consumption streams; I now relax this assumption and admit
any β > 0. The household is subject to consumption taxation and its maximization
problem is:
U β (w) =
(Hβ)

max

x1 ,x2 ,h1 ,h2

log c1 + β log c2 − φ

h1+γ
h1+γ
1
− βφ 2
1+γ
1+γ

s.j. x1 + x2 = w1 h1 + w2 h2
cj = λxj1−τ
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j = 1, 2

The solution to the household’s problem is characterized by the following Euler equations for hours, expenditure and consumption.
    γ1
w2
1
h1
h2 =
β
w1

x2 = βx1

c2 = β 1−τ c1

(2.8)

Unlike before, expenditure and consumption now generally follow non-constant paths.
Notice that the consumption stream {c1 , c2 } is distorted by progressive taxation whenever β 6= 1, that is, whenever non-constant consumption is optimal. From (2.8), we
have:

c2 = β 1−τ c1 =⇒

1
β
6=
⇐⇒ uc1 6= βuc2
c1
c2

This wedge in the household’s Euler equation is analogous to the one imposed on
labor supply decisions by progressive labor income taxation (see Lemma 1). The
underlying problem is the same, viz., the application of a progressive rate schedule
to a fluctuating base.
There are fiscal tools, however, that will allow the tax planner to correct the intertemporal distortion of consumption. I focus attention on two remedies: (1) age-dependent
taxation; and (2) endogenous tax smoothing. I show that both policies restore the
planner’s ability to replicate a tax on lifetime resources.
Age Dependence
The idea of conditioning taxes on age is not new. Several papers have touted the
merits of age-dependent income taxation, with Weinzierl (2011) being a leading example. The key lesson from this literature is that age dependence allows the tax code
to accomodate for how the distribution of skills and wages changes over the life cycle.
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For example, if the famous “no distortion at the top” result applies, then it should
apply separately at each age. But this would be impossible to implement if taxpayers
of all ages were subject to the same rate schedule.
A similar principle applies to consumption taxation. If consumption increases over the
life cycle (as it would if β > 1), then a highly-endowed young agent and a modestlyendowed old agent might incur the same expenditures. We might wish to treat them
differently for redistributive purposes, but would be unable to do so if constrained by
an age-independent system.
Fortunately, it is relatively straightforward to introduce age-dependent average tax
rates in this setting. Let τ be universal but allow λ to vary with age. In particular,
consider:
λ1 = λ
(2.9)
λ2 = β τ λ
The following proposition describes how adjusting the tax parameters in this way
eliminates the intertemporal distortion.
Proposition 3. When consumption paths are non-constant, an age-dependent periodby-period consumption tax can:
1. Eliminate the intertemporal distortion on consumption; and
2. Replicate a progressive tax on lifetime earnings.
Proof. The proof is similar to earlier ones. I relegate it to the appendix.
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2.5.2. Hybrid Taxation
The tax-base question is meaningful in dynamic settings only because of the implicit
restriction to period-by-period taxation. If households were taxed once, at death, then
the question would be moot—constrained optimal behaviour ensures that lifetime
consumption equals lifetime earnings.14 In the absence of direct lifetime taxation,
the consumption base is preferred because it fluctuates less from year to year. By
taxing agents according to a relatively smooth base, the tax planner can still design
a system that is progressive with respect to lifetime resources.
But when consumption is less than perfectly flat (as when β 6= 1), tax liabilities vary
from year to year and the tax system begins to diverge from its lifetime ideal. One
way to fix this problem is to let taxes depend on age, as documented in the previous
subsection. Alternatively, the government can let households smooth their tax liabilities directly. This can be accomplished fairly easily by giving households access to
both qualifed and non-qualified tax treatments. Under this regime, households decide
for themselves how much of their net saving to deduct (and, similarly, how much of
their net borrowing to include). The tax system would be neither earnings-based nor
consumption-based, but rather a hybrid of the two.
The household’s problem under the hybrid system is written as:
U 2 (w) =
(Hh)

max

x1 ,x2 ,h1 ,h2 ,s

log c1 + β log c2 − φ

h1+γ
h1+γ
1
− βφ 2
1+γ
1+γ

s.j. x1 + x2 = w1 h1 + w2 h2
c1 = λx11−τ − s
c2 = λx21−τ + s

14

Notwithstanding bequests given and received, which are absent in this model.
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Here, the choice variable x is re-interpreted as the household’s taxable income, that
is, earnings less net saving into qualified accounts. The new choice variable s denotes
net saving into non-qualified accounts. The key difference between this model and
the benchmark model is that the household’s tax smoothing is not constrained by its
chosen consumption pattern. The intertemporal budget constraint ensures that all
earnings are declared taxable at some point, but the household is free to use nonqualified saving and borrowing to shift consumption across time without triggering
any consequences for its tax return.
The following proposition describes how hybrid taxation produces the same benefits
as age-dependence.
Proposition 4. When consumption paths are non-constant, a period-by-period hybrid
tax can:
1. Eliminate the intertemporal distortion on consumption; and
2. Replicate a progressive tax on lifetime earnings.
Proof. I relegate the proof to the appendix.
2.5.3. Age Dependence v. Hybrid Taxation
While both solutions correct for year-to-year changes in household consumption, hybrid taxation holds two advantages over age dependence. The first is practical. The
status quo is already a hybrid system. By using a mixture of instruments, a taxpayer
can smooth her tax liabilities over time, at least in part. Reforming the tax system
along the lines of the hybrid tax model is therefore a matter of refinement, not overhaul. Age dependence, on the other hand, is largely absent from the actual tax code.
Introducing age-conditioned rate schedules into the tax system is likely to prove very
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difficult, both administratively and politically.
The second advantage lies in hybrid taxation’s potential to address problems outside
the scope of this simple model. Age dependence only works if consumption varies in
a predictable age-related fashion, as it does here. It would not work if consumption
varied for idiosyncratic reasons. Suppose, for example, that households are subject
to preference shocks: the marginal utility of consumption is especially high in some
periods and especially low in others, leading to year-to-year variation in consumption.
An age-dependent tax system cannot smooth these sorts of fluctuations. It accounts
only for trends, not deviations.
Now consider a household’s likely behaviour under hybrid taxation. In periods of
especially low expenditures, the household makes unregistered savings. In so doing
they forgo the savings deduction and inflate the current tax base. But since their
marginal tax rate is relatively low in such periods the increase is muted. Then, in
periods of unusually high expenditures, the household can finance its spending needs
by drawing down its unregistered savings. This patten of saving and dis-saving allows
the household to ‘pre-pay’ future tax liabilities when it can exploit more favourable
tax rates.
Unanticipated shocks are not the only reason why household expenditures vary from
year to year. Spending also fluctuates if households make lumpy purchases of large
consumer durables, most notably owner-occupied housing. Imagine, for instance, if
households had to include downpayments in their tax base in the year of purchase.
This would result in large and unfair spikes in taxes owed. But the problem only
arises if all financial assets are treated as qualified accounts. If the household could
instead save for its downpayment through non-qualified accounts, it could avoid any
concurrent tax consequences when making a purchase.
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It is true that the dual-treatment option pushes the system away from a pure consumption tax base. But taxing consumption was never the end, only a means. The
goal is to build a period-by-period tax system that can redistribute resources with
minimal distortion. Any measure that enables households to smooth tax liabilities
over time aids in that regard. I discuss some of the issues in more detail in the next
chapter, which covers the practical administration of a progressive consumption tax.
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CHAPTER 3 : On the Feasibility of Progressive Consumption
Taxation

But what I should lay down as a perfectly unexceptionable and just principle of income tax, if it were capable of being practically realised, would
be to exempt all savings. . . I am laying this down merely as the theory
of a perfectly just income tax. I am quite aware that it cannot be fully
carried out.
John Stuart Mill, Report from the Select Committee (1861)

It is strange that those who recognize that “spendings” are the only fair
and logical base for taxable income often fail to realize how practical and
simple is its application.
Irving Fisher and Herbert Fisher, Constructive Income Taxation (1942)

The previous chapter laid out the case for basing progressive tax structures on consumption instead of labor income. In this chapter, I discuss the administration and
operation of such a scheme.

3.1. Indirect Consumption Taxation: The RST and the VAT
The most familiar forms of consumption taxation are the retail sales tax (RST) and
the value-added tax (VAT). These are general consumption taxes that apply to a
broad range of goods and services. Most jurisdictions also levy taxes on specific good
and services through the use of import duties, excise taxes (e.g. gasoline, cigarettes),
and taxes on specific services (e.g. financial services, hotel accommodations). All
of these taxes are indirect, in that they are levied against transactions, products, or
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events, rather than persons. In this section I briefly discuss the RST and the VAT.
3.1.1. Retail Sales Tax
The retail sales tax is the simplest version of a general consumption tax. It is imposed
only on the sale of final goods and services and is remitted to the government by
sellers. No tax is charged if the purchaser intends to resell the item or use it as a
business input. To distinguish between end-users and intermediate-users, businesses
and other non-consumers are typically required to present a “resale certificate” or
equivalent evidence when buying an item that would normally be subject to tax. In
the absence of such evidence, the retailer collects the tax by default.
While no RST has ever been adopted federally, subnational legislators are more enthusiastic about its merits, so much so that sales taxes are in force almost everywhere
in the country. Including a population-weighted average of local taxes, the combined
statutory rate ranges from 0% in four hold-out states (Delaware, Montana, New
Hampshire and Oregon), to 9.5% in a trio of southern states (Arkansas, Louisiana
and Tennessee). The population-weighted average across all states is 7.4%. The RST
is far less popular internationally. Of the 37 countries in the OECD, only the U.S.
employs an RST as its principal form of consumption tax.
The RST has (at least) two major drawbacks. First, because only final goods and
services are subject to taxation, it becomes necessary to discriminate between purchasers. This necessitates the creation of a costly administrative apparatus to enable
exemptions and track transactions. Because exemption coverage in the US is less than
complete in practice, the RST inadvertently leads to substantial taxation of business
inputs and goods for resale (OECD, 2020), in violation of standard proscriptions
against the taxation of intermediate goods (Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971).
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Second, and relatedly, final-stage collection creates opportunities for tax evasion since
the system necessarily relies on honest and thorough record-keeping by retailers, many
of whom are small businesses. This problem is particularly acute for services, which
are inherently intangible and therefore less easily monitored. Because the incentive
to avoid and evade increases with the rate of taxation, the feasible scale of the RST
is arguably limited (Murray, 1997; Gale, 2005).
3.1.2. Value Added Tax
An alternative form of general consumption tax is the value-added tax. Its central and
distinguishing feature is the multi-stage process by which it is collected. Instead of a
single levy at the final point-of-sale, the VAT is applied at every point along the supply
chain. Each trader in the chain—whether manufacturer, wholesaler or retailer—
participates by paying tax on its purchases and collecting tax on its sales. Because a
business is allowed to deduct the tax charged on its inputs, the tax effectively applies
only to the economic value added at each stage of production or distribution, hence
the name. Suppose, for example, that the VAT is 20%, and a business purchases
$1000 of inputs, paying an additional $200 in tax. Suppose further that it sells its
outputs for $1500, collecting an additional $300 in tax. When the business files its
return with the tax authority, it remits a net tax of $100, exactly in line with the
$500 of value-added that it produced.
There are two main mechanisms for operating the staged collection process. The
invoice-credit method relies on invoices passed between traders at each transaction.
These invoices are used by purchasers to submit claims for credit against taxes paid
on inputs. The subtraction method calculates assessments according to entity-based
measures of taxable sales and purchases. Almost all VATs are administered using the
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invoice-credit method.1
The VAT solves both drawbacks of the RST mentioned above. Because it applies to
all sales, there is no need to make legal distinctions between intermediate goods and
final goods. This eliminates the need for exemption certificates and mitigates the risk
of unintended taxation of intermediate goods. Moreover, the credit-invoice method
doubles as a built-in enforcement mechanism, thereby eliminating a major avenue
for avoidance and evasion. By linking one trader’s credit to another’s obligation,
the system is designed for relatively easy cross-checking. And because claims for tax
credits require appropriate documentation, both parties are incentivized to properly
report transactions to the relevant authority.
For these reasons, the VAT has proven quite popular internationally. First implemented by France in 1954, a VAT of some kind has been adopted by every OECD
country except the U.S., accounting for more than one-fifth of all tax revenue in these
economies. The unweighted average tax rate across the OECD is close to 20%, substantially higher than the average sales tax rate in the U.S. At least 170 countries
have adopted a VAT worldwide, up from 50 countries three decades ago. Besides
its administrative advantages over the RST, the global appeal of the VAT is linked
to its neutral treatment of imports, an important feature in an era of steady trade
liberalization. The adoption of the VAT across the European Union, for instance, is
directly tied to the development of its internal market.2
It should be noted that the widespread adoption of the VAT has not diminished the
1

See Schenk et al. (2015) for a detailed discussion of tax liability calculations.
The 1957 Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community, the predecessor of
the EU, and led to the mandatory adoption of the VAT. Article 99 of that treaty states: “The
Commission shall consider in what way the laws of the various Member States concerning turnover
taxes, excise duties and other forms of indirect taxation, including compensatory measures applying
to exchanges between Member States, can be harmonised in the interest of the Common Market.”
2
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importance of income taxes. Tax authorities have typically used the VAT to replace
turnover taxes, excise taxes and other taxes on specific goods and services, not taxes
on income or property. (See Figure 15 in the appendix.)
3.1.3. Indirect Consumption Taxes and Progressivity
The case for consumption taxation presented in Chapter 2 presumed a progressive tax
system. It is natural to ask, then, whether these familiar forms are appropriate fiscal
instruments. As indirect taxes, both the single-rate RST and the single-rate VAT
are proportional by construction. They take no account of an individual taxpayer’s
personal circumstances or ability to pay. Moreover, if the marginal propensity to
consume is higher for poor households, than general consumption taxes are regressive
with respect to income. This perceived regressivity is one of the chief complaints
about taxes of this sort (Caspersen and Metcalf, 1994).
One way to bypass the proportionality problem is to set different rates for different
categories of goods and services, with exemptions or zero-ratings for necessities3 and
very high rates for luxuries. To the extent that consumption patterns vary with socioeconomic status, a system of differentiated tax rates could bring about the desired
degree of progressivity. Most state sales taxes and European VATs have adopted this
approach to some degree in their implementations.
But rate differentiation dissatisfies for several reasons. For one thing, it violates the
principle of uniform commodity taxation. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) showed that
indirect taxes are superfluous whenever tastes for commodities are homogeneous,
utility is separable in consumption and leisure, and the government has access to
flexibly non-linear taxation of earnings.4 Under these conditions, rate differentiation
3
4

The difference between zero-ratings and exemptions is discussed in Schenk et al. (2015, ch. 9).
For a clear exposition and simple proof of this result, see Laroque (2005). For variations on
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only serves to distort household consumption decisions. The Atkinson-Stiglitz result
leaves open the possibility that such taxes could play a useful role when tastes are
heterogeneous. But even then, tastes would have to covary with unobserved ability
in predictable ways, and there there is no prima facie reason to suspect this is the
case. And even if it were the case, there is still the problem of pinning down the
correct rates for different categories, almost certainly an impossible tax given the
sheer number of different goods and services. Finally, a highly-differentiated RST or
VAT would be subject to constant political pressure as producers and consumers of
different kinds of goods lobby for systemic adjustments in their favor.
In his text on public finance, Arthur Pigou raised these and many other objections to
rate-differentiation, including concerns about the difficulty of targeting certain kinds
of services enjoyed by the rich (e.g. foreign travel) and the ease of raising revenue
from the most basic items (e.g. food staples). He writes:
The construction of a progressive expenditure tax would present other and
more formidable difficulties; for it would be necessary to impose upon each
commodity, not a single rate, but a number of different rates adjusted
to the incomes of the various purchasers. Such an arrangement would
be absolutely unworkable. . . It is idle, therefore, to look in practice for a
system of commodity taxes that shall be better than proportionate.5
Consumption tax designers have, for the most part, failed to heed Pigou’s advice.
Most modern general consumption tax systems are riddled with exemptions, reduced
rates, and other base-narrowing interventions. In the UK, for example, raw and
unprocessed nuts are zero-rated. A fruit and nut mix is zero-rated too, but only if
this theme, see also Atkinson (1977) and Deaton (1979).
5
Arthur C. Pigou, A Study in Public Finance, p. 123.
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the nuts comprise less than a quarter of the whole by weight. Roasted, coated or
salted nuts are subject to the standard rate. Unless, of course, they are unshelled,
in which case a zero-rating applies. Similar examples abound in every jursidiction
that employs a RST or VAT. And yet evidence suggests that these administrative
nightmares do not reduce the regressivity of the tax as intended (de la Feria and
Walpole, 2020).

3.2. Direct Consumption Taxation: The Cash-Flow Tax
Because it is difficult to deviate very far from linearity with either an RST or a
VAT, they are unlikely instruments for establishing a progressive consumption tax.
Alternatively, a direct tax on spending—that is, one whose application is personal
rather than transactional—could be levied at graduated rates in any arbitray way. In
that case, higher-spending households could be made to contribute proportionately
greater amounts to the public treasury, with the degree of progressivity controlled
by the statutory rate schedule. Early advocates for this kind of tax include many
prominent economists of the 19th and early 20th centuries, including John Stuart
Mill, Alfred Marshall and Arthur Pigou. Their enthusiasm was muted, however,
by concerns of measurement and feasibility. It was considered both unrealistic and
unreasonable to expect taxpayers to keep sufficiently complete records so as to accurately monitor spending from year to year. Testifying before the Colwyn Committee
on National Debt and Taxation in 1924, John Maynard Keynes characterized a system of this sort as “theoretically sound” but “practically impossible”. In his seminal
book-length treatment of the topic, Nicholas Kaldor (1955) summarizes the general
attitude amongst economists of that era as follows:
Full exploration of the problem was delayed by the persistent conviction
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that studying the merits of such a tax was largely an academic exercise—
for it was taken for granted that the administrative difficulties involved in
assessing people on their spending were too great for this “ideal” system
of taxation to be put into practice.6
Fortunately, the solution to this problem is easily grasped once one observes that
only two pieces of information are needed to calculate a household’s consumption
expenditures: (1) the sum of earnings, incomes, transfers and other receipts; and (2)
the sum of net contributions to savings and investment. After subtracting the second
sum from the first, what remains must equal consumption. The direct consumption
tax operates, therefore, very much like the existing income tax, except that taxpayers
are allowed a deduction for net savings into “qualified” accounts. Instead of recording
thousands of individual transactions, only a small number of data points are needed,
many if not most of which are already collected by the existing administrative apparatus. After all, this type of treatment is already granted to pension plans and
retirement accounts like the IRA and the 401(k). The conceit of the direct consumption tax is to do away with these special tax-advantaged programs and their limits,
restrictions and penalties, and instead treat all savings in this manner.7
The idea of using the household’s budget constraint to recover consumption for the
purposes of personal taxation is closely associated with Irving Fisher. He and his
brother, Herbert Fisher, authored an influential text on the subject of income taxation
in which they write the following:
We propose, then, to reckon taxable spendings, not by adding together
the separate items spent for food, clothing, rent, amusements, etc., but by
6

Nicholas Kaldor, An Expenditure Tax (London: Unwin University Books, 1955), p. 11.
For detailed descriptions of the operation of a cash-flow tax, see Kaldor (1955), Andrews (1974),
United States Treasury (1977) and Graetz (1979).
7
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adding together the gross receipts from all sources and then deducting all
items of outgo other than “spendings.” The chief deductions under this
proposal are: investments, taxes paid during the taxable year, and proper
exemptions for the taxpayer and his dependents. . . The application of this
simple procedure to the tax problem is the only novelty in the present
proposal. Moreover, the data needed for this calculation are considerably
more trustworthy than those used in our present income taxes, which often
depand on debatable estimates.8
The Fisher brothers called their tax plan a “spendings tax”, but the idea has acquired many other names over the years as other academics and thinkers have championed its cause, including “expenditure tax” (Kaldor, 1955), “consumption-type
personal income tax” (Andrews, 1974), “savings-exempt income tax” (Domenici,
1994), “consumed income tax” (Goldberg, 2013), and Verbrauchseinkommensteuer
(Schumpeter). My preferred label is “cash-flow consumption tax”, the name used
in Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform (1977) and one that highlights its key features.
First, that it is indeed a consumption tax and not an income tax, despite a practical
application that deviates from the existing tax system mostly by degree and not in
kind. As such it should be considered alongside the RST and the VAT as an alternative to a labor income tax. And second, its use of cash-flow accounting principles
to indirectly measure a taxpaying unit’s consumption expenditures. In what follows
“cash-flow consumption tax” or, more briefly, “cash-flow tax” will be my standard
choice of nomenclature, but all these names should be considered synonymous.
The key difference between the indirect consumption taxes and the cash-flow tax is
that the latter can be applied at graduated rates. Thus, if a policy-maker desires
8

Irving Fisher and Herbert Fisher, Constructive Income Taxation (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942), p. 6.
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flexibility in setting the progressivity of the tax system, she is well-advised to favor
the latter form. And since this dissertation concerns settings where taxes are allowed
to be non-linear, it is the cash-flow form that I have in mind throughout.

3.3. The Legislative History of the Cash-Flow Consumption Tax
The history of the modern federal income tax begins with the ratification of the
Sixteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in 1913. While income
taxes had been collected sporadically throughout the previous century (most notably
during the Civil War and its aftermath), the federal government had theretofore relied
on tariffs and excise taxes to finance its limited activities. In any case, there were
constitutional obstacles to the adoption of an income tax at the national level.9 The
Sixteenth Amendment cleared these obstacles, paving the way for the government to
establish a federal income tax, a power it exercised later that same year with the
passage of the Revenue Act of 1913. These acts greatly enhanced the U.S. Treasury’s
capacity to raise revenue, but also introduced a new hobby-horse for policy-makers
and scholars to ride: fundamental tax reform.
Over the past century, several attempts have been made to reform the federal income
tax code along the lines of a cash-flow consumption tax. The earliest occurred in
1921 when Republican Congressman Ogden Mills proposed a progressive “spendings
tax” as a partial replacement for the existing income tax. Treasury Secretary Henry
Morgenthau advanced a similar plan in 1942 in the wake of the country’s entry into
the Second World War. Both the 1921 and 1942 proposals died in committee, unable

9

After dozens of misfires, Congress successfully passed a federal income tax bill in 1894, but the
Supreme Court of the United States struck it down less than a year later in Pollock v. Farmers’
Loan & Trust Company, 157 U.S. 429 (1895). In the Court’s opinion, the income tax violated
the constitutional requirement that all direct taxes be apportioned among the states according to
population.

56

to secure a sufficiently broad coalition of support.
Renewed interest in fundamental tax reform during the 1970s precipitated a thorough
investigation by the U.S. Treasury Department into the merits and feasibility of progressive consumption taxation. After initial reports from the Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations (1974) and the Office of Tax Analysis (1977), the case
for a cash-flow tax was laid out more rigorously in Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform,
with economist David Bradford as lead author.10 The first version of the document
was published in 1977, with a revised edition appearing seven years later in advance
of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The Reagan administration ultimately rejected personal cash-flow taxation, choosing instead to streamline the existing tax system by
drastically reducing marginal rates and by eliminating many deductions, exemptions
and loopholes.

That said, several consumption-tax elements were passed into law

during this era. Most significantly, the introduction and refinement of the IRA and
the 401(k) between 1974 and 1986 transformed the tax code into the hybrid system
we recognize today.
The 1986 reforms were not resilient, however, and fundamental tax reform was back
at the top of the political agenda within a decade. In April 1995, a bipartisan trio of
Senators co-sponsored a bill proposing a progressive cash-flow consumption tax, which
they called the Unlimited Savings Allowance (USA) Tax (Domenici et al., 1995). But
as in 1921 and 1942, their proposal never reached the floor of the House or Senate for
a vote.
As documented by Bank (2003), each iteration of the expenditure tax proposal failed
10

Around the same time, a similarly sweeping review of tax policy was undertaken in the United
Kingdom by the Institute of Fiscal Studies under the chairmanship of James Meade. Their report,
published as The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation, strongly advised a transition toward a
progressive cash-flow consumption tax.
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for the same reason: an inability to convince either side of the political spectrum that
a cash-flow tax represented a worthy compromise of its political aims. Recall that
the essential components of the progressive consumption tax are (1) a graduated rate
structure; and (2) the exemption of net savings from the tax base. Opponents on the
right applaud the latter but object to the former; they prefer an indirect consumption
tax or a flat tax on earnings.11 Opponents on the left applaud the former but object
to the latter; they take exception to wealthy but frugal households avoiding their
‘fair share’ of the tax burden.12 With both sides unwilling to sacrifice its ideological
commitments, the cash-flow tax has not yet gained enough political traction despite
bipartisan support among moderates.13
Serious proposals for a cash-flow consumption tax have been advanced in other countries as well, including Australia, Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom. None
was adopted, except for small-scale experiments in India and Sri Lanka in the 1950s
that overtaxed those countries’ administrative capacities and were quickly abandoned.
11

During during the tax reform craze of the mid-1990s (that is, contemporaneously to the USA
Tax proposal), there were at least four separate congressional resolutions for a VAT, three for a
Hall-Rabushka style flat tax, and one for a national RST. See Schenk (1996) for a review.
12
During the 1921 congressional committee hearings, Representative William Stevenson asked: “I
wonder how [Mills] would think a man like the late Russell Sage was bearing his part of governmental
expenses when he was drawing his millions and living on $60 a month or thereabouts, and all of that
exempt?” (as quoted in Bank, 2003) A like-minded person today might find an equivalent exemplar
in famously frugal Warren Buffett.
13
It is interesting to consider Bank’s diagnosis of the actual political failures of cash-flow consumption taxation in the United States alongside James Meade’s concerned musings in the preface
to The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation (1978, p. xvi):
A possible political reaction to this would, I supppose, be for the “left” to reject it
becuase it gave an opportunity for private capitalist enterprise (as well as for state
enterprise and labour-managed enterprise) to invest more and to expand employment
opportunities, and for the “right” to reject it because it would hit the rich who were
living on inherited property. My hope is that the opposite would happen—that the
“left” would welcome the egalitarian overtones and the “right” the opening up of
opportunities and incetnives for all forms of enterprise. Indeed, if we are to find a
reasonable base of political consensus in our mixed economy, I can see no better fiscal
contribution to this end than a tax structure of this kind.
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3.4. Practical Issues
The fundamental idea of cash-flow taxation is to indirectly measure household spending by adding all cash inflows and subtracting all non-consumption cash outflows.
In practice, of course, things are less straightforward. Where ambiguities arise, the
design of the tax should be guided by its ultimate aim: producing an accurate measure of the taxpayers consumption flow. Lawrence Seidman (1997, p. 72) puts the
principle this way:
The key question is not whether an item is ‘income’, but whether it is a
cash inflow that must be included in order to yield an accurate computation of consumption. Similarly, the issue is not whether a particular cash
inflow item is ‘taxable’. What is taxable is consumption. The term cash
inflow should replace ‘income’ on the household tax return.
In this section, I discuss some of the practical issues that relate to the administration
of a cash-flow consumption tax. To motivate this discussion, it is helpful to express
more formally the extent of the data requirements by writing down a typical household
budget constraint:

ct + ∆dt = yt + Tt + Rkt − kt+1

(3.1)

where c denotes non-durable consumption, ∆d denotes net purchases of consumer
durables, y denotes labor earnings, T denotes transfers, k denotes assets, and R
denotes the gross rate of return.
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3.4.1. Measuring Wealth
One potential problem is immediately apparent from examining the right-hand side
of (3.1). In order to calculate consumption through the budget constraint, it seems
necessary that we measure wealth. And then we have simply traded one measurement
problem (observing thousands of individual consumption transactions) for another
(observing and accurately measuring all forms of household wealth).
But this is not a serious problem as it is not necessary to observe kt , only Rkt −
kt+1 . The variable we need to track is saving, not wealth. Or more precisely, net
saving. Indeed, the cash-flow tax does not even require that we observe all inflows
and outflows, only their net difference. A taxpayer might make many deposits into
and withdrawals from a qualified savings account through the course of a single tax
period, but the only information the tax authority requires is their final sum. In fact,
since the observation of Rkt − kt+1 requires no knowledge of its constituent parts at
all, a sensible administrative principle is that only non-zero net cash flows need be
reported.
One implication of this principle is that unrealized capital gains (and losses) can be
safely ignored for the purpose of cash-flow taxation. While a capital gain does constitute an income flow, it does not constitute a cash flow. Only when the asset is sold
and the gains realized must the taxpayer claim it on his tax return. In that case, the
taxpayer reports the whole proceed of the sale, not just the realized gain. (Recall
that the initial purchase price would have been deducted in the year the taxpayer
acquired the asset.) The only case in which it may prove unnecessary to report the
sale is if the proceeds are used to purchase another asset. In that case the net saving
is zero, and no tax slip need be produced if all transactions occur within the same
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account. Thus, if revenue from the sale of an asset generates $1000, the addition to
the taxpayers base is $1000 regardless of how much constitutes a gain (or loss). If
some or all of the $1000 is used to finance the purchase of a new asset then an offsetting deduction can be claimed and the net impact on the tax assessment is reduced
accordingly. Otherwise, the proceeds are counted as consumption expenditures.
The treatment of interest, dividends, pension benefits and other financial incomes is
similarly straightforward. Claim all distributions to the taxpayer. Ignore any amount
retained within a qualified account or other financial vehicle.
As a rule, the cash-flow tax makes no distinctions between different types of inflows
and outflows. In contrast, income tax systems typically make many distinctions between different types of capital income, generating a host of problems and distortions.
These problems include the measurement of real capital gains in the presence of inflation, the incentive for unrealized capital gain accrual (lock-in effect), and the bias
toward debt financing over equity financing that is embedded in the corporate income tax structure. It is a mistake, however, to conclude that the mere adoption of
personal cash-flow taxation solves these problems. The cash-flow tax is, after all, a
consumption tax, not an alternative to or substitute for capital income taxes. Capital
income amounts are included in the cash-flow tax base only insofar as they reflect accretions to the household’s current expenditure capacity. Consequently, the manner
in which the cash-flow tax treats financial flows is orthogonal to the aforementioned
(and other unmentioned) problems of capital income taxation. These will continue
to exist as long as a capital income taxes exist.
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3.4.2. Borrowing
Looking again at the right-hand side of (3.1), it behooves us to ask what happens
if kt+1 < 0. That is, how does the cash-flow tax treat borrowers? The answer is
simple: the same way it treats lenders. Recall that the cash-flow consumption tax
grants deductions for savings (a cash outflow) but levies taxes on withdrawals (a cash
inflow). The same principle applies to borrowing. Since a loan is a cash inflow, it
must be added it to the tax base. By the same token, repayments of principal and
interest are cash outflows and therefore tax-deductible. While this aspect of cashflow taxation is unfamiliar to the taxpaying public, it is generally conceded to be the
correct way of implementing such a tax. In a 1984 report, the U.S. Treasury writes:
The principle of taxing consumption determines the treatment of loans
under a consumed income tax. Since repayment of old debt is equivalent
to saving, a deduction would be granted for such repayment and for payments of interest; similarly, the proceeds of borrowing would be included
in taxable consumption. If the net loan proceeds were not included in the
tax base, taxpayers could game the system by borrowing funded depositing them in a qualified account, and taking a deduction for the increase
in their saving. Although the present value of the taxes might not be affected, since the taxpayer could not deduct the repayments and interest
on the loan, omitting borrowing from the base would enable the taxpayer
to postpone the liability. This would disrupt the timing of government
receipts and would seem unfair.14
Notably, and in keeping with the fundamental principle of cash-flow tax design, only
loans used to finance the purchase of goods and services would increase a taxpayer’s
14

U.S. Treasury, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth (1984), p. 192

62

current tax obligation. Loans used to finance the purchase of capital assets would
result in no change in tax burden, as the deduction from the investment exactly
offsets the inclusion from the loan. A related exception applies when a loan is used to
finance the purchase of consumer durables, a topic to which I return in a subsequent
subsection.
3.4.3. Insurance
Insurance is an area where it is important to remember that the objective of the cashflow tax is to approximate a household’s consumption in the taxable period. As such,
different kinds of insurance should receive different kinds of treatment. Life insurance
should be treated like other forms of saving, that is, by deducting premiums and
including benefits. This means that the beneficiary of a life insurance policy is liable
for a large and immediate tax obligation in the year she receive a payout. But since
she can also claim a deduction for any amount saved, the effective increase in her tax
obligation is commiserate with her marginal propensity to consume out of wealth.
Most other forms of insurance should be ignored, especially health insurance and
property insurance. In these cases, the premium should be considered a consumption
item, not saving.
3.4.4. Consumer Durables
Durable Consumption and Tax Smoothing. The treatment of consumer durables
is one of the trickiest practical issues a cash-flow tax designer must consider. The
defining feature of a consumer durable is that it generates an ongoing flow of valued
services, rather than a momentary burst of consumption. As such, their purchase is
simultaneously an act of both spending and saving. This dual role in the households
portfolio poses a significant administrative challenge as the tax designer must devise
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a way to disentangle the immediate consumption value from the future consumption
value. Otherwise the entire tax burden for the consumer durable is felt in a single
tax period, which is neither consistent with the guiding principles of the cash-flow
consumption tax nor desirable for reasons of equity and efficiency.
One possibility is the application of a depreciation schedule that instructs the taxpayer
on how to amortize the cost of the durable good over time. But that approach imposes
onerous record-keeping, complicates the assessment of a taxpayer’s obligation, and
requires many arbitrary decisions by a tax authority, exactly the sort of problems
cash-flow taxation is meant to preclude.
Alternatively, the tax system could ignore the problem altogether. This approach
is adequate for semi-durables like children’s clothes and furnace filters, goods whose
lifespans are shorter than the taxable period. This approach is also adequate for small
and medium durables like microwaves and vacuum cleaners. Although the expenditure path for any one such item is very lumpy, a household’s aggregate expenditure
on this class of good is relatively stable from year to year. It is with respect to large
durables like vehicles, boats and, especially, housing that cash-flow taxation presents
a serious problem. If a taxpayer is unable to claim a deduction for the purchase of
a large durable because such transactions are ignored by the tax system, then her
tax base in the year of purchase will greatly overstate her actual consumption, creating a disproporionate immediate burden and undermining the purpose of cash-flow
consumption taxation.
Amortization and exclusion, then, are both unsatisfactory responses to the problem
of durables. What we need is a tax treatment that approximates the consumption
flow over time without producing wild swings in an individual’s tax base or generating
unreasonable administrative cost. Does such a treatment exist? Yes, in two parts.
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For concreteness, consider a taxpayer who purchases a car for $20,0000. She finances
her purchase with $8000 cash and a $12,000 loan, which she repays in six annual
instalments of $2000 (suppose no interest for simplicity of exposition). Recall from a
previous subsection that consumer borrowing should generally be treated like other
cash flows: include the loan proceeds and deduct the loan repayments. In the case
of loans secured against durables, however, the prescribed treatment is the opposite.
If both the $12,000 loan and the $2000 repayments are excluded, then the system
implicitly spreads the tax burden across time. To the extent that the repayment
period matches the lifespan of the durable, this method provides a decent approximation to the imputed consumption flow. Seidman (1997, p. 79) recommends the
loan-exclusion method, writing:
This treatment postpones the consumer durable tax on the amount equal
to the loan. It therefore improves the accuracy of the computation of
each year’s flow of consumption, appropriately eases the tax in the year
of purchase, and spreads it over time as the loan is repaid. Because it improves the accuracy of the measuring the household’s annual consumption,
I recommend that this treatment be required, not optional.
But what about the $8000 downpayment? If the taxpayer withdraws the money from
her qualified saving account, she must add the amount to her current tax base. Equivalently, if she takes the money out of current earnings, she forgoes the opportunity
to deposit $8000 into her qualified account. Either way, she triggers a large immediate tax increase that overstates the change in her current consumption. But this
is only true if the qualified treatment is the only way for taxpayers to save. Imagine
instead that taxpayers make deposits to two different kinds of accounts, qualified and
non-qualified. Qualified accounts function along the lines of the basic cash-flow logic:
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contributions are deductible and withdrawals are taxable. Non-qualified accounts
function in the conventional way: they are ignored.
Thus, in anticipation of a large future outlay, our car-buying taxpayer avoids an
atypically high tax bill by saving up in a non-qualified account. She forgoes the
deduction as she saves, but also avoids the $8000 taxable withdrawal when she dissaves. In the end, her $20,000 purchase results in a much smaller immediate tax
burden. The rest of the obligation is spread out pre-purchase as she saves and postpurchase as she repays. While this method does not and cannot match the actual
consumption flow, it achieves the first-order goal of minimizing large fluctuations in
the tax burden from year to year.
Large outlays for lumpy non-durable consumption, e.g. weddings and vacations, can
be treated in a similar fashion. In general, it is my recommendation that a cash-flow
system allow taxpayers to choose for themselves how to treat their borrowing and
saving activities. In the presence of a progressive rate schedule, it is in the taxpayer’s
self-interest to smooth her burden as much as possible. She will naturally want save
and borrow in non-qualified accounts for atypical expenditure needs, and save and
borrow in qualified accounts to self-insure against income shocks and prepare for
retirement. There is no need to police these matters too closely, as the interests of
taxpayer and tax authority are broadly aligned.
Durable Resales. A related issue concerns the resale of consumer durables. Suppose our taxpayer sells her car three years later at a price of $11,000. She uses part
of the proceeds to repay the outstanding $6000 on the car loan. What, if anything,
should the tax system do about this transaction? To answer this question, recall
that the purchaser of a consumer durable absorbs the tax by forgoing a series of po-
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tential deductions.15 First, by making deposits into a non-qualified account in order
to save for a downpayment. Second, by excluding loan repayments from the set of
deductible cash outflows. Because these non-deductions embody the whole value of
the consumer durable, any requirement to report the the resale proceeds as a cash
inflow would effectively subject the taxpayer to double taxation. The tax system,
then, should ignore resales. The taxpayer is free to do whatever she likes with the
$11,000, which in this scenario reflects the car’s unused consumption value. She could
purchase a different consumer durable or re-deposit the money into a non-qualified
account and use it to finance a stream of non-durable consumption. In either case,
her computed tax base remains a rough approximation of her actual consumption
stream.
A more complicated scenario arises when the underlying value of the durable increases
between the the date of purchase and the date of resale. In that case, the resale price
reflects not just the unused consumption value as it was measured at the time of
purchase, but also its subsequent appreciation. Ideally, the appreciation should be
considered a realized capital gain and included as a taxable cash inflow, a treatment
which requires a method of measuring the capital gain. It is not obvious how to
do this since asset appreciation and heterogeneous usage rates are observationally
equivalent. If the expected resale price of the taxpayers vehicle is $10,000, but she
sells it for $11,000, does the difference reflect appreciation for that particular make
and model, or better care and maintenance? A good rule of thumb, and one to which
most commentators subscribe, is to ignore durable resales unless the resale price
nominally exceeds the initial price. In that case, the difference must be reported as a
realized capital gain. Combined with a reasonable lower threshold (say $5000), this
15

Similarly, one can think about the tax on non-durable consumption as a single instance of
forgoing a potential deduction.
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treatment would restrict practical attention to a much narrower class of transactions,
namely resales of owner-occupied housing and high-value collectibles.
For similar reasons, the tax code should address the treatment of unanticipated depreciation and loss. Suppose, for example, that our taxpayer’s car is stolen. In that case
she neither benefits from the proceeds of a resale nor does she exhaust the vehicle’s
consumption value. And yet she remains liable for the full tax burden, both because
she largely pre-paid it through non-qualified saving and because she remains liable
for the outstanding non-deductible repayments. Two remedies to this problem merit
recommendation. First, if the durable is insured then the loss of consumption value
is offset by the associated insurance payout. And as discussed in the previous subsection, property insurance is properly excluded from cash-flow taxation calculations.
This remedy applies not just to vehicles but to a large number of other insurable
goods. For example, theft and damage are typically covered under homeowner’s or
renter’s insurance. Second, if the durable is uninsured or only partially insured, then
the taxpayer can claim a deduction for a casualty, disaster or theft loss, as is currently
permitted in the existing income tax code by filing a Form 4684.
It should be noted that the resale of consumer durables is primarily a distributional
issue, not a fiscal one. Regardless of whether proceeds are partially or fully included,
the government’s tax base is, to a first approximation, the same. The main impact
is felt in the resale price, which depends on the relative elasticities in the resale market. The administrative choices in this area should therefore be guided by concerns
about how the tax burden is smoothed over the life cycle, and how the tax burden is
distributed across sellers and buyers of used durables.
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Summary. The treatment I describe in this subsection is what the tax literature
typically prescribes with respect to consumer durables under cash-flow consumption
taxation. This consensus view is summarized by Michael Graetz:
I recommend an identical approach for the taxation of consumer durables
and the taxation of housing. No deductions should be permitted for the
purchase of consumer durables and housing; yield in the form of imputed
rents should be ignored; and when the sale price does not exceed the
original cost, no amount need be included in the expenditure tax base
upon sale. When the sale price of a house or consumer durable exceeds
original cost, such excess should be added to expenditure tax receipts,
when received. Loans for the purchase of consumption goods or housing
should ordinarily not be included in expenditure tax receipts, and no
deduction should be allowed for interest or principal payments. A dollar
limitation might be using in implementing this rule.16
3.4.5. Labor Income vs Capital Income
Looking again at (3.1), note that the right-hand side includes income from both
labor and capital. To the extent that income tax systems treat labour and capital
differently, administrative distinctions must be made between these two sources of
income. This matters especially for the tax treatment of pass-through income from a
partnership or closely-held business, and also for the treatment of various corporate
compensation schemes like stock options.
The cash-flow consumption tax, on the other hand, cares not a whit about these
distinctions. As with dividends and capital gains, its disinterested treatment of inflows
16

Michael Graetz, “Expenditure Tax Design”, 1980, p. 197.
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and outflows makes the particular classification of any given flow irrelevant. Bonuses,
stock redemptions, self-employment income, and distributions from partnerships or
S-corporations are all added to the same ledger.
3.4.6. Gifts and Bequests
The usual prescription for gifts and bequests is to treat them like standard cash flows.
That is, require beneficiaries to claim the gift as a cash inflow and allow benefactors
to deduct the gift as a cash outflow. Inclusion is favoured here because it aligns most
closely with the consumption tax ideal. After all, it is the beneficiary who spends
and consumes the gift, not the benefactor. Seidman (1997, p. 85) puts the logic this
way:
A donor household does not consume resources when it gives s cash gift,
bequest, or charitable contribution. Hence the gift, bequest, or contribution should be tax deductible, just like saving—it is a non-consumption
cash outflow. If the donee (recipient) household saves it, the donee should
should not be taxed. When and if the donee consumes it, it should be
taxed.
Since death and inheritance are easily observed (and traditionally taxable) events, this
treatment poses little incremental administrative cost for bequests. It is somewhat
less clear how to feasibly account for inter vivos gifts. It would be costly and difficult
to monitor transfers of this sort between taxpayers, so the system would have to
depend on voluntary declarations. As with consumer durable resales, the issue here
is not primarily one of revenue, but how to properly spread the tax burden across
individuals and across time. In the case of gifts between living taxpayers, a selfenforcement mechanism can help. Since it is collectively beneficial to report gifts
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from a high-rate taxpayer to a low-rate taxpayer, the parties to a private transfer
are typically incentivized to comply. When it comes to genuine gifts, then, there
is little cause for concern. I recommend that donors and donees be afforded the
option of declaring transfers (perhaps with some threshold), but it would not seriously
undermine the design of the tax if they decline to.
Insincere gifts are the true concern. The standard cash-flow treatment would allow a
high-rate taxpayer to transfer money to a low-rate confederate, who could in turn kick
it back to the donor. Under a progressive tax system, a false donor could exploit this
strategy to reduce his net tax burden, even with the confederate taking a cut. A similar problem exists under an income tax since wealthy taxpayers can funnel resources
to lower-rate family members through fictitious or exaggerated employment schemes.
This is especially true for business owners and other individuals who can more easily
mask gifts as phoney compensation. In the case of the cash-flow consumption tax,
there are three apparent solutions: (1) devote more resources to auditing declared
gifts; (2) set a higher threshold on declarable gifts; and (3) exclude gifts from the
set of deductible cash flows. If there exists no combination of (1) and (2) that can
achieve effective monitoring of gift-giving at reasonable expense, then option (3) is
not a terrible outcome despite its deviation from the consumption tax ideal. This
is especially true if the equilibrium gift size proves sensitive to its tax treatment.
For example, instead of transferring $10,000 and the associated tax liability, a donor
might transfer $8000 and retain the tax liability.
3.4.7. Charitable Contributions and Medical Expenses
The existing tax code allows (limited) deductions for charitable contributions and
out-of-pocket medical expenses. The case for or against the deductibility of such
items is the same under a cash-flow consumption tax as it is under an income tax,
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namely whether one thinks thinks there are normative reasons for excluding them
from an individual’s assessed taxable capacity. Since this is not a cash-flow-specific
issue, I omit any further discussion.
3.4.8. Tuition and Education Expenses
It is in keeping with the guiding principle of cash-flow consumption taxation to treat
human capital investments no differently than other investments. Consequently, deductions should be allowed for spending on education and training (“saving”). As
with ordinary saving, taxes are levied later on the “withdrawals”, which here take the
form of higher future earnings. Of course, certain education-related expenses have
dubious human capital content. Some fraction of the tuition at expensive schools
and colleges is undoubtedly tied to its value as an experience good or a status good.
Thus, some fractional or limiting rule should apply, though how that rule should be
specified is not without ambiguity. As an example, the 1995 USA bill provided a
$2000 deduction per person up to a maximum of $8000 per household.
3.4.9. In-Kind Compensation
Another administrative difficulty is the treatment of in-kind compensation. The spirit
of the cash-flow consumption tax demands that the full value of non-cash benefits
and other forms of in-kind compensation (including, but not limited to, cars, cell
phones, meals, child care and recreational facilities) be attributed to individuals as
part of their declared taxable remuneration. Alternatively, such expenses could be
deemed nondeductible by the firm for the purposes of calculating taxable income.
The latter treatment might be preferable for goods and services that are difficult to
apportion among the the workforce, e.g. staff parties. A more nefarious practice is
the deliberate use of corporate structures to finance private consumption and evade
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taxes, e.g., business expense fraud. It is important to remark, however, that income
tax systems are plauged by these same difficulties. In-kind compensation is both
labor income and consumption.
3.4.10. Existing Wealth
Imposing a new consumption tax of any form generates a windfall loss on existing
wealth-holders since it reduces the consumption value of their assets. There are several
ways of handling this transitional problem. Examples include: (1) make no provision
for existing wealth and let the windfall gains and losses fall where they may; (2) make
compensatory transfers to existing wealth-holders to offset their windfall losses in full
or in part; and (3) treat existing wealth as non-qualified assets. That is, exclude from
the tax base all withdrawals, realizations and other flows from existing assets and
liabilities. Apply the cash-flow treatment to new saving and borrowing only.
The first two options are unsatisfactory for distributional and administrative reasons.
In contrast, the third allows for a natural and smooth transition from the existing tax
code. Existing tax-advantaged savings accounts are converted into new unrestricted
tax-deductible accounts. Wealth currently held in other forms remains as is. Over
time, as older cohorts draw down existing wealth and younger cohorts enter the
economy, the system as a whole will converge to the cash-flow treatment. Or at least
to an adequate approximation of it. Few direct transitional measures are needed.
This desirable feature is unique to the cash-flow form of consumption taxation. There
can be no neutral introduction of a retail sales tax or a VAT without an auxiliary
administrative apparatus to mitigate windfall gains and losses. Because those forms
are de-personalized by definition, there is no way to distinguish between a dollar spent
out of old wealth and a dollar spent out of new wealth. It follows that a large-scale
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adoption of consumption taxation in the US might be more politically feasible with
a direct cash-flow tax rather than an indirect form like the VAT.

3.5. Summing Up
In the previous chapter, I formally showed how household heterogeneity and nonlinear rate schedules break the equivalency between consumption-based tax systems
and earnings-based tax systems. In this chapter, I discussed the mechanics of implementing a progressive consumption tax. The main points of discussion are these:
first, it is difficult to construct a flexibly progressive structure using indirect taxes
like the RST or the VAT; second, it is feasible to tax consumption directly using
the cash-flow method, thereby allowing for any abitrary rate schedule; and third, the
cash-flow method poses some degree of added complexity.
The most notable administrative complications relate to the treatment of durables
and to tax evasion schemes. In my opinion, the problem of durables is surmountable.
The consensus recommendation, viz., allow non-qualified saving and exclude secured
loans, generates zero incremental compliance cost. Rather, the problem of durables
is that the stream of tax obligations under the recommended treatment will generally
fail to match the associated stream of consumption services. This is particularly true
for owner-occupied housing, the most important durable in the household’s portfolio.
As such, the ideal consumption tax is not obtained. But as I showed analytically
in the previous chapter and assess numerically in the next, the relative merit of the
cash-flow tax is not the consumption base per se, but rather its facilitation of endogenous tax-smoothing by households, thereby mitigating distortions on intertemporal
labor supply. While imperfect, the recommended treatment of durables enables an
imperfect form of tax-smoothing, so it is not unreasonable to expect that most of the
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gains are still captured.
Tax evasion is the more serious challenge. Estimating the cost of monitoring qualified
gifts and closely-held businesses is beyond the scope of this study, but the costs are
certainly not trivial. There are also compliance costs associated with bringing traditionally excluded financial transactions like life insurance and unsecured consumer
debt into the tax code. These adminstrative costs cannot be ignored, nor can it be
denied that a progressive labor income tax is considerably simpler overall.
Given these practical difficulties, the contest between the two tax bases must be settled by first quantifying the relative advantages of progressive consumption taxation
and then measuring them against the additional administration and compliance costs.
The next chapter sets out to perform the first of those two steps. If the welfare gains
are large, then the effort of enacting a full-fledged cash-flow tax may be worthwhile.
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CHAPTER 4 : The Quantitative Case for Consumption Taxation

There is a general agreement that a system of taxation should be adjusted
in more or less steep graduation, to people’s incomes: or better still to
their expenditures.
Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics (1890)

Are consumption taxes better than labor income taxes? In Chapter 2, I showed
that consumption taxes outperform labor income taxes in the presence of wage heterogeneity and non-linear taxation. In Chapter 3, I discussed the feasibility and
administration of a non-linear consumption tax. But the question is ultimately a
quantitative one. In this chapter, I numerically assess the transition to a consumption base using a heterogeneous agents macro model calibrated to the U.S. economy.
This reform generates moderate welfare gains for future households.

4.1. The Quantitative Model
I develop a standard incomplete markets model where finitely-lived households supply
labor elastically and self-insure against idiosyncratic wage and mortality risk as in
Huggett (1993) or Aiyagari (1994). Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0, 1, . . . , ∞.
In each period, a single final good is produced according to a neoclassical production
function and used for private consumption, investment, and government goods and
services. All markets are competitive.
4.1.1. Households
Demographics The economy is populated by agents who live for at most J periods
(and hence by J overlapping generations). A continuum of new agents is born in
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each period and begins working immediately. Education and training occur prior to
economic birth and are not modelled. The working life continues until an exogenouslyspecificed retirement age jR ≤ J, after which the household collects social security
benefits. The conditional probability of surviving from age j − 1 to age j is denoted
by ψj , with ψJ+1 = 0. The unconditional probability of surviving to age j is denoted
by Ψj and defined by:
Ψj ≡

j
Y

ψk

k=1

The population is assumed to grow at a constant rate n. By a law of large numbers
and the stationarity of the demographic structure,

nΨj
Ψj+1

tracks the relative size of

adjacent cohorts.
Endowments Agents are endowed with one unit of time in every pre-retirement
period, a fraction of which is endogenously devoted to labor market activities. Each
unit of work time generates ρ(j, m, n) productivity units, where m ∈ M denotes a
fixed ability type drawn from a distribution Fm and n ∈ N denotes an idiosyncratic
stochastic component that follows an age- and type-independent Markov chain with
transition matrix π(n0 |n). Thus, productivity varies across households for three reasons: (1) age, which substitutes for experience; (2) pre-market differences, whether
instrinsic or acquired; and (3) unanticipated shocks that (potentially) accumulate
over the life cycle. Letting w denote the market price per productivity unit, the
household’s wage rate is given by w · ρ(j, m, n).
Households are born with zero wealth but receive two types of transfers. Retired
households collect a social security benefit, denoted b, while working households receive a bequest, denoted q. The bequest comes from the unintended estates of nonterminal-age decedents, which are appropriated by the government and distributed
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evenly among the working-age population.
Preferences Households maximize utility by choosing consumption cj and, if not
retired, hours hj at every age. Preferences over stochastic streams of consumption
and hours are ordered by:

E

"j −1
R
X

β j−1 Ψj u(cj , hj ) +

j=1

J
X

#
β j−1 Ψj ũ(cj )

(4.1)

j=jR

where β denotes the common discount factor and u and ũ denote the period utility
functions for working years and retirement years, respectively.
4.1.2. Government
The government raises revenue to finance exogenous expenditures G, service its accumulated debt B, and fund a social security system that delivers a benefit b to each
retired household. It does so by levying taxes and issuing new debt. Its set of available
fiscal instruments includes linear taxes on both consumption and the return to capital,
denoted τc and τk respectively. It also operates a non-linear tax-and-transfer scheme
based on labor earnings, denoted T̂ (·). No part of the tax code can be conditioned
on taxpayer age.
Finally, as alluded to above, the government collects accidental bequests and redistributes them among the working-age population in a lump-sum fashion. The
exclusion of retirees from the spoils of unspent nest eggs is a crude way of accounting
for the age distribution of beneficiaries.
4.1.3. Markets
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Output Market A representative firm produces the economy’s only good by operating a constant returns-to-scale technology. The aggregate production function
is:

Q = F (K, N ) = AK α N 1−α

(4.2)

where Q, A, K and N denote the aggregate levels of output, technology, capital and
labor supply. Capital earns an output share α ∈ (0, 1) and depreciates at rate δ > 0.
Factor Markets Spot markets exist for capital and labor with prices denoted by
r and w, respectively.
Asset Markets A representative intermediary trades the economy’s sole financial
asset: a one-period risk-free bond that pays an interest rate i or, equivalently, a gross
rate R ≡ 1 + i. This intermediary supplies capital to the representative firm and facilitates the intertemporal transfer of resources for both households and government.
Notably, there are no assets with which the household can explicity insure against
idiosyncratic wage risk or the uncertainty of survival and death. Moreover, the scope
of self-insurance is limited by a stringent borrowing constraint applied to all households. The government, on the other hand, is limited only by its ability to pay back
debts.
4.1.4. Equilibrium

Household’s Problem I formulate the household’s problem recursively. Individual
state variables are age j, assets a, ability type m, and current productivity n. Let z =
(j, a, m, n) denote the agent’s state and Φt denote a probability measure describing
the distribution of individual states at time t. Given a sequence of prices and policies,
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the Bellman equation for the working household (j < jR ) is:
Z
v(j, a, m, n) = max0 u(c, h) + βψj+1
h,c,a

(H1)

v(j + 1, a0 , m, ñ)π(ñ|n)dñ

s.t. (1 + τc )c + a0 = Y d (wρ(j, m, n)h) + Ra + q
c, a0 ≥ 0, h ∈ [0, 1]

where Y d (y) ≡ y − T̂ (y) denotes after-tax earnings. The Bellman equation for a
retired household (j ≥ jR ) is simpler:
ṽ(j, a) = max
ũ(c) + βψj+1 v(j + 1, a0 )
0
c,a

(H2)

s.t. (1 + τc )c + a0 = Ra + b
c, a0 ≥ 0

Firm’s Problem The representative firm hires capital and labor to maximize profits, which are zero in equilibrium by construction. Its optimality conditions are:
r = αA(N/K)1−α − δ
(4.3)
α

w = (1 − α)A(K/N )

Intermediary’s Problem The competitive markets assumption implies zero profits for the financial intermediary. Combined with a no-arbitrage condition, this gives:

R ≡ 1 + i = 1 + (1 − τk )r
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(4.4)

Government Budget Government budget deficits (surpluses) are absorbed by increases (decreases) in the stock of public debt.

Gt +

J
X

Z
Ψj bt + Rt Bt =

Z
T̂t (wt ρ(j, m, n)ht (j, a, m, n))dΦt + τc,t

ct (j, a, m, n)dΦt

j=jR

+ τk,t rt Kt + Bt+1

(4.5)

Accidental Bequests Estates must be assigned in order to close the model. I
assume that they are collected and redistributed in full to the working-age population.
 
−1 R

 PjR −1 Ψk
Ψj−1 (1 − ψj )Rt a0 dΦ0
if t = 0
k=1
qt =
−1 R
P

jR −1

Ψj−1 (1 − ψj )Rt at (j, a, m, n)dΦt−1 otherwise
k=1 Ψk

(4.6)

Market Clearing The market-clearing conditions for factor markets are:

R

 a0 dΦ0
Kt =
R

 a (j, a, m, n)dΦ
t

t−1

if t = 0
otherwise

(4.7)

Z
Nt =
Letting Ct =

R

ρ(j, m, n)ht (j, a, m, n)dΦt

ct (j, a, m, n)dΦt , the resource constraint is:
Ct + Kt+1 + Gt = AKtα Nt1−α + (1 − δ)Kt

although this can be safely ignored by Walras’ law.
Definition 1. Index time by t = 0, 1, . . . , ∞. Fix a sequence of government expenditures {Gt } and initial conditions B0 and Φ0 . A recursive competitive equilibrium is a sequence of value functions {vt }, allocations {ht , ct , at+1 , Kt , Nt }, prices
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{wt , rt , it }, government policies {T̂t , τc,t , τk,t , bt , Bt }, transfers {qt }, probability measures {Φt }, and laws of motion {Ht } such that for all t:
1. Given prices, policies and transfers, {vt } solves problems H1 and H2, with
{ht , ct , at+1 } being the associated decision rules;
2. Given prices, the firm’s allocation {Kt , Nt } satisfies (4.3);
3. Prices {rt , it } satisfy the no-arbitrage condition (4.4);
4. The government budget (4.5) is balanced;
5. Estates are redistributed in their entirety, as per (4.6);
6. Markets clear, as per (4.7); and
7. The distribution over individual states evolves according to Φt+1 = Ht Φt ,
where the aggregate laws of motion {Ht } are consistent with the decision rules
{ht , ct , at } and the transtion matrix π.1
Definition 2. A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium is a recursive
competitive equilibrium where the distribution over individual states is stationary.
That is, Φt+1 = Φt for all t = 1, . . . , ∞. A stationary equilibrium is also called a
steady state of the economy.

4.2. Calibration
The quantitative analysis begins by making functional form assumptions and choosing values for model parameters. There are two distinct sets of parameters. Externally calibrated parameters are taken directly from other sources or can be estimated

1

For a formal characterization of this statement, see any number of papers (co-)authored by
Dirk Krueger.

82

independently of the model. Internally calibrated parameters are selected so that
model-generated data match a certain set of targets. Although each internally calibrated parameter is associated with a particular target, it is important to keep in
mind that they are jointly determined. All parts of the calibration exercise proceed
under the assumption of a stationary equilibrium.
Demographics One model period corresponds to one year. Agents enter the economy at age 23 (j = 1), retire at age 65 (jR = 42), and die no later than at age 95
(J + 1 = 73). The Social Security Administration’s Actuarial Life Table for men2
is used to determine age-dependent survival probabilities {ψj }Jj=1 , with ψJ+1 set to
zero. The population growth rate is 1.1%, the long-run averge value for the USA.
Preferences I assume the following functional form for the period utility function:

u(c, h) =

h1+γ
c1−σ
−ϕ
1−σ
1+γ

(4.8)

The parameters σ, ϕ and γ govern risk aversion, disutility of work, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for labor supply. I set σ = 2 and γ = 2. Both values are
standard in the literature.3 Disutility of work ϕ is chosen so that working households
devote, on average, one third of their time endowment to labor market activities.
The final preference parameter is the discount factor β, which is chosen to generate
an equilibrium capital-output ratio of 2.75 or, equivalently, an interest rate of 4.0%.
Given additive separability of consumption and hours, the retirement utility function
is naturally defined as ũ(c) = u(c, 0).

2

http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/STATS/table4c6.html.
The choice of γ implies an after-tax Frisch elasticity of 0.5, as recommended by Chetty et al.
(2011). More recently, Blundell et al. (2016) report Frisch elasticity estimates of 0.68 for men and
0.96 for women. See Keane (2011) for a survey of the earlier microeconometric literature
3
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Productivity Recall that household productivity depends on age, pre-market differences and unanticipated shocks. With that in mind, consider the following specification for the evolution of the agent’s productivity.
ln e(j, m, n) = β0m + β1m (j − 1) + β2m (j − 1)2 + ζ(n) βm ∼ N (β, Σ)
εj ∼ N (0, σε2 )

ζ(n) = ηj + εj

νj ∼ N (0, σν2 ) |φ| < 1

ηj = φηj−1 + νj
η0 = 0

(4.9)
Ability types are associated with a particular coefficient vector βm = (β0m , β1m , β2m ),
with each being an independent draw from the same distribution. Ability, therefore,
governs the shape and scale of the household’s expected wage profile. The covariance
matrix Σ is unrestricted, allowing for correlation between the components of βm . Let
σi2 denote the diagonal elements of Σ and σij denote the off-diagonal elements.
The model is silent about why productivity varies from person to person ex ante.
We might think that the dispersion in intercepts is due to pre-market activities that
affect initial human capital (e.g. schooling choice and family background). Similarly,
inate differences in the ability to learn and acquire additional human capital might
account for variation in the slope and curvature of the wage profile as in Huggett et
al. (2011). I abstract from such considerations here and take these ex ante differences
as exogenous.
The stochastic process linked to state variable n has two components, a persisent
shock ηj that follows an AR(1) process and a transitory shock εj . Together, these
two shocks generate random fluctuations around a deterministic trend. Assume that
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the innovations are independent of each other and βm .
I use data from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) to estimate (4.9) using
adjusted male log-wages as the dependent variable. The results are reported in Table
1 and the details of the sample selection and estimation are discussed in Appendix
A.5. The estimates are very precise except for the covariance between the personspecific intercept and the person-specific experience coefficients. The results suggest
that, on average, real wages grow at about 4% per year early in a person’s working
life. There is, however, evidence of significant heterogeneity. A person whose β1m falls
one standard deviation above (below) the mean will experience initial wage growth
of 7% (1.5%) ceteris paribus. Over time, these growth rate differentials can generate
substantial inequality as initial advantages and disadvantages accumulate over the
life-cycle. The effect is partly mitigated by the strong negative correlation between
the linear and quadratic coefficients (β1m and β2m ).
The estimate of φ indicates moderate persistence. Roughly half of a persistent shock’s
effect remains after three years. At the ten year mark, over 90% of the shock has
dissapated. This level of persistence is significantly lower than estimates obtained for
models that exclude heterogeneity in growth rates. Such estimates are typically in
the 0.96-1.00 range.4
I use a quadrature-based method to approximate both shock processes with discretized Markov chains. I use seven states for the persistent component and three
states for the transitory component, meaning that nj takes on one of twenty-one values in the finite set N . The invariant distributions of these discretized Markov chains
are summarized in Table 2.
4

See, for example, Abowd and Card (1989), Storesletten et al. (2004) or Karahan and Ozkan
(2013).
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Table 1: Income Process Estimation Results (log-wages)
Parameter Estimate Std Error t-statistic P-value CI0.025
CI0.975
Common Trend
β0
β1
β2

2.1809
0.0415
-0.0008

0.1438
0.0007
0.0000

15.17
59.81
-52.65

0.00
0.00
0.00

1.8991
0.0402
-0.0009

2.4628
0.0429
-0.0008

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.47
0.08
0.00

0.1639
0.0220
0.0005
-0.1534
-1.2076
-0.9106

0.2602
0.0303
0.0007
0.7687
-0.0658
-0.8148

0.00
0.00
0.00

0.7390
0.1872
0.3681

0.8301
0.2345
0.4065

Heterogeneous Trend
σ0
σ1
σ2
corr01
corr02
corr12

0.2175
0.0265
0.0006
0.1475
-0.4588
-0.8749

0.0239
0.0021
0.0000
0.2052
0.2585
0.0224

9.10
12.74
13.67
0.72
-1.77
-39.05

Stochastic Trend
φ
σν
σε

0.7869
0.2096
0.3884

0.0224
0.0117
0.0096

35.19
17.89
40.53

The first-stage regression includes 4286 individuals and 67,009 person-year observations.
The second-stage regression includes 932 empirical variance-covariance moments.

Similarly, I approximate the distribution of wage profiles by selecting a finite number
of equiprobable types, each of which is characterized by a vector βm . Constructing the set of types is complicated by the fact that the coefficients are correlated.
There are three possible values for the intercept (think: high, medium, low), three
possible values for the slope (conditional on the intercept), and three possible values
for the curvature (conditional on both the intercept and the slope). Hence, M has
twenty-seven elements. The details of both discretization procedures are discussed in
Appendix A.6.1.
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Table 2: Invariant Distributions of Productivity Shocks
State
η1
η2
η3
η4
η5
η6
η7

Value
0.3916
0.5534
0.7493
1.0000
1.3345
1.8070
2.5539

Π
0.0025
0.0499
0.2447
0.4058
0.2447
0.0499
0.0025

State
ε1
ε2
ε3

Persistent shock process.

Value
Π
0.7712 0.1932
1.0000 0.6135
1.2967 0.1932

Transitory shock process.

Government Policy The main policy of interest is the non-linear tax on labor
income, which takes the following log-linear form:

T̂ (y) = y − λy 1−τ

I set τ = 0.136 as estimated by Kaplan (2012) and choose λ to balance the government’s state-steady budget.5 The capital income tax rate is set to τk = 28.3%
as in Kindermann and Krueger (2021). The linear consumption tax rate is set to
τc = 4.4%, which is equal to the sum of general and selective sales taxes collected
by all state and local governments divided by total nominal personal consumption
expenditures in 2017.
With respect to the other side of the public ledger, I choose exogenous government
spending such that it accounts for 17% of total output. I then take the implied level of
governent expenditures as fixed in all ensuing tax reform experiments. I choose social
security benefits b to equal 35% of average earnings and the stock of outstanding
public debt B to yield an equilibrium debt-to-output ratio of 0.97, as in the data.

5

Wu and Krueger (2021) estimate the same labor income tax function and obtain a similar
estimate of τ = 0.133.
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The government is also responsible for collecting and redistributing accidental bequests. Though not a parameter, q is an equilibrium object that must be solved for
within the model.
Technology Three parameters (A, α, δ) characterize the production technology. I
set the capital share to α = 0.33 and the depreciation rate to δ = 8%. The level of
technology A is normalized so that the equilibrium wage rate is unity.
Summary The key non-productivity parameters are summarized in Table 3, with
internally calibrated parameters in bold.

Parameter

Table 3: Benchmark model parameters
Value

Target

Preferences
σ
γ −1
ϕ
β

Coefficient of relative risk aversion
Frisch elasticity
Disutility of labor
Annual discount factor

2.0
0.5
63.3 h̄ = 1/3
0.992 r = 4%

Capital income share
Depreciation rate
Aggregate technology

0.33
8%
0.937 w = 1.0

Labor tax progressivity
Labor tax level
Capital tax rate
Sales tax rate
Public debt
Social security benefit

0.136
0.666 G/Q = 0.17
28.3%
4.4%
27.1 B/Q = 0.97
0.198 b/ȳ = 0.35

Accidental bequest

0.033

Production
α
δ
A
Policies
τ
λ
τk
τc
B
b
Transfers
q

Internally calibrated parameters are in bold.
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fixed point

Brief Remark on Computation Calibration requires the repeated solution and
simulation of the model. To solve for the optimal decisions rules, I use the endogenous
grid method, augmented for endogenous labor supply as in Barillas and FernándezVillaverde (2007). The chosen functional forms for preferences and taxes mean that
no root-finding procedures are needed, except when simulating the decisions of a
borrowing-constrained household. See Appendix A.6 for a detailed description of the
algorithms employed.
Life-Cycle Profiles in the Baseline Economy Figure 1 displays average hours
and earnings profiles for working-age households and average consumption and asset
profiles for all households. Assets rise over the working life as household build buffer
stocks to hedge against wage shocks and accumulate wealth to finance retirement
consumption. The consumption and asset profiles are also affected by a high degree
of patience: the subjective discount rate is 0.8% while the after-tax rate of return is
substantially higher at 2.9%.
For reasons explained in Section 2.4, the degree to which consumption and labor
income fluctuate from year to year will be an imporant factor in the comparative
assessment of the two candidate tax bases. To that end, I simulate a large number of
histories and compute household-specific standard deviations for those two variables.
Retirement benefits are counted as labor income for the purposes of this exercise, and
all calculations are weighted by survival probabilities and normalized. The densities
of these standard deviations are plotted in Figure 2. It is clear from the graph that
the model produces considerably less year-to-year variation in consumption relative
to earnings.
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Figure 1: Cross-Sectional Means over the Life Cycle

4.3. A Simple Tax Reform
In this section I use the calibrated model to study a simple tax reform that converts
the household tax base from labor income to consumption. I begin by describing the
experiment in detail, and then set out the main results. I focus on long-run impacts
by comparing stationary equilibria, but also discuss the macroeconomic and welfare
consequences along the transition path. The simple reform generates moderate welfare gains by tempering distortions on the labor supply responses to productivity
shocks.

90

0.03
Consumption
Earnings

Frequency

0.02

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.00
0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

Standard Deviation

Figure 2: Fluctuations in Consumption and Earnings over the Life Cycle
4.3.1. Description of the Experiment
The economy is in its initial stationary equilibrium at time t = 0 when the government
announces a plan to convert the household tax-and-transfer system to a consumption
base. Progressivity, indexed by the parameter τ , remains fixed while the average tax
rate, indexed by the parameter λ, can and will adjust to maintain budget balance. As
is standard in the literature, I assume that the policy change is unexpected and the
government can credibly commit to making no further changes. Another standard
practice I adopt is to fix the level of government purchases, allowing the fraction of
output devoted to government goods to deviate from its calibrated target.
In practice, this reform is accomplished by allowing a deduction for net savings in
the style of IRAs or 401(k) plans. The household’s tax base decreases one-for-one
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with every dollar it contributes to a savings account and increases one-for-one with
every dollar it withdraws. Because consumption equals earnings less net saving, this
policy successfully implements the intended reform. Unlike IRAs and other real-world
savings plans, investments are not sheltered in whole or in part from ongoing capital
income taxation. Neither do I impose any limits, restrictions or penalties. In other
words, the policy reform is a cash-flow consumption tax as described in Chapter 3.
I rule out changes to the capital income tax rate τk for two reasons. First, my goal is
to isolate and assess a particular policy choice: that between the taxation of earnings
and the taxation of consumption. Because capital taxes have important efficiency and
distributional impacts (Fehr and Kindermann, 2015), varying τk would add noise to
the results. Second, unanticipated changes to the capital tax structure mimic a lumpsum tax (or transfer) on the existing capital stock. By levying a tax on an inelastic
resource, the government can reduce or even eliminate the need for distorting taxes,
thereby generating substantial welfare gains from reform. But there are unmodelled
political reasons why a fiscal policy of this sort might be unfeasible. One could
imagine, for example, that governments are subject to some sort of commitment
constraint that prohibits new taxes on old choices. Or, more simply, it could be
difficult to garner political support for a policy that punishes living citizens, who can
vote, in order to reward future citizens, who cannot.
A new tax on consumption produces a similar effect. Households that had accumulated assets under the belief that those assets could be liquidated tax-free in the
future now face unanticipated tax bills. One way to neutralize this effect is to assign
compensatory transfers, as in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). While this approach
provides a useful theoretical measurement of a policy’s efficiency effects, it would be
difficult to implement in practice, fraught as it would be by information frictions,
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equilibrium effects, and administrative costs. I adopt an alternative approach, one
that is both feasible and easy to imagine in practice. Specifically, I assume that the
new tax structure applies only to future generations, that is, those born at time t = 1
or later. Existing cohorts continue to work and save under the rules of the status quo.
In this way, they are shielded from the adverse effects of unexpected wealth levies
and exposed only to general equilibrium effects on factor prices.
A further detail concerns the balancing of the government budget. One way to do this
is to adjust λ in every period along the transition path, thereby keeping the budget
balanced period-by-period. This approach, however, produces significant inter-cohort
redistribution. A notable feature of consumption is that its time path is delayed relative to the time path of earnings. This is a mechanical consequence of the life-cycle
savings motive. Households save when young and productive so that they can consume when old and unproductive. As a result, a consumption tax tends to postpone
tax liabilities until later in the life cycle. But this means that the aggregate tax
base drops significantly during the early years of the transition, requiring comparatively large tax rates for the government to equalize revenues and expenses in all
periods. This constitutes a potentially large transfer from early generations to later
generations.
Instead, I set a time-invariant λ for all future households living under the consumption
tax regime. Any shortfalls in the sequential budgets are absorbed by new issues of
government debt. This debt will accumulate over the transition until it settles at its
new long-run level. I also fix the retirement benefit b throughout the transition.
A related issue concerns the treatment of bequests. Because a consumption tax
postpones tax liabilities until later in life, households naturally accumulate more
assets over their working years. Their retirement savings must account not just for
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targeted consumption needs but also any tax obligations triggered by dis-saving. As
a result, accidental estates are mechanically larger in the new steady state. This
introduces a potential bias against generations born early in the transition. If the
‘bequest budget’ were balanced year-by-year, these generations would receive the same
bequests as their labor-taxpaying neighbours. Unlike those neighbours, however, the
consumption-taxpayers would owe tax when they spend their bequests. To sidestep
this problem, I assign the terminal (initial) steady state bequest to all new (old)
generations in each year of the transition. Any shortfall in the bequest budget is
covered by the government and added to the public debt.
There are therefore only two fiscal constitutions. Let subscripts 0 and ∞ denote
the initial and terminal steady states, respectively. Pre-reform households of all ages
continue to live under the status quo policy {τ k , τ c , τ, λ0 , b0 , q0 } for the remainder
of their lives. Post-reform households of all birth cohorts live under the new policy
{τ k , τ c , τ, λ∞ , b∞ , q∞ } for the entirety of their lives. These policy parameters are
reported in Table.

Baseline
Reform

Table 4: The Two Fiscal Constitutions
tax base
τ
λ
τk
τc
b
q
labor income 0.13615 0.6659 28.3% 4.4% 0.1980 0.0331
consumption 0.13615 0.6591 28.3% 4.4% 0.2456 0.0543

In summary, all households alive at time t = 0 continue to pay taxes on their labor
income according to the same rate schedule as before. Agents who enter the economy
at time t = 1 or later will instead pay taxes on their consumption, with the same
parameter τ but with λ selected to ensure the government’s intertemporal budget
constraint is satisfied. Government debt adjusts along the transition to absorb any
shortfalls. These policy design choices ensure that there are only two operative channels: the direct tax base effect and the associated general equilibrium effects (if any).
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Assuming that the economy converges to its new steady state after G periods, the
induced transition path is characterized by sequences of prices {rt , wt }G
t=1 and debt
{Bt }G
t=1 .
4.3.2. Steady State Analysis
Long-Run Impact
The considered tax reform has few consequences for existing households or the shortrun macroeconomy. Only in the long run, as labor-income-taxpayers die out and
consumption-taxpayers take over, do aggregate quantities reveal the impact of the
policy change. A comparison of stationary equilibria is therefore sufficient to effectively demonstrate the relative merits of the two fiscal regimes. Columns 1 and 2 of
Table 5 report the relevant details of the pre- and post-reform steady states. Unless
otherwise indicated, interpret all quantities as per capita measures, in the tables and
charts as well as in the text.
Hours and Productivity The tax reform reduces aggregate work hours by a slight
0.1% in the long run. But because work decisions are less distorted, these hours
are allocated more efficiently. Consequently, aggregate labor supply, as measured in
productivity units, increases by 1.1%. This improvement springs from two possible
sources. First, households can work fewer hours during predictably low-wage years
and more hours during predictably high-wage years. Second, households can intensify
their labor supply responses to productivity shocks, in both positive and negative
directions.
It turns out that intertemporal re-allocation does not play an important quantitative
role. Figure 3 plots the percentage change in average hours between the two steady
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Table 5: The Two Steady States
(1) Baseline

(2) Reform

Earnings
0.666
0.136

Consumption
0.659
0.136

Tax regime
Tax base
Tax level λ
Tax progressivity τ
Quantities (%∆)
Hours worked
Labor supply
Capital stock
Consumption
Output

-0.13
1.07
1.85
1.49
1.33

Ratios
Investment–Output
Government–Output
Capital–Output
Debt–Output

0.250
0.170
2.75
0.97

0.252
0.168
2.76
3.22

1.000
4.00

1.003
3.94

Prices
Wage rate
Interest rate (%)
Welfare
CEV (%∆)

0.92

Gini coefficients
Consumption
Earnings
Wealth

0.201
0.343
0.495

0.200
0.364
0.506

states over the working life (in blue). The change is slightly positive through the first
two-thirds of the agent’s career, but drops off substantially after wages peak at age 50
(vertical dashed line). The overall effect is marginally negative. The U-shape pattern
in the first half of the working life is an artifact of the strict borrowing constraint,
which binds more frequently for the very youngest households.
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The household’s heightened response to productivity shocks is the important channel. A system that taxes earnings period-by-period penalizes workers for aggressively
exploiting temporary wage changes. This penalty disappears under a consumption
tax, since the worker can reduce his tax liability by smoothing his consumption. As a
result, we see significant re-allocation of effort across states, with workers expanding
and contracting their labor supply more freely in response to positive and negative
changes to their earning power. Heightened sensitivity to wage shocks leads to significantly higher average productivity in the new steady state at every age, as shown
by the green line in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Steady-State Differences in Hours and Productivity by Age
I decompose the aggregate change in labor efficiency as follows. Let n̄0,j and n̄∞,j
denote mean labor supplied at age j in the initial and terminal steady states, respec97

tively. Define h̄0,j and h̄∞,j analogously for hours worked. I then measure the net
impact of the intertemporal effect by supposing that life-cycle hours conform to the
terminal steady state but, counterfactually, mean productivity follows the life-cycle
pattern of the initial steady state. Similarly, the net impact of the intratemporal
effect imagines that hours conform to the initial steady state but productivity follows
the life-cycle pattern of the terminal steady state. Expressed formally, I calculate:
 X
jR 
jR
X
n̄0,j · h̄∞,j
intertemporal effect =
/
h̄∞,j
h̄0,j
j=1
j=1
 X
jR 
jR
X
n̄∞,j · h̄0,j
/
intratemporal effect =
h̄0,j
h̄
∞,j
j=1
j=1
I report these calculations in Table 6. Note that the aggregate change in labor
efficiency between steady states of 1.2% is due entirely to intratemporal re-allocation
of hours across productivity states.
Table 6: Decomposing the Change in Aggregate Labor Efficiency
%∆ in labor efficiency due to..
Effect Size (%) Share of Total (%)
intertemporal re-allocation of hours
-0.03
-2.3
intratemporal re-allocation of hours
1.23
102.4
combined re-allocation of hours
1.20
100.0

Labor Supply Elasticities We can further illustrate the reform’s supply-side effects by recovering the elasticity of hours worked with respect to innovations to wages.
Recall from (4.9) that we can write log-wages for household i at age j as:

ln wageij = ln wj + β0m + β1i (j − 1) + β2i (j − 1)2 +

j−1
X
m=1
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φj−m νim + νij + εij

where ν’s and ε’s denote productivity shocks. This motivates a linear regression
equation of the following form:

ln h = 0 + p ν + t ε + error

(4.10)

The slope coefficients capture the contemporaneous labor supply response to persistent wage shocks ν and transitory wage shocks ε. To obtain these coefficients, I
simulate a large number of histories under both the initial labor tax regime and the
terminal consumption tax regime. The sequences of pseudo-random numbers is the
same for both sets of histories. I then run the regression in (4.10) on the simulated
data.
Pooling the data across age groups yields the aggregate elasticies reported in Table 7.
Observe two things. First, and unsurprisingly, model households are more responsive
to transitory shocks than they are to persistent shocks. Second, and more importantly,
model households are more responsive to shocks of both kinds under the consumption
tax.
Table 7: Comparing Labor Supply Elasticities Across Tax Regimes
Parameter
Labor Tax
Consumption Tax
persistent-shock elasticity p
0.2506
0.3092
transitory-shock elasticity t
0.3495
0.4294
Note: The simulated sample covers 13,500 households over 42 years of working
life, for a total of 567,000 observations.

By repeating the same regression year-by-year, we can track how labor supply elasticities evolve over the life cycle. The results of this exercises are plotted in Figure 4.
Households are much less responsive to wage shocks early in the life cycle when assets
are low and many are borrowing-constrained. As households approach retirement, the
persistent-shock elasticities (dashed lines) converge to to the transitory-shock elasti99

cies (solid lines), as expected. As with the pooled results, the important takeaway
here is that households are uniformly more sensitive to wage shocks when subject to
a consumption tax.
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Figure 4: Labor Supply Elasticities Over the Life Cycle

Aggregate Quantities and Inequality The tax reform also leads to higher capital
accumulation, with the long-run capital stock settling close to 2% above its initial
level. Combined with the increase in labor supply, this leads to a long-run increase
in GDP of 1.3%. While some of this additional output is used to maintain the
larger stock of machinery and equipment, aggregate consumption still increases by a
substantial 1.5%.
Table 5 reports Gini coefficients for several relevant variables. Using this measure
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of inequality, we see that mitigating the distortion on labor effort amplifies the dispersion in labor earnings and wealth. But consumption inequality remains roughly
unchanged. Thus, the aggregate increase in consumption does not come at the expense of long-run distributional concerns. Resources are better exploited but not less
equally distributed in the new steady state.
Welfare Effects To measure the overall impact on welfare, I solve the following
equation for the consumption equivalent variation:

W ((1 + CEV )c0 , h0 ) = W (c∞ , h∞ )

where W denotes ex ante expected lifetime utility (see Equation 4.1) and (c0 , h0 ) and
(c∞ , h∞ ) denote allocations in the old and new steady states, respectively. In words,
the CEV is the uniform percentage change in consumption at all ages and in all states
of the world required to make the initial allocation as attractive to a future household
as the terminal allocation. Because households in the new stationary equilibrium
enjoy higher consumption without working more hours, it should not surprise that the
CEV is positive. The proposed reform generates a moderate long-run consumptionequivalent welfare gain of 0.9%.
Taxation Patterns Table 8 reports tax collections by source as a share of total
revenue. The household tax includes retirement benefits. For comparison’s sake, I
also report the equivalent figures from the benchmark economy in Kindermann and
Krueger (2021). The sales tax in my baseline calibration yields a slightly smaller
share of revenue than in theirs. They set the sales tax rate somewhat higher at 5%.
Note that capital income taxes account for a larger share of government revenue in
the terminal steady state, a mechanical response to greater demand for assets in a
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consumption-based tax system.
Table 8: Sources of Government
Baseline
Capital income tax
21.2%
Proportional sales tax
12.7%
Household tax-and-transfer 66.0%

Revenues
Reform K & K
25.7% 20.9%
9.7%
15.5%
64.5% 63.6%

Figure 5 illustrates the impact of the tax base on the life-cycle pattern of tax obligations. I calculate mean net taxes by age in both steady states, where net tax is
defined as the sum of capital income taxes, sales taxes, and the household tax net
of social security. I then discount these series with the respective interest rates to

Discounted Net Taxes

obtain present values.
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Figure 5: Discounted Net Taxes Over the Life Cycle
The top panel of Figure 5 plots the life-cycle profile of discounted net taxes for
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both steady states. The bottom panel plots the cumulative share of lifetime taxes
paid. At the mid-career point (shown with a vertical dashed line), the average laborincome-taxpayer has paid two-thirds of her lifetime net tax burden while the average
consumption-taxpayer has paid just half. It is clear from both panels that retired
households in the initial steady state receive, on average, more money from the government in the form of social security benefits than they pay in capital income taxes
and sales taxes. In contrast, the typical retiree in the new steady state remains a
positive net contributor to the public treasury well into her 80s.
Figure 5 addresses the reform’s impact on the distribution of the tax burden. The
top panel plots the cross-sectional Lorenz curves for the household tax in both steady
states. The terminal Lorenz curve in green is much closer to the 45 degree line
than the initial Lorenz curve in blue, suggesting that the simple reform substantially
flattens the tax system and spreads the tax burden much less progressively across
taxpayers. But that is only true at a given point in time. Consider the bottom panel
of the figure, which plots the lifetime Lorenz curves for the household tax. Here we
see that the green curve is only marginally closer to the 45 degree line, showing that
the simple reform has little impact on the lifetime progressivity of the household tax.
This is important methodologically since it confirms that parametric progressivity is
a consistent index of systemic progressivity across tax bases, at least locally. As such,
the actual tax experiment—tax base conversion with constant τ —is roughly equivalent to the idealized tax experiment—tax base conversion with constant progressivity.
We can be confident, therefore, that our steady-state comparisons are capturing the
impact of the change in tax base, not some unintended alteration to the redistributive
structure of the tax code.
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Figure 6: Distribution of the Household Tax Burden
Distributional Effects The simple reform generates long-run improvements in aggregate quantities with minimal impact on aggregate inequality and modest aggregate
welfare gains. I now turn my attention to micro-level impacts. To sharpen the analysis, I construct a measure of household welfare similar in spirit to Benabou (2002) and
Bakış et al. (2015). Specifically, I simulate a large number of histories and compute
the lifetime utility for each one. I then calculate the constant consumption stream
each household would have to receive to attain the same level of lifetime utility, assuming zero work hours. Denoting household i’s time paths for consumption and
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hours as ci,j and hi,j , define its welfare ωi as the solution to:
J
X
j=1

(
β j−1

1−σ
h1+γ
ci,j
i,j
−ϕ
1−σ
1+γ

!

ω 1−σ
− i
1−σ

)
=0

Since preferences are homogenous, this measure allows us to make interpersonal comparisons, a useful feature when evaluating heterogeneous effects.
With an interpretable measure of household welfare in hand, I rank each simulated
household in ascending order of lifetime utility, so that household 1 has the lowest
ω, household 2 has the second lowest ω, and so on. I then re-simulate the histories
using the decision rules and policy framework of the new steady state, keeping the
sequences of productivity shocks the same. With two distinct choice histories for
each shock sequence, I can answer questions about how certain kinds of households
would fare if they were counterfactually subject to a cash-flow tax rather than a labor
income tax.
Figure 7 illustrates how the simple reform affects behaviour and outcomes across the
welfare distribution. For a range of variables, I calculate the percentage change across
tax regimes for each simulated household, and then regress those percentage changes
on a quadratic in initial welfare ranks. The fitted values and 95% bounds from these
regressions are displayed in the figure for a selection of key variables. The horizontal
axis of each panel marks the percentiles of initial welfare. To properly interpret these
graphs, think of the solid lines as tracing out the expected percentage change as a
function of initial welfare rank, and the dashed line as tracing out the associated
range of outcomes. Thus, Figure 7 is useful for thinking about the ways in which the
simple reform amplifies or mitigates inequalities across households. Is the cash-flow
tax better for the utility-rich or the utility-poor?
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Figure 7: Discounted Net Taxes Over the Life Cycle
The top-left panel shows a clear upward trend in lifetime earnings. The households for
whom the cash-flow tax generates the largest impact on earnings are those who already
occupy the top percentiles of the welfare distribution. Interestingly, the bottomleft panel indicates a relatively flat average effect on hours. Together, the two left
panels indicate that the principal channel through which the simple reform improves
welfare—namely, reducing distortions on the labor supply response to changes in
wages—operates primarily among high-productivity households.
Compare this result to those in a related study by Nakajima and Takahashi (2020).
They evaluate the effectiveness of a reform that finances an increase in lump-sum
transfers with a higher linear tax rate on consumption. Importantly, labor is indivisi-
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ble in their model, and there is therefore no margin by which working households can
adjust their labor supply upwards in response to stronger work incentives. As a result, their reform captures little to no improvement in labor efficiency. This suggests
that the existence of an intensive margin may be critical to the quantitative results.
The upward trend in lifetime earnings is inherited by lifetime consumption. While
the vast majority of households enjoy an increase in lifetime consumption, the highest
ranked households experience the largest gains, as exhibited in the top-right panel.
The picture is slightly different for lifetime utility, which is shown in the bottom-right
panel. This chart indicates that the largest changes in the household welfare measure
accrue to those households with the very lowest rankings in the initial steady state.
Overall, the percenage change in welfare across tax regimes exhibites a pronounced
U-shape. As with earnings and hours, there is substantial heterogeneity in policy
effects for consumption and utility, even after conditioning on initial welfare rank.
4.3.3. The Transition Path
Figure 8 documents the evolution of key macroeconomic aggregates and prices along
the transition path. Notice the absence of discontinuous jumps at the outset of
the transition. Although sharp immediate reactions are typical with this sort of
quantitative exercise, the short-run macroeconomic response is muted here because
the new policy applies exclusively to post-reform generations. Consequently, the
economy evolves gradually, converging to the new steady state after one hundred
periods or so.
The short-run impact on work effort is mildly positive, with average hours climbing
gently over the first two decades of the transition, falling sharply thereafter to the new
long-run level. Aggregate labor supply increases steadily before leveling off around
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Figure 8: Transition Path for Aggregate Quantities and Prices
the time the last of the existing generations retires from the workforce. Physical
capital, total output and consumption all increase monotonically along the transition
path. Most of the gains are realized by the time the first post-reform generation dies
out.
The reform’s immediate impact on labor supply causes wages to fall and interest rates
to rise in the short run, though the magnitude of these changes is negligible. After a
couple of decades, the effect of higher capital accumulation kicks in and prices begin
moving in the opposite directions toward new steady-state values. The real wage
ultimately climbs 0.3% while the interest rate falls from 4.0% to 3.9%.
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One of the most notable changes is the increase in government debt, which more than
triples over the transition on a per capita basis. In the initial stationary equilibrium,
government debt accounts for roughly one-quarter of household assets, with physical
capital accounting for the rest. By the time the economy converges to the postreform steady-state, the average portfolio holds more government debt than physical
capital. This massive expansion of the public debt is largely mechanical. Because
tax liabilities are deferred under the consumption tax regime, the government collects
fewer taxes in the early years of the transition. The government offsets these revenue
shortfalls by issuing new bonds. Fortunately, there are many willing buyers for this
debt since post-reform cohorts know they must eventually finance the significant tax
liabilities triggered by their late-in-life consumption. Thus, the net flow of funds
between households and the government is, to a rough approximation, no different
under the new tax regime. The only difference is that collections are tilted more
toward loans and less toward taxes. Indeed, 99% of the increase in household saving
consists of government bond purchases.
The rapid and substantial increase in government debt is therefore an artifact of
changes to the timing of tax collections over the life cycle, not a sign of weak government finances. That being said, this accumulation of debt underlines the importance
of computing the entire transition path when evaluating a policy change. Otherwise,
a considerable part of the future fiscal burden would be covertly shifted to the near
term, yielding misleading estimates of the reform’s long-run effects. My approach
avoids this bias by explicitly ensuring equal tax treatment for all cohorts during the
transition. Consumption-taxpayers face the same rate schedule no matter when they
are born.
As a check on how well my approach isolates the impact of the choice of tax base,
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we can chart welfare gains and losses by cohort. The top panel of Figure 9 displays
cohorts already alive at the time of the reform. The bottom panel displays cohorts
born into the transition. Recall that all post-reform generations are subject to the
exact same fiscal policy; the only difference in their economic environments is the
path of equilibrium factor prices which evolve over the transition as shown in Figure
8. The same can be said of all pre-reform generations. Thus, we should expect only
minimal variation in welfare consequences within each panel. And this is indeed what
we see.
The CEVs for existing generations are tiny and range from -0.06% for the very
youngest to 0.02% for middle-aged households. The CEVs for post-reform generations range from 0.85% for households born in the 17th year of the transition to
roughly 0.92% for all cohorts born after the first fifty years. These slight variations in
welfare across cohorts are due to small changes in the evolution of wages and interest
rates from one steady state to another.
4.3.4. Decomposing the Macroeconomic Effects
The reform’s long-run effects stem from several operative channels. The direct effects
include efficiency gains from mitigating the distortions on work decisions and possible
impacts on the social insurance system. There are also general equilibrium prices effects. The larger capital stock in the new steady state leads to (slightly) higher wages
and (slightly) lower returns to saving. I assess the relative importance of these channels by computing the transitions implied by a series of appropriate counterfactual
conditions.
In the first of these exercises, the results of which are reported in column 2 of Table 9,
I isolate the impact of the labor supply distortions. In this scenario, no actual changes
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Figure 9: Welfare Effects of Policy Reform by Age Cohort
are made to the tax base. All cohorts, old and new alike, continue to pay taxes on
the basis of their earnings. Post-reform households, however, are assumed to act as
though they were subject to a newly introduced consumption tax. Their decision
rules solve an auxiliary problem, one where taxes are levied on consumption, not the
actual problem where taxes are levied on earnings. These households are, in a sense,
‘tricked’ to behave in a manner that produces the efficiency gains associated with the
switch to a consumption base, but without introducing real changes to the structure
of social insurance. In addition, factors prices are fixed at their initial steady-state
levels.
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Table 9: Decomposing the Macroeconomic and Welfare Effects
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Baseline Efficiency Insurance Fixed Prices Reform
Tax regime
Tax base
Tax level λ
Tax progressivity τ

L
0.666
0.136

L
0.674
0.136

C
0.653
0.136

C
0.659
0.136

C
0.659
0.136

0.35
1.59

-0.41
-0.42

-0.17
1.03

2.31

-0.57

1.56

-0.13
1.07
1.85
1.49
1.33

1.000
4.00

1.000
4.00

1.000
4.00

1.003
3.94

1.35

-0.33

0.95

0.92

0.202
0.364
0.496

0.201
0.352
0.503

0.203
0.364
0.505

0.200
0.364
0.506

Quantities (%∆)
Hours worked
Labor supply
Capital stock
Consumption
Output
Prices
Wage rate
Interest rate (%)

1.000
4.00

Welfare
CEV (%∆)
Gini coefficients
Consumption
Earnings
Wealth

0.201
0.343
0.495

The third column reports the results of the reverse exercise: households continue
acting as though they are subject to tax on earnings, but tax burdens are in fact
assessed according to expenditures. The purpose of this exercise is to isolate the
impact on the social insurance system. Does a consumption-based tax code do a
better job of redistributing resources from the rich and lucky to the the poor and
unlucky? As with the first counterfactual exercise, prices are held fixed.6
I then quantify the joint impact of the efficiency and insurance channels by solving
6

For additional details on the computation of the pseudo-consumption tax case and the pseudolabor income tax case, see Appendices A.6.4 and A.6.5.
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for the terminal steady state in the case of an open economy. The only difference
between this scenario and the full reform is that prices do not evolve to reflect changes
in aggregate quantities. The results of this exercise are reported in column 4 of Table
9. In all decomposition exercises, it is necessary to compute the transition path of
pubic debt in order to obtain the correct budget-balancing values for tax parameter
λ. The true initial and terminal steady states are displayed in columns 1 and 5 of
Table 9.
Several observations are worth making. First, the quantitatively important effect is
the mitigation of labor supply distortions. Eliminating these distortions, in isolation,
produces a 0.4% increase in labor supply and a 1.2% improvement in labor efficiency.
Aggregate consumption rises by a sizable 2.3% in the long run, more than enough to
offset somewhat higher work hours. This channel is responsible for generating all the
positive welfare gains associated with the simple reform.
Introducing the social insurance effect attenuates or reverses many of these aggregate
impacts. For example, long-run hours are 0.4% higher after mitigating the labor
supply distortion, but 0.4% lower after changing the basis for social insurance. There
is no impact on aggregate labor productivity. From a welfare perspective, the social
insurance effect is modestly negative. In this setting, the advantage of taxing the
superior signal for lifetime resources is clearly dominated by whatever advantage lies
in taxing earnings year by year.
Given the small differences in factor prices from one steady state to the other, it is
not surprising to see that the small open economy departs only marginally from the
closed economy. Equilibrium price effects are simply not large enough to color the
welfare consequences of the tax reform.
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4.4. An Optimal Tax Reform
In the previous section I assessed the impact of converting the tax system from an
earnings base to an expenditure base while holding progressivity fixed. This simple
reform generates a sustained consumption-equivalent welfare gain of roughly 0.9% for
cohorts born into the transition.
However, there is no reason to think a priori that the baseline progressivity is optimal
for either tax base. The parameter τ reflects the tax code as it is, not as it ought to be.
The results of the previous section are therefore an approximation of the differences
between a progressive labor income tax and a progressive consumption tax, not its
definitive measure. To obtain the latter, we must numerically characterize the optimal
choice of τ under both tax regimes and then compare. The differences that we observe
from the best-on-best comparison could be larger or smaller than before.
To ensure a consistent analysis, the optimal tax reform proceeds along the exact
same lines as the experiment described in subsection 4.3.1. In particular, only future
cohorts are subject to the new tax code and older cohorts continue to operate under
the old policy rules. This is true for all experiments, regardless of whether the tax
base is converted to consumption or not.
4.4.1. The Optimal Tax Codes
Figure 10 plots welfare gains against the progressivity parameter τ . The green and
blue dashed lines indicate the locations of the optimal progressivity parameter for the
labor income tax and consumption tax, respectively. The vertical black dashed line
indicates the location of the baseline progressivity parameter.
There are several important things to notice from this picture. First, the optimal
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Figure 10: Long-Run Welfare Gains by Tax Base as a Function of τ
tax code is less progressive, in the sense that τ is lower, whether or not the tax
system is converted to a consumption base. Second, the τ that maximizes welfare for
the consumption-based system is higher than the one that maximizes welfare for the
earnings-based system. Third, the utilitarian gap between the two tax bases narrows
slightly when we compare optima.
Table 10 documents important long-run differences across tax regimes. The numbers
for Baseline and Simple Reform are reproduced from Table 5. To those I have added
model data for the steady states induced by a transition to the optimal labor income
tax (column 2) and the optimal consumption tax (column 4). Both optimal reforms,
which reduce the scale of the progressivity parameter, lead to large long-run increases
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in aggregate quantities. Labor supply and physical capital expand by roughly 3% and
7%, respectively, and both output and consumption increase well over 4%. Interestingly, the changes in these quantities are very similar under either optimized reform,
despite the different tax bases and the different settings for the tax parameters.
Table 10: Terminal Steady States Under Optimal Tax Reform
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Optimal Simple Optimal
Baseline
L-Tax Reform C-Tax
Tax regime
Tax base
Tax level λ
Tax progressivity τ

L
0.666
0.136

L
0.712
0.078

C
0.659
0.136

C
0.699
0.095

2.48
2.94
7.16
4.35
4.32

-0.13
1.07
1.85
1.49
1.33

2.30
3.19
6.93
4.61
4.41

1.013
3.68

1.003
3.94

1.009
3.78

0.47

0.92

1.16

0.205
0.358
0.514

0.200
0.364
0.506

0.201
0.352
0.503

Quantities (%∆)
Hours worked
Labor supply
Capital stock
Consumption
Output
Prices
Wage rate
Interest rate (%)

1.000
4.00

Welfare
CEV (%∆)
Gini coefficients
Consumption
Earnings
Wealth

0.201
0.343
0.495

Despite the substanial increases in per capita quantities, the long-run welfare impacts
of optimized tax reform are surprisingly muted. The CEV is 0.5% for the optimal
labor income tax. It is 1.2% for the optimal consumption tax, not much higher than
the gain generated by base-conversion alone. Relative to the simple reform, the change
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in consumption is 3.12 percentage points greater under the optimal consumption tax.
But the change in hours is 2.43 percentage points greater too. The disutility of
the incremental work effort erodes most of the welfare improvement from higher
consumption.
The simple reform produces a welfare gain of 0.9%. When comparing optima, the
performance advantage of consumption taxation narrows to about 0.7%, somewhat
smaller than before. In fact, starting from the initial steady state, there are more
welfare gains to be had from converting to a cash-flow tax than there are from optimizing the existing labor income tax. The main result stands: adopting a progressive
consumption tax generates moderate welfare gains relative to a tax on earnings.
4.4.2. Labor Supply in the New Steady State
I previously argued that labor efficiency was the main channel through which the
simple reform affected aggregate quantities and welfare. I conduct a similar analysis
here for the optimal tax reforms.
In Figure 11, I trace out the life-cycle profiles of work effort and average productivity
in the stationary equilibria associated with each of the three tax reforms. As shown
in the top panel, the two optimal reforms induce similar changes in hours over the
life cycle. The slight difference in aggregate hours between these two regimes has its
source at the beginning and end of the working life. In contrast, the simple reform
has a very marginally negative impact on hours. These results illustrate the impact
of the progressivity parameter τ on lifetime hours, which applies regardless of the tax
base.
The bottom panel reveals a starker rank-order with respect to changes in labor productivity, which is defined as total productivity units divided by total hours, as before.
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Figure 11: Hours and Productivity Over the Life Cycle by Tax Reform
The simple reform induces the the greatest response along this dimension, greater
even than the optimal consumption tax. Under the latter regime, hours are uniformly higher in all states of the world, so the change in average labor productivity
is mechanically less pronounced. The optimal labor income tax, which continues to
distort the allocation of labor across productivity states—albeit less intensely than
before—induces the smallest improvement in labor efficiency.
Table 11 reports the steady-state changes in labor productivity, aggregated across age
groups. The story for the optimal reforms is similar to that for the simple reform.
There is little re-allocation of work effort across age; the improvement springs entirely
from re-allocation of work effort across productivity states.
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Table 11: Change in Aggregate Labor Efficiency Across Steady States
Simple Optimal Optimal
∆% in labor efficiency due to..
Reform C-Tax
L-Tax
intertemporal re-allocation of hours
-0.03
-0.02
-0.06
intratemporal re-allocation of hours
1.23
0.89
0.51
combined re-allocation of hours
1.20
0.87
0.45
As I did for the simple reform, I estimate the elasticity of labor supply with respect
to persistent and transitory innovations to the productivity process. The life-cycle
elasticity profiles are plotted in Figure 12 and the aggregate elasticities are reported
in Table 12. All three tax reforms induce marked increases in labor supply sensitivity
to shocks of either type. The elasticty profiles of the two consumption-tax steady
states are indistinguishable, while workers toiling under the optimized labor income
tax are somewhat less responsive, though still much more so than in the benchmark
economy.
Table 12: Comparing Labor Supply Elasticities Across Steady States
Simple Optimal Optimal
Parameter
Baseline
Reform L-Tax
C-Tax
persistent-shock elasticity p 0.2506
0.3170
0.2926
0.3092
transitory-shock elasticity t
0.3495
0.4343
0.4132
0.4308

4.5. Sensitivity Analysis
In this section I discuss the sensitivity of my results to the key parametric assumptions. For each alternative specification it is necessary to recalibrate the model to
make the results comparable with those reported above for the baseline economy.
Throughout this section I focus on results from the simple tax reform described in
Section 4.3.
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Figure 12: Labor Supply Elasticities Over the Life Cycle
4.5.1. Labor Supply Elasticity
I showed in Section 4.3 that the welfare gains associated with a progressive consumption tax are closely linked to the willingness and ability of households to subsitute
work hours across productivity states. To check if these results are quantitatively
robust, I conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to the labor elasticity parameter
γ. In particular, Table 13 documents how the results change when we set the Frisch
elasticity at a lower value (0.25) and a higher value (0.75). Not surprisingly, the
impact of the simple tax reform is less dramatic when labor supply is less elastic.
Long-run labor efficiency improves by only 0.6% in the low Frisch scenario, about
half the baseline increase. Consequently, the welfare gains are more modest, about
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0.5% in consumption-equivalent terms.
Table 13: Sensitivity with Respect to Preference Parameters
Low
High
Low
High
Baseline
Frisch Frisch CRRA CRRA
Parameters
Coefficient of RRA σ
Frisch elasticity
γ −1

2.00
0.50

1.00

4.00

0.25

0.75

-0.13
1.07
1.85
1.49
1.33

0.13
0.74
0.43
0.91
0.63

-0.52
1.26
3.07
1.87
1.85

-1.18
0.14
-0.75
0.06
-0.15

0.61
1.72
4.90
2.65
2.76

1.003
3.94

0.999
4.02

1.006
3.86

0.997
4.07

1.010
3.76

0.92

0.55

1.20

0.26

1.69

Quantities (%∆)
Hours worked
Labor supply
Capital stock
Consumption
Output
Prices
Wage rate
Interest rate (%)
Welfare
CEV (%∆)

This table reports the long-run impact of the simple tax reform under alternative
specifications of the model. The model is always calibrated so that prices in the initial
steady state are w = 1 and r = 4%, and so that one-third of the time endowment
is devoted to working. The baseline results from Section 4.3 are reproduced her for
ease of comparison. Blank cells in the parameter rows indicate no change from the
baseline.

4.5.2. Consumption Smoothing
The relative merits of progressive consumption taxation are closely linked to the
household’s inclination to smooth its consumer spending over time. To test how my
choice for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution affects the results, I consider a
lower value (σ = 1, that is, log-utility) and a higher value (σ = 4) for this parameter.
The results are reported in Table 13 alongside those from the previous subsection.
The key finding here is that the welfare and macroeconomic effects of the simple
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reform are quite sensitive to the choice of this parameter. In the log-utility case, the
welfare gain of tax-base conversion is much smaller, about 0.3%. In the other case,
the welfare gain nearly doubles to 1.7%.

4.6. A Rate-Differentiated Indirect Tax System
In this section, I explore the possibility of building a progressive tax system using
rate-differentiated indirect taxes on consumption. For reasons discussed in Chapter
3, I consider only the simplest version of this scehme, one in which a subset of final
goods and services is exempt from taxation, and all others are taxed at a common
rate. This kind of rate differentiation is familiar to taxpayers in many jurisdictions
with RSTs or VATs, as it is common to levy below-standard or zero rates on groceries,
medicines and other necessities. If the expenditure share on taxable goods increases
with total expenditure, then a simple two-rate system can distribute the tax burden
across households in a progressive manner.
4.6.1. A Model with Basic and Non-Basic Consumption
The model is the same as before with one notable modification. Instead of a single
composite good, households divide their spending between basic consumer goods c
and non-basic consumer goods d. The household’s choice is constrained by a mininum
basic consumption level c.
Following Conesa et al. (2020), the period utility function takes the following form:

u(c, h) =

[(c − c)θ d1−θ ]1−σ
h1+γ
−ϕ
1−σ
1+γ

(4.11)

The parameter θ governs the share of household expenditures in excess of the minimum level that is devoted to basic goods and services. Non-basic consumption is
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subject to its own flat tax rate, denoted τd , and the output good is costlessly converted
into either consumption good.
4.6.2. Calibrating the Two-Good Model
Compared with the baseline model, I need to pin down two additional structural
parameters, c and θ. These parameters are chosen to capture consumption patterns
observed in the 2006-2012 waves of the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX).
The first step is to empirically distinguish between basic and non-basic consumption.
After restricting the sample along similar lines to Heathcote et al. (2010), I calculate
expenditure shares for 12 consumption categories and dozens of associated subcategories. I then separately regress each consumption variable on total expenditure and
its square. The results are displayed in Table 20 and are used to classify goods and
services into one of two groups. For more details on the sample selection and the
classification procedure, see Appendix A.7.
The first group of variables consists of those for which the the estimated constant term
is positive and the estimated quadratic coefficient is negative. There are eight such
variables: food at home; rented dwellings; utilities; gasoline and motor oil; vehicle
insurance; prescription drugs; televisions, radios, and sound equipment; and tobacco
and smoking supplies. Because some of these goods are unlikely to be exempted
from tax in practice, I choose four of them to serve as my empirical counterpart to
the model’s basic consumer good, namely: food at home, rented dwellings, utilities,
and prescription drugs. These four variables account for 27.3% of total consumer
spending. All other variables are subsumed into the non-basic category.
The relationship between expenditure shares and total expenditure is displayed in
Figure 13 for selected categories. The basic expenditure share declines steeply with
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total expenditure. These categories account for 55.8% of all consumer spending in
the bottom decile but only 15.4% of all consumer spending in the top decile.
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Figure 13: Basic and Non-Basic Consumption
To pin down the new structural parameters, I regress the sum of the designated basic
categories on total expenditure and set θ equal to the estimated slope coefficient.
The value is 0.091, indicating that approximately 91% of consumer expenditures in
excess of the basic minimum are devoted to non-basic consumer goods. The minimum
consumption c is subsequently chosen to target the empirically observed ratio of nonbasic to basic consumption,

C
D

= 2.65.

In the initial calibration, the tax rates on both kinds of consumption are set to the
same value, 4.4%. All other parameters, whether calibrated externally or internally,
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are chosen as in Section 4.2. Select key parameters are summarized in Table 14, with
internally calibrated parameters in bold.

Parameter

Table 14: 2-good model parameters
Value

Target

Preferences
σ
γ −1
ϕ
β
θ
c

Coefficient of relative risk aversion
2.0
Frisch elasticity
0.5
Disutility of labor
170.1 h̄ = 1/3
Annual discount factor
1.015 r = 4%
Basic consumption share
0.091
C
Basic consumption minimum
0.062 D
= 2.65

Production
α
δ
A

Capital income share
Depreciation rate
Aggregate technology

0.33
8%
0.937 w = 1.0

Labor tax progressivity
Labor tax level
Capital tax rate
Basic sales tax rate
Non-basic sales tax rate
Public debt
Social security benefit

0.136
0.656 G/Q = 0.17
28.3%
4.4%
4.4%
26.4 B/Q = 0.97
0.193 b/ȳ = 0.35

Accidental bequest

0.029

Policies
τ
λ
τk
τc
τd
B
b
Transfers
q

fixed point

Internally calibrated parameters are in bold.

4.6.3. Two Routes to a Progressive Consumption Tax
The benchmark quantitative model of Section 4.1 admits a single approach to implementing a progressive consumption tax: the direct cash-flow tax with graduated
rates. With the two-good model we can also study the adoption of a rate-differentiated
indirect system. In this subsection, I numerically assess and compare these two ap-
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proaches.
The tax experiments proceed as in Section 4.3. Pre-reform households remain subject
to the existing earnings-based tax system. Post-reform households are subject to the
new consumption-based tax system, with fiscal policy parameters and transfers held
constant across generations. Public debt adjusts along the transition to absorb any
shortfalls in the government budget. Consequently, the only environmental differences
across generations (besides status as pre- or post-reform) are general equilibrium price
effects.
The cash-flow reform is constructed the same way as before. The base is converted
from earnings to consumption, and λ adjusts to ensure budget balance. The design of
the rate-differentiation reform is as follows. The progressive labor income tax and the
common-rate sales tax are jointly replaced by a dual-rate sales tax. The tax rate on
basic goods is exogenously set to zero. The tax rate on non-basic goods is chosen to
balance the government budget in the terminal steady state. The difference between
the two tax rates, along with the endogenous consumption response, determines the
extent of progressivity in equilibrium. The policy parameters of the various reform
packages are summarized in Table 15.
Table 15: Consumption-Based Tax Regimes
direct tax
indirect taxes
transfers
c
d
τ
λ
τ
τ
b
q
Closed Economy
Cash-Flow System
0.136 0.574 4.4% 4.4% 0.2427 0.0624
Rate-Differentiation
0.0% 111.5% 0.1932 0.0573
Open Economy
Cash-Flow System
0.136 0.561 4.4% 4.4% 0.2427 0.0713
Rate-Differentiation
0.0% 112.6% 0.1932 0.0575
The capital income tax rate remains fixed at 28.3% in all experiments.

The consumption-equivalent welfare measure used to evaluate the tax reforms un126

der consideration is defined as before, with some modifications to account for the
presence of multiple goods and the consumption floor. Specifically, the consumption
equivalent variation is the uniform percentage change in total consumption required
to make the initial steady-state allocation as attractive as the terminal steady-state
allocation, assuming that the difference is distributed across the two consumer goods
in proportion to the amounts consumed in excess of the basic minimum.
Formally, let (c0 , d0 , h0 ) and (c∞ , d∞ , h∞ ) denote allocations in the old and new steady
states, and let W denote ex ante expected lifetime utility as a function of the allocation. Then the consumption-equivalent variation is defined as:

CEV =

c0 − c + d0
c0 + d 0


ς

where ς is the (unique) solution to:

W ((1 + ς)(c0 − c), (1 + ς)d0 , h0 ) = W (c∞ , d∞ , h∞ )

4.6.4. Cash-Flow Direct Taxation vs Rate-Differentiated Indirect Taxation
Table 16 shows the steady-state results for the baseline economy and the various
consumption tax reforms. The most salient result is the difference in welfare effects
across the two tax structures. Whereas the cash-flow system generates very large
welfare gains, the rate-differentiated system generates very large welfare losses.
The long-run effects of the cash-flow reform are familiar from previous exercises, but
with more extreme responses given the modified preference structure in 4.11. Labor
productivity increases by 3% across steady states, leading to large increases in capital
accumulation, output, and consumption of both goods. The impact is quantitatively
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Table 16: Steady-State Comparisons in the Two-Good Model
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Baseline Cash-Flow Cash-Flow Dual-Rate Dual-Rate
Closed
Open
Closed
Open
Tax regime
Tax base
Tax level
Tax progressivity
Basic sales tax
Non-basic sales tax

L
0.656
0.136
4.4%
4.4%

C
0.574
0.136
4.4%
4.4%

C
0.561
0.136
4.4%
4.4%

1.85
4.81
16.82
3.06
11.59
9.24
8.63

1.39
4.18

0.0%
111.5%

0.0%
112.6%

-11.68
-10.22
-9.99
14.69
-26.42
-15.09
-10.14

-11.71
-10.24

Quantities (%∆)
Hours worked
Labor supply
Capital stock
Basic consumption
Non-basic cons.
Total consumption
Output

3.36
12.73
10.15

14.72
-26.74
-15.31

Prices
Wage rate
Interest rate (%)

1.000
4.00

1.036
3.16

1.000
4.00

1.001
3.98

1.000
4.00

15.77

18.09

-10.38

-10.63

Welfare
CEV (%∆)

similar whether or not we allow prices to adjust in equilibrium. The aggregate welfare
gain is 16% in the closed economy-version of the experiment and 18% in the openeconomy version.
The indirect tax system generates effects of similar magnitude but opposite sign.
Replacing the personal tax with a dual-rate system requires a tax of close to 112% on
non-basic consumer goods, a large deviation from the principle of uniform commodity
taxation. This severe distortion of relative prices induces both a 15% increase in basic
consumption and a 26% decrease in non-basic consumption. The aggregate ratio of
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non-basic to basic consumption falls from 2.65 in the initial steady state to 1.68 in
the terminal steady state. The distortion of relative prices affects more than just the
allocation of spending across different categories of consumer goods. It also creates a
disincentive to work and invest, resulting in substantial long-run reductions in hours,
labor suppy, physical capital and output. In welfare terms, the rate-differentiated
system generates a long-run loss of 10%. This effect is consistent with Conesa et al.
(2020), who report a steady-state welfare loss of 6.6% when they replace labor and
capital income taxes with a dual-rate consumption tax system like the one considered
here.
These results quantify the sentiments expressed in the Mirrlees Review : “When other
more direct instruments exist, using differentiation in the indirect tax system to
achieve distributional objectives is likely to be costly and inefficient.”7 Policy-makers
seeking to enact a progressive consumption-based tax system are well-advised to adopt
the cash-flow structure instead.

4.7. Concluding Remarks
This dissertation asks a simple question: are consumption taxes better than labor
income taxes? Departing from existing analyses in the literature, I focus attention on
economies with non-linear taxes and heterogeneous agents. Equivalency between the
two candidate tax systems breaks down in such settings for two reasons. First, consumption is endogenously smoothed over the life cycle and is therefore more strongly
correlated with lifetime resources. Second, a progressive labor income tax dampens
the household’s responsiveness to wage changes in ways that a progressive consumption tax does not. It is the second channel that proves quantitatively important. A
7

Mirrlees et al., Tax by Design: The Mirrlees Review (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011),
p. 160.
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simple conversion of the existing tax-and-transfer system from an earnings base to an
expenditure base yields a welfare gain of 0.9%, all of which is due to the re-allocation
of work hours across productivity states. This relative utilitarian advantage narrows
to 0.7% when we compare optimized tax systems, as shown in Section 4.4.
The key driver of my results is the interaction between non-linear tax schedules and
fluctuating wages. But this is not the only reason to suspect the non-equivalency of
consumption taxation and labor income taxation. Several others come to mind. For
example, agents in my model trade a single risk-free bond. But the risk-free rate is just
one possible component of the return on an investment. Investment returns also reflect
risk premia, economic rents and sheer luck. An intriguing feature of consumptionbased tax systems is that they effectively tax these other components while leaving
the risk-free component untouched. Since most of the theoretical objections to capital
income taxation concern the impact on the risk-free rate, a progressive consumption
tax could allow policy-makers to tax supernormal returns (at graduated rates) without
distorting the basic incentive to save and invest. This aspect of cash-flow taxation
presents a promising avenue for future research.
As noted in earlier chaptesr, the cash-flow tax I study bears a resemblance to existing
retirement savings programs likes IRAs and 401(k)s. The major plank of all these
policies is the deductibility of contributions to savings accounts from the taxpayer’s
taxable income. One significant difference is that IRAs and 401(k)s are subject to
many restrictions, limits and penalties. In contrast, the cash-flow tax studied here
has no restraints. An important quantitative question that I leave for future research
is the extent to which the restricted extant programs are able to capture the gains
identified in this study.
In my model, consumption is especially smooth over the life cycle because there are no
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lumpy expenditures or shocks to marginal utility. If expenditures were more volatitle,
the advantage of the consumption base would begin to dissipate. As discussed in
Section 2.5, a feasible solution to such problems is to give households the choice of
whether to deduct net savings on their tax returns. A hybrid system of this sort allows
households to continue saving in qualified accounts for self-insurance and retirement.
But they could also use non-qualified accounts to save for durables and to weather
unexpected expenditure shocks. Consequently, I do not consider the absence of such
features in my model to be limiting. The main result still applies. By relaxing
the distortions on household labor supply, a progressive consumption tax generates
aggregate improvements in labor efficiency and modest welfare gains over the long
run.
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APPENDIX
A.1. Endorsements of the Hobbesian Concept of Tax Fairness
Petty (1662, p. 71):
Concluding therefore that every man ought to contribute according to
what he taketh to himself, and actually enjoyeth. The first thing to be
done is, to compute what the Total of the Expense of this Nation is by
particular men upon themselves, and then what part thereof is necessary
for the Publick.
Rep. Alanson Houghton (1921), as cited in Bank (2003, p. 2242):
Would you put a tax on a man who by saving increases the total funds
of investment money in the country and so develops business, industry,
and farming, or would you put the burden on the man who spends it on
flowers, in yachting, and a thousand and one ways that do not produce a
permanent increase in revenue?
Fisher and Fisher (1942, p. 94):
When rich men are an offense in the eyes of the relatively poor, it is
because of their big domestic establishments and their big spendings, not
because of their big savings and big industrial plants. Snobbery goes with
the idle and extravagant way of living—with diamonds and retinues of
servants; but snobbery is seldom seen in a big factory where the owner
himself works. In fact, few workers in democratic America object to the
rich man who lives and works like a poor man—who puts his gains into
instruments of production, not into instruments of consumption.
Kaldor (1955, p. 53):
An Expenditure base would tax people according to the amount which
they take out of the common pool, and not according to what they put into
it. An inhabitant from Mars, admiring the highly intricate arrangements
whereby men in society satisfy their needs in common through mutual
co-operation, would surely be puzzled to discover that each individual’s
contribution to the finance of socially provided benefits depends not on
the sum of benefits he receives from the community but on his personal
contribution to the wealth of the others. It is only be spending, not by
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earning or saving, that an individual imposes a burden on the rest of
the community in attaining his own ends. In all his other activities his
own interests and the interests of the community run not counter to one
another but parallel.
Feldstein (1976, p. 15):
The idea that everyone’s tax should depend on how much he consumes,
regardless of how that consumption is financed, appeals strongly to our
sense of fairness.
Meade (1978, p. xv-xvi):
A modern humane society demands that effective action be taken to
prevent poverty and to remove unacceptable inequalities of opportunity,
wealth and privilege...An appropriate structure for this purpose would
be...a basic reform of direct taxation which levied a charge on what people took out of the economic system in high levels of consumption rather
than what they put into the system through their savings and enterprise.
Summers (1984, p. 258):
First, there is the question of choosing a fair base for taxation. Thomas
Hobbes argued that there was greater justice in taxing people on what they
took from the social pot (their consumption) rather than on what they
contributed (as measured by their income). In many cases, this valued
judgment seems compelling. Should not some tax be paid by a wealthy
man who draws down his wealth to maintain a high rate of consumption?
It is not unreasonable for the profligate borrower, who lives beyond his
income, to pay taxes on his pleasures?
Seidman (1997, p. 56):
It seems reasonable to contend that a principle of fairness ought to consider
what each person adds to and subtracts from the economic pie. It ought
to consider how a person’s economic behaviour affects others. From this
perspective, it seems fairer to tax a person according to what that person
subtracts from, rather than adds to, the economic pie.
Hall and Rabushka (2007, p. 61-62):
The underlying concept of consumption taxes is that individuals would
be taxed on what they take out of the economy (when they spend money
to consume), not on what they produce (reflected in working and saving).
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A.2. Consumption Taxation and Zero Capital Income Taxation
This dissertation emphasizes the importance of evaluating consumption taxation as
an alternative to labor income taxation specifically, independently of the treatment
of capital. In contrast, the existing literature often treats consumption taxation as
an alternative to labor and capital income taxation jointly, thereby conflating the
economic effects of consumption taxation with those of zero capital income taxation.
Here is a non-exhaustive sample.

Mieszkowski (1977, p. 4):
The substitution of an expenditure tax for an income tax, of equal yield,
is likely to increase the amount of savings and lead to capital formation
and higher overall consumption possibilities in the long run.
Bradford et al. (1977, p. 10):
By eliminating disencentives to saving, the cash flow tax would encourage
capital formation, leading to higher growh rates and more capital per
worker and higher before-tax wages.
Seidman (1997, p. 1):
According to proponents, the aim of the [consumption tax] is to promote
saving and investment.
McNulty (2000, p. 2133):
Another important point made in favor of a flat or graduated rate consumption tax is that it will increase and improve saving.
McCaffery (2002, p. 113):
The Fair Not Flat Tax distorts neither decisions about how much to save
nor decisions about the form of savings. Capital is good for us all, and the
Fair Not Flat Tax releases capital from the perverse investment incentives
of the status quo.
Frank (2005, p. 1):
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Replacing the income tax with a progressive consumption tax would stimulate additional savings.
Auerbach and Hassett (2005, p. 5):
The distinction between a consumption tax and an income tax...is that
an income tax, at least to some extent, taxes the return on savings and
investment, whereas a consumption tax does not.
Zodrow (2006, p. 3):
The primary difference between the income and consumption tax approaches lies in their treatments of capital income.
Hall and Rabushka (2007, p. 63):
The justification for consumption taxes rests on their built-in incentives
to save and invest.
Boadway (2010, p. 11):
What does normative tax analysis suggest about the case for the choice
between consumption taxation and income taxation, or equivalently, the
case for taxing capital income?’
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A.3. Indirect Consumption Taxes in the OECD
Figure 14 shows the time series for global adoption of the VAT. Figure 15 charts the
evolution of the tax structure across the OECD. Table 17 and Table 18 shows the
VAT as a percentage of GDP and tax revenue for OECD countries for selected years.
Table 19 reports sales tax rates in the U.S.
Figure 14: # of Countries with a Value-Added Tax, 1960-2020
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Source: OECD, Consumption Tax Trends 2020.

136

2010

2020

Figure 15: OECD Average Tax Mix as a % of Total Revenues, 1965-2018
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Table 17: Value-Added Taxes in the OECD as
Year
1975 1990 2000 2005 2010
Australia
0.0
0.0
3.4
3.9
3.4
Austria
7.2
8.2
7.9
7.6
7.7
Belgium
6.3
6.8
7.1
6.9
7.0
Canada
0.0
0.0
3.2
3.2
4.2
Chile
6.3
7.9
7.8
7.5
Colombia
2.6
4.3
5.2
5.3
Czech Republic
5.9
6.5
6.6
Denmark
6.4
8.4
9.1
9.7
9.4
Estonia
8.4
8.0
8.5
Finland
5.7
8.3
8.0
8.3
8.3
France
8.1
7.6
7.2
7.2
6.8
Germany
5.0
5.8
6.7
6.1
7.0
Greece
0.0
6.2
6.3
6.7
7.1
Hungary
8.7
8.2
8.5
Iceland
0.0
8.7 10.3 10.8 7.3
Ireland
4.1
6.6
7.1
7.3
6.0
Israel
7.4
7.5
7.5
Italy
3.3
5.3
6.2
5.7
6.1
Japan
1.2
2.3
2.5
2.5
Korea
0.0
3.4
3.6
3.8
3.9
Latvia
7.0
7.4
6.7
Lithuania
7.5
7.1
7.8
Luxembourg
3.8
4.0
4.9
6.0
6.4
Mexico
3.2
2.8
3.3
3.8
Netherlands
5.4
6.5
6.4
6.7
6.7
New Zealand
0.0
8.1
8.1
8.6
9.3
Norway
8.0
7.6
8.2
7.7
7.8
Poland
6.9
7.7
7.6
Portugal
0.0
5.2
7.6
8.2
7.5
Slovak Republic
6.8
7.7
6.1
Slovenia
8.5
8.5
8.1
Spain
0.0
5.0
5.8
6.2
5.2
Sweden
4.6
7.3
8.2
8.5
9.0
Switzerland
0.0
2.8
3.6
3.6
3.4
Turkey
2.7
5.7
5.1
5.4
United Kingdom
3.0
5.5
5.9
6.1
6.1
United States
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Unweighted average 3.1
5.1
6.3
6.5
6.4

a % of
2015
3.6
7.6
6.6
4.4
8.3
5.2
7.2
9.1
9.0
9.0
6.9
7.0
7.3
9.5
8.0
4.5
7.8
6.1
4.2
3.6
7.7
7.7
6.5
3.8
6.5
9.5
8.2
7.0
8.6
6.8
8.3
6.4
8.9
3.4
5.1
6.9
0.0
6.7

GDP
2017
3.5
7.6
6.7
4.5
8.4
5.5
7.6
9.5
9.0
9.0
7.0
7.0
8.1
9.3
8.9
4.4
7.4
6.2
4.1
4.1
8.1
7.8
5.9
3.7
6.8
9.5
8.6
7.8
8.6
7.0
8.1
6.5
9.2
3.4
5.0
6.9
0.0
6.8

Sources: OECD, Consumption Tax Trends 2020 ; OECD, Revenue Statistics 2020.
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2018
3.3
7.6
6.8
4.5
8.5
5.7
7.6
9.5
9.0
9.1
7.1
7.0
8.3
9.7
8.8
4.4
7.5
6.2
4.1
4.1
8.4
7.8
6.1
3.9
6.8
9.7
8.4
8.1
8.7
7.1
8.2
6.6
9.2
3.3
4.8
7.0
0.0
6.8

Table 18: Value-Added
Year
1975
Australia
0.0
Austria
19.8
Belgium
16.2
Canada
0.0
Chile
Colombia
Czech Republic
Denmark
17.5
Estonia
Finland
15.6
France
23.1
Germany
14.6
Greece
0.0
Hungary
Iceland
0.0
Ireland
14.7
Israel
Italy
13.7
Japan
Korea
0.0
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
12.1
Mexico
Netherlands
14.4
New Zealand
0.0
Norway
20.5
Poland
Portugal
0.0
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Spain
0.0
Sweden
12.0
Switzerland
0.0
Turkey
United Kingdom
8.9
United States
0.0
Unweighted average 8.8

Taxes in the OECD as a %
1990 2000 2005 2010
0.0 11.1 13.1 13.4
20.8 18.7 18.6 18.7
16.4 16.1 15.9 16.2
0.0
9.2
9.9 13.7
37.4 41.8 37.8 38.5
22.6 27.6 28.2 29.3
18.3 19.1 20.5
18.8 19.5 20.2 21.0
27.1 26.9 25.7
19.3 17.4 19.9 20.4
18.4 16.7 16.7 16.1
16.6 18.4 17.8 19.8
24.6 18.9 21.1 22.0
22.4 22.5 22.9
28.5 28.5 27.3 22.7
20.4 22.9 24.2 21.7
21.1 22.3 24.4
14.7 15.4 14.6 14.5
4.4
9.1
9.5
9.6
18.7 17.0 17.4 17.5
23.9 26.4 23.3
24.4 24.3 27.5
12.1 13.2 16.0 17.0
26.1 24.7 29.3 29.4
16.5 17.3 19.2 18.7
22.4 24.9 23.8 30.7
18.8 19.8 18.1 18.6
21.0 23.2 24.2
19.6 24.4 26.6 24.7
20.4 24.6 21.8
22.6 21.6 21.3
15.7 17.6 17.7 16.5
14.8 16.8 18.1 21.0
11.6 13.1 13.4 12.7
18.3 24.2 21.8 21.7
16.9 18.1 18.6 19.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
16.9 19.6 20.2 20.5

of Total Revenue
2015 2017
2018
13.0 12.2
11.7
17.7 18.3
18.0
15.0 15.2
15.4
13.3 13.5
13.6
40.8 41.6
40.2
26.0 29.0
29.4
21.7 22.0
21.6
19.9 20.7
21.5
27.2 27.7
27.3
20.6 21.0
21.6
15.2 15.3
15.4
18.8 18.4
18.2
20.0 21.0
21.3
24.5 24.4
25.8
22.6 23.8
23.6
19.3 19.3
19.3
24.9 22.9
24.2
14.2 14.8
14.8
13.7 13.0
12.8
15.3 16.0
15.3
25.6 25.7
27.0
27.0 26.6
25.8
17.5 15.8
15.4
23.9 23.1
24.3
17.6 17.4
17.6
30.2 30.2
29.6
21.3 22.2
21.2
21.5 22.8
23.1
24.9 25.1
25.1
20.8 20.5
20.5
22.2 21.8
22.0
19.0 19.2
19.0
20.8 20.7
21.0
12.4 12.0
11.7
20.6 20.1
19.8
21.4 20.9
21.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
20.3 20.4
20.4

Sources: OECD, Consumption Tax Trends 2020 ; OECD, Revenue Statistics 2020.
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Table 19: Retail Sales Tax Rates by State
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
US Average

State Tax
Rate
4.00%
0.00%
5.60%
6.50%
7.25%
2.90%
6.35%
0.00%
6.00%
6.00%
4.00%
4.00%
6.00%
6.25%
7.00%
6.00%
6.50%
6.00%
4.45%
5.50%
6.00%
6.25%
6.00%
6.88%
7.00%
4.23%
0.00%
5.50%
6.85%
0.00%
6.63%
5.13%
4.00%
4.75%
5.00%
5.75%
4.50%
0.00%
6.00%
7.00%
6.00%
4.50%
7.00%
6.25%
6.10%
6.00%
5.30%
6.50%
6.00%
5.00%
4.00%
5.75%

Average Local
Tax Rate
5.22%
1.76%
2.80%
2.97%
1.41%
4.75%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
1.05%
3.31%
0.44%
0.03%
2.83%
0.00%
0.94%
2.18%
0.00%
5.07%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.58%
0.07%
3.96%
0.00%
1.43%
1.47%
0.00%
-0.03%
2.69%
4.52%
2.22%
1.86%
1.42%
4.44%
0.00%
0.34%
0.00%
1.46%
1.90%
2.53%
1.94%
1.08%
0.22%
0.35%
2.71%
0.41%
0.46%
1.34%
1.66%

Combined
Tax Rate
9.22%
1.76%
8.40%
9.47%
8.66%
7.65%
6.35%
0.00%
6.00%
7.05%
7.31%
4.44%
6.03%
9.08%
7.00%
6.94%
8.68%
6.00%
9.52%
5.50%
6.00%
6.25%
6.00%
7.46%
7.07%
8.19%
0.00%
6.93%
8.32%
0.00%
6.60%
7.82%
8.52%
6.97%
6.86%
7.17%
8.94%
0.00%
6.34%
7.00%
7.46%
6.40%
9.53%
8.19%
7.18%
6.22%
5.65%
9.21%
6.41%
5.46%
5.34%
7.41%

Rank
4
46
11
3
9
16
33
38
47
23
19
45
37
6
24
27
8
38
2
42
38
35
38
18
22
14
47
28
12
47
30
15
10
26
29
21
7
47
34
24
17
32
1
13
20
36
41
5
31
43
44
44

Max Local
Tax Rate
7.50%
7.50%
5.60%
5.13%
2.50%
8.30%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
2.50%
5.00%
0.50%
3.00%
10.00%
0.00%
1.00%
4.00%
0.00%
7.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
2.00%
1.00%
5.63%
0.00%
2.50%
1.65%
0.00%
3.31%
4.13%
4.88%
2.75%
3.50%
2.25%
7.00%
0.00%
2.00%
0.00%
3.00%
4.50%
2.75%
2.00%
2.95%
1.00%
0.70%
4.00%
1.00%
1.75%
2.00%
10.00%

Source: Tax Foundation, https://taxfoundation.org/2020-sales-taxes/
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A.4. Proofs
A.4.1. Proof of Lemma 2, Part 3
Lemma. Lifetime output is higher under the consumption tax. That is,

C
L
L
L
y c = w1 hC
1 + w2 h2 > w1 h1 + w2 h2 = y

Proof. To show this is true, it will be convenient to define ε =

w2
w1

and:

g(τ̂ ) ≡ (1 − τ̂ )(1 + η)(η + τ̂ )−1
 −1
Γ1 (ε) ≡ 1 + εg(τ̂ ) 1+η
 −1
Γ2 (ε) ≡ 1 + ε−g(τ̂ ) 1+η
Γ(ε) ≡ Γ1 (ε) + εΓ2 (ε)

 1
ϕ ≡ 2(1 − τ )φ−1 1+η

With this notation, write hours under the labor tax as h∗j = ϕΓj (ε) and pre-tax
earnings as y = w1 ϕΓ(ε). Now, the only difference under the consumption tax is
that the parameter τ̂ in the g-function is zero. To adjust the distortion on the hours
profile while maintaining the same progressivity, differentiate with respect to τ̂ .


−( 2+η
∂y
−1
1+η )
=ϕ
1 + εg(τ̂ )
(ln ε)εg(τ̂ ) g 0 (τ̂ )
∂ τ̂
1+η



 2+η
−1
g(τ̂ ) −( 1+η )
−g(τ̂ ) 0
−ε
1+ε
(ln ε)ε
g (τ̂ )
1+η
Since g 0 (τ̂ ) = − [(1 − τ̂ )(η + τ̂ )−2 + (η + τ̂ )−1 + 1], we have:
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∂y
=
∂ τ̂

Note that

∂y
∂ τ̂



ϕ ln ε
1+η




 2+η
(1 − τ̂ )
1
g(τ̂ ) −( 1+η ) g(τ̂ )
+
1
1
+
ε
ε
+
(η + τ̂ )2 η + τ̂



 2+η
−1
g(τ̂ ) −( 1+η ) −g(τ̂ )
1+ε
−ε
ε
1+η

= 0 when ε = 1. This is sensible because when a household’s wages

are constant, optimal hours are constant too and no allocation distortion can apply.
Otherwise:
∂y
< 0 ⇐⇒ G(ε) ln ε < 0
∂ τ̂
where G(·) is short-hand for the terms in the curly brackets.
Without loss of generality, we can examine only the case of an increasing wage profile,
that is, ε > 1. The argument for the opposite case is symmetrical. When ε > 1, the
distortion decreases lifetime output ( ∂∂yτ̂ < 0) if and only if:
G(ε) < 0 ⇐⇒

1+ε

 2+η
g(τ̂ ) −( 1+η ) g(τ̂ )
ε


<ε

−1
1+η



1 + εg(τ̂ )

−( 2+η
1+η )

ε−g(τ̂ )

 2+η
1 + εg(τ̂ ) 1+η
⇐⇒ ε
<
1 + ε−g(τ̂ )



2+η 
ln(1 + εg(τ̂ ) ) − ln(1 + ε−g(τ̂ ) )
⇐⇒ (2g(τ̂ ) − 1) ln(ε) <
1+η
2g(τ̂ )−1



Define:

Ĝ(ε; ĝ) ≡ (2ĝ − 1) ln ε −

2+η
1+η






ln(1 + εĝ ) − ln(1 + ε−ĝ )

Thus, we have G(ε) < 0 if and only Ĝ(ε; ĝ) < 0. Differentiating the latter function
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with respect to ĝ:



∂ Ĝ
2+η
ln ε · εĝ ln ε · ε−ĝ
= 2 ln ε −
+
∂ĝ
1+η
1 + εĝ
1 + ε−ĝ


  ĝ
 ĝ 
2+η
ε
ε
ε−ĝ
= 2−
ln ε
+
ĝ
−ĝ
1+η
1+ε
1+ε
εĝ
  ĝ



ε
2+η
1
ln ε
= 2−
+
1+η
1 + εĝ 1 + εĝ


η
=
ln ε
1+η
which is striclty positive if ε > 1, as assumed. Recalling that g 0 < 0, this implies that
∂ Ĝ ∂g(τ̂ )
∂G(ε)
= exp{Ĝ(ε)}
<0
∂ τ̂
∂ĝ ∂ τ̂
We have the following result: if ε > 1 and G(ε) ≤ 0 for some τ̂ , then G(ε) < 0 for
any τ > τ̂ . So consider the no-distortion case of τ̂ = 0 where g(0) =

1+η
.
η

Returning

to an earlier inequality, we obtain:

G(ε) ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ ε2(

1+η
η

1+ε

)−1 ≤

1 + ε−

Raising both sides of the inequality to the power

G(ε) ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ ε

1+η
η

≤

1+ε
1+ε

1+η
η

− 1+η
η

⇐⇒ ε

1+η
η

≤

1+η
2+η

1+η
η

gives:

1+ε
1+ε

! 2+η
1+η

1+η
η

1+η
η

− 1+η
η

⇐⇒ 1 + ε

1+η
η

≤1+ε

1+η
η

which holds with equality. Therefore, G(ε) = 0 when τ̂ = 0 (again, this is sensible
because there is no distortion in this case). And based on what was already demonstrated, this implies that G(ε) < 0 for all ε > 1 and τ > 0. Conclude that
when ε > 1.
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∂y
∂ τ̂

<0

As remarked earlier, the case of a decreasing wage profile can be approached with
symmetrical arguments. Putting it all together, we see that lifetime output is invariant to the tax regime for households with constant wage profiles, but is otherwise
higher under the consumption tax.

A.4.2. Expanded Proofs for Lemmas 3 and 4
For sake of clarity and concision, the proofs in the main text omitted certain details,
mainly algebraic ones. The proofs are produced here in full.
Lemma. The dynamic Ramsey problem is isomorphic to the static Ramsey problem,
but only when the tax system is consumption-based.

Proof. Using Lemma 1 to replace distutility terms in (2.7), the value function for the
household under a progressive consumption tax is given by:


C

U (w; λ, τ ) = 2 log λ + 2(1 − τ ) log

w1 h∗1 + w2 h∗2
2




−2

1−τ
1+η


(A.1)

Now use (2.4) and (2.5) to substitute for h∗1 and h∗2 .

log

w1 h∗1 + w2 h∗2
2


1
= log 
2

 
 
1
h∗2
= log
w1 + w2 · ∗ h∗1
2
h1

1

!−1  1+η
  η1 !
 ( 1+η
η )
w2
2(1 − τ )φ−1 1 + w2
 
w1 + w2

w1
w1






= log  w1 + w2

+

1
1+η

w2
w1

 η1 !


1+

w2
w1


(log(1 − τ ) − log(φ))
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−1
! 1+η
 1+η
η


−η

2( 1+η ) 

(A.2)

Substituting (A.2) into (A.1) we get:




1−τ
U (w; λ, τ ) = 2 log λ + (1 − τ ) log(wC ) +
[log(1 − τ ) − log φ − 1]
1+η
C

(A.3)
where wC denotes the agent’s “pseudo-static” wage:
"



wC = w1 + w2

−1
# 1+η
  1+η
 η1 # "
η
−η
w2
w2
1+
2( 1+η )
w1
w1

(A.4)

The pseudo-static wage is the constant wage that is output-equivalent to the agent’s
actual wage profile. That is, for given wage profile w = (w1 , w2 ), the associated
pseudo-static wage solves:
w1 h∗1 + w2 h∗2 = 2 · wC h̄
where we use the fact that h̄ is the optimal labor supply when productivity is constant
over the life cycle. By rearranging this equation, it becomes clear that the pseudostatic wage can also be thought of as the household’s hours-adjusted average wage:

wC =

1 h∗1
·
2 h̄




w1 +

1 h∗2
·
2 h̄


w2

It turns out that wC is given by (A.4) when the utility function and tax code take
the assumed functional forms. If wages are constant, i.e., w1 = w2 = w̃, then:
−1

−η

wC = (w̃ + w̃)(1 + 1)( 1+η ) 2( 1+η ) = w̃ · 2

(1+η)−1−η
1+η

= w̃

When wages are not constant, i.e., w1 6= w2 , the pseudo-static wage is greater than
than

w1 +w2
,
2

the arithmetic mean wage.
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Notice that (A.3) is identical to (2.3), the household’s value function in the static
version of the model, except scaled up by the number of periods and with wC in
place of w. It is also easy to demonstrate that the government’s budget constraint
can be expressed in terms of the distribution of pseudo-static wages, rather than
the distribution of wage profiles. Consequently, we can re-write the government’s
dynamic Ramsey problem as:




1−τ
[log(1 − τ ) − log φ − 1]
max 2 log λ + (1 − τ )E[log wC ] +
τ,λ
1+η

s.t. 2 E[wC ]h̄ − λE[(wC )1−τ ]h̄1−τ − g = 0

This multi-period problem is identical to the single-period problem R1, except that
w is replaced everywhere by wC . Hence, the dynamic problem is isomorphic to the
static problem, implying that a period-by-period tax levied on current consumption
can replicate a lifetime tax levied on earnings.
Can the same be said when taxes are based on labor income? The household’s value
function in this case is given by (2.7).

L

U (w; λ, τ ) = 2 log λ + 2 log



(w1 h∗1 )1−τ + (w2 h∗2 )1−τ
2



∗(1+η)

∗(1+η)

h
h
−φ 2
−φ 1
1+η
1+η

Let X = ((w1 h∗1 )1−τ + (w2 h∗2 )1−τ )/2. Then, proceeding along similar steps as before,
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we have:
1
X=
2

w11−τ

h∗
+ w2 2∗
h1




1−τ !

(h∗1 )1−τ

1−τ !1−τ
 η+τ





)(1+η) !−1
 (1−τ
(η+τ )



 1−τ
1+η

1  1−τ
w2
 2(1 − τ )φ−1 1 + w2

w1 + w2
2
w1
w1


1+η
)(1+η) !! 1−τ 
1−τ !1−τ
  η+τ
  (1−τ
 1−τ
(η+τ
)
1+η
w2
1  1−τ
w
1
−
τ
2
η
 2 1+
= τ w1 + w2
2
w1
w1
φ

=


Multiplying and dividing the right-hand side by

X = 2−τ


w1 + w2

w2
w1


×

w1 + w2


×

1−τ
φ

!−(1−τ )
 τ1−τ
+η

w2
w1

!1−τ
 τ1−τ
+η

w1 + w2


w11−τ +




w2

w2
w1

w2
w1

1−τ
 τ1−τ
+η

1−τ !1−τ
 η+τ

yields:



1−τ

−1





 1+

w2
w1

)(1+η) ! 1+η
 (1−τ
(η+τ )

2

−η
1+η



 1−τ
1+η

1−τ

= (Ω(w, τ ) · wL (w, τ ))


·

1−τ
φ

 1−τ
1+η

where wL is the agent’s pseudo-static wage under a labor income tax regime:
−1

"
wL = w1 + w2



)(1+η) # 1+η
 1−τ # "
  (1−τ
(τ +η)
−η
w2 η+τ
w2
1+
2( 1+η )
w1
w1
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(A.5)

and Ω is defined as follows:
1


"   1−τ #1−τ  1−τ
1−τ !−(1−τ )
  η+τ
 
η+τ
w2
1
w11−τ + w2 w2

w1 + w2
Ω= τ
(A.6)
2
w1
w1

Thus, we can re-write the value function as:
 




1−τ
1−τ
log
−1
(A.7)
U (w; λ, τ ) = 2 log λ + (1 − τ ) log (ΩwL ) +
1+η
φ
L

As under the consumption tax, the value function (A.7) is identical to (2.3), except
the raw wage w is replaced by the variable ΩwL . But the Ramsey problem can not
be made isomorphic to the static version because the government budget constrained
cannot be expressed in the same format. In particular, the Ramsey problem under
the labor income tax is:




1−τ
max 2 log λ + (1 − τ )E log (Ω(w, τ )wL ) +
[log(1 − τ ) − log φ − 1]
τ,λ
1+η
o
n
wL ]h̄ − λE[(Ω(w, τ )wL )1−τ ]h̄1−τ − g = 0
s.t. 2 E[

This problem is not identical to the static analogue because Ω does not premultiply
wL everywhere. In particular, it is “missing” at the location of the red rectangle.

Remarks The proof defined several new objects, namely the pseudo-static wages
wC and wL and the function Ω. These objects are not mere algebraic objects, but
have important economic meanings.
It is not always obvious whether one wage profile is ‘better’ than another. The
arithmetic mean wage is not a good measure since it ignores fact that agents can
allocate more effort to high-wage periods and less effort to low-wage periods. The
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pseudo-static wage, on the other hand, explicitly accounts for optimizing behaviour,
and therefore serves as a reliable measure of lifetime earnings capacity.
Because the consumption tax leaves intertemporal work decisions undistorted, the
pseudo-static wage under that tax regime provides the true ranking of lifetime productivity. If agent A’s wC is higher than agent B’s, then it is correct to say that A
is more productive than B. This ordering is generally not preserved under a labor
tax. Moreover, the intertemporal distortion generated by progressive earnings taxation implies that wC > wL for all wage paths. This follows directly from Lemma
2. The difference between wC and wL , therefore, represents the adverse effect of the
intertemporal distortion.
Now, wL is premultiplied by Ω in (A.7). This function has the following form:
p

p−1

Ω =2

p

p

(a + b ) (a + b)

−p


=

ap + b p
2



a+b
2

−p


≤

a+b
2

p 

a+b
2

−p
=1

Thus, Ω is less than unity for all wage paths, holding strictly whenever wages are
not constant. It reflects the insurance penalty incurred by households with volatile
wages. These households are not well served by a progressive tax on labor income,
since such systems will tend to overtax them relative to their economic peers with
steadier wage paths.
A.4.3. Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition (Age Dependence). When consumption paths are non-constant, an agedependent period-by-period consumption tax can: (1) Eliminate the intertemporal distortion on consumption; and (2) Replicate a progressive tax on lifetime earnings.
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Proof. When the household’s problem is generalized to admit age-varying tax rates,
we get the following (inverse) Euler equation:

c2 =

λ2
λ1



β2
β1

1−τ


c1 =⇒ c2 =

β1τ λ
β2τ λ



β2
β1

1−τ


c1 =⇒ c2 =

β2
β1


c1

where the second equality uses (2.9), the proposed age-conditioned tax plan. Notice
that by allowing taxes to depend on age in the right way, we can easily eliminate the
intertemporal wedge in the household’s Euler equation. This modification works because it ‘age-adjusts’ a household’s annual expenditures before assessing tax liability.
To demonstrate the second part of the proposition, I follow the same strategy as in
Lemma 3. Some straightforward algebra (omitted here) yields convenient expressions
for optimal hours:

 1
h∗1 = (1 + β)(1 − τ )φ−1 (1 + A)−1 1+η
1


 1+η
1+β
∗
−1
−1 −1
h2 =
(1 − τ )φ (1 + A )
β

(A.8)


1
where A = β −1 (w1 /w2 )1+η η . Letting v denote lifetime disutility of effort, we have:
∗(1+η)

v=φ

h1

∗(1+η)

+ βh2
1+η

!
=

−1 i
(1 + β)(1 − τ ) h
(1 + A)−1 + 1 + A−1
1+η

=

(1 + β)(1 − τ )
1+η
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(A.9)

Letting y denote lifetime earnings, we have:

y=

=



h∗2
= w1 + w2 · ∗ h∗1
+
h1


  1
"

 η1 !
 1+η # η1 −1 1+η
1 w2
 (1 + β)(1 − τ ) 1 + 1 · w1
 
w1 + w2 ·
·
β w1
φ
β
w2

w1 h∗1

w2 h∗2

= (1 + β)wC h̄

(A.10)

where h̄ is the static labor supply, defined as before, and wC is the agent’s pseudostatic wage, re-defined as:
"



wC = w1 + w2

−1
# 1+η
 η1 # "

 1+η
η
−η
1 w2
1 w2
·
·
1+
(1 + β)( 1+η )
β w1
β w1

Similarly, an agent’s lifetime tax liability is given by:

y − λ1 x1−τ
− λ2 x1−τ
= (1 + β)wC h̄ − λ(wC h̄)1−τ − (β τ λ)(βwC h̄)1−τ
1
2

= (1 + β) wC h̄ − λ(wC h̄)1−τ

The household’s value function is:

U C = log λ



w1 h∗1 + w2 h∗2
1+β
!

∗(1+η)

−φ

h1
1+η

− βφ

1−τ !

+ β log β τ λ

∗(1+η)

h2
1+η



β(w1 h∗1 + w2 h∗2 )
1+β

1−τ !

!

Using (A.9) and (A.10), this simplifies to:


 


1−τ
1−τ
U = (1 + β) log λ + (1 − τ ) log(wC ) −
log
−1
+ β log β
1+η
φ
C
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Notice that the value function is a positive monotonic transformation of the analogous
static value function, and in fact reduces to the benchmark two-period version when
β = 1. That is,

U C = (1 + β) · U 1 (wC ; τ, λ) + β log β

The Ramsey problem can therefore be written as:




max (1 + β) log λ + (1 − τ )E[log wC ] +
τ,λ

1−τ
1+η




[log(1 − τ ) − log φ − 1]


s.t. (1 + β) E[wC ]h̄ − λE[(wC )1−τ ]h̄1−τ − g = 0

This problem is isomorphic to the static problem R1.

A.4.4. Proof of Proposition 4
Proposition (Hybrid Taxation). When consumption paths are non-constant, a periodby-period hybrid tax can: (1) Eliminate the intertemporal distortion on consumption;
and (2) Replicate a progressive tax on lifetime earnings.

Proof. The household’s problem can be re-written as:

2

U (w) =

max

x1 ,x2 ,h1 ,h2 ,s

log(λx1−τ
1

− s) + β

log(λx1−τ
2

h1+η
h1+η
1
+ s) − φ
− βφ 2
1+η
1+η

s.t. x1 + x2 = w1 h1 + w2 h2

Letting µ denote the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint, the first-order
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conditions are:

x1 :

1−τ
− s)−1 − µ
0 = λ(1 − τ )x−τ
1 (λx1

(A.11)

x2 :

1−τ
0 = βλ(1 − τ )x−τ
+ s)−1 − µ
2 (λx2

(A.12)

h1 :

0 = −β t−1 φhη1 + µw1

(A.13)

h2 :

0 = −β t−1 φhη2 + µw2

(A.14)

0 = −(λx11−τ − s)−1 + β(λx1−τ
+ s)−1
2

(A.15)

s:

From (A.11) and (A.12), we have: λx1 − sxτ1 = λx2 − sxτ2 . Because xj ≥ 0, this
equality holds if and only if x1 = x2 = x. The first-order condition for unregistered
savings gives: λx1−τ
+ s = β(λx11−τ − s). Substituting x1 = x2 = x yields:
2


∗

s =−

1−β
1+β



λx1−τ

Notice that s∗ = 0 when β = 1. When the desired consumption profile is flat, the
household does not need to resort to unregistered financial vehicles to smooth its tax
liabilities. A full consumption base is good enough.
The consumption allocation is given by:

c∗1


=

2
1+β


λx

c∗2

1−τ


=

2β
1+β



λx1−τ

and so the consumption path is intertemporally undistorted: c∗2 = βc∗1 ⇐⇒ uc1 =
βuc2 . From (A.13) and (A.14), we see that the Euler equation for labor supply is also
1

undistorted: h1 = [β (w1 /w2 )] η h2 ⇐⇒ uh1 = βuh2 . Some further algebra yields
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expressions for optimal hours:

h∗1
h∗2





−1

= (1 + β)(1 − τ )φ

= (1 + β

−1

1+ β

−1

)(1 − τ )φ

−1

1

(w2 /w1 )

1+η  η

1
−1  1+η

 1

1 −1 1+η
1+η  η
1 + β (w2 /w1 )

Not surprisingsly, labor supply under the hybrid tax code is the same as under the
age-dependent code, which means that lifetime disutility of effort is also the same.
The household’s value function can be written as:

U

H








2
2β
1−τ
1−τ
= log
λx
λx
+ β log
−v
1+β
1+β




1−τ
[log(1 − τ ) − log φ − 1] + β log β
= (1 + β) log λ + (1 − τ ) log(wC ) +
1+η
= (1 + β) · U 1 (wC ; τ, λ) + β log β

where wC is the agent’s “pseudo-static” wage, defined as under the age-dependent
tax regime:
"



wC = w1 + w2

−1
# 1+η

 η1 # "
 1+η
η
−η
1 w2
1 w2
·
1+
·
(1 + β)( 1+η )
β w1
β w1

We complete the proof in the same way as before: by observing that the hybrid
Ramsey problem, expressed below, is isomorphic to the static Ramsey problem.




max (1 + β) log λ + (1 − τ )E[log wC ] +
τ,λ

1−τ
1+η




s.t. (1 + β) E[wC ]h̄ − λE[(wC )1−τ ]h̄1−τ − g = 0
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[log(1 − τ ) − log φ − 1]

A.5. Estimation of the Productivity Process
This appendix describes the data and estimation method used to estimate the evolution of household wages, as specified in 4.9. The point estimates are used to parameterize the productivity process in the model.
A.5.1. Data
Source The data are taken from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID),
a longitudinal survey of US households beginning in 1968. Interviews occured every
year until 1997, but are now conducted on a biannual basis. The initial wave consisted
of nearly 2,000 families drawn from a low-income oversample and nearly 3,000 families
drawn from a nationally representative core sample. These original families and their
members have been tracked ever since. As sample individuals move out of existing
households and form new ones, ‘split-off’ households are added to the sample, helping
to offset attrition and adding an inter-generational dimension to the data. During
the 1990s, additional households were added to the panel to correct for the absence
of post-1968 immigrants.

Sample Selection A total of 28,066 individuals have appeared as a household
head in the PSID. I restrict attention to white males from the core sample who
satisfy the following criteria in at least four, not necessarily consecutive, waves: (i)
the individual is the head of his household; (ii) the individual’s age is between 24 and
65; (iii) the individual participates in the labour force (i.e. not a student, not retired);
(iv) reported annual hours of work are between 500 and 5000; and (v) average hourly
wages fall between $2 and $500.1 Individuals who never reported years of completed
1

Nominal variables are adjusted to a 2010 basis using the Consumer Price Index as constructed
by the Bureau of Labour Statistics.
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schooling are also dropped. The final sample include 4286 individuals and 80,987
person-year observations (an average of 19 appearances).

Definitions The variables used in the sample selection and estimation are:
Education. The PSID records years of completed schooling for household heads. The
variable is topcoded at 17 for individuals with any amount of post-graduate study.
It is sometimes inconsistent as an individual might be listed as having completed 12
years of school in one year only to be listed as having completed 11 years in a later
survey. To deal with this, I let a person’s educational attainment be the highest
education level ever reported.
Age. The age variable in the PSID does not always increase by 1 from one year to the
next. Patterns such as (30, 30, 32) are not uncommon, probably because interviews
occur at different points in the calendar year. But patterns such as (30, 41, 32) also
occur, suggesting other forms of measurement error. I create a consistent age variable
by inferring the year of birth that is consistent with the largest number of reports.
For example, if the pattern (30, 30, 32) is observed for waves (1980, 1981, 1982), then
I assign 1950 as the individual’s year of birth.
Labour Income. The measure of labour earnings is comprehensive and includes wages,
salaries, bonuses, overtime, professional fees and commissions, as well as as the labour
part of farm and business income. The variable exists for both heads and wives.
Hours Worked. The PSID records annual hours worked. This variable is constructed
from answers to questions about the number of hours worked per week and the number
of weeks worked per year.
Hourly Wages. The average hourly wage is the ratio of labour income to hours
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worked. The variable is topcoded, but some missing values can be readily recovered
by calculating the wage directly.
A.5.2. Specification
Supposes wages evolve according to:
log wi,t = β0i + β1i t + β2i t2 + ηi,t + εi,t
ηi,t = φηi,t−1 + νi,t
(A.16)

βi ∼ N (β, Σ)
εi,t ∼ N (0, σε2 )
νi,t ∼ N (0, σν2 ) |φ| < 1 ηi,−1 = 0

where i indexes the individual and t denotes potential labor market experience. That
is, t = AGE − max{EDU C, 12} − 6.
It is convenient to write the person-specific components as:


ui,t ≡ β̃0i + β̃1i t + β̃2i t2
|
{z
}
heterogeneous trend

+

(ηi,t + εi,t )
| {z }

stochastic disturbance

where β̃i ≡ βi − β. The covariance structure of ui,t is given by:
Cov(ui,t+k , ui,t ) = σ02 + σ12 t(t + k) + σ22 t2 (t + k)2 + σ01 (2t + k) + σ02 [t2 + (t + k)2 ]
+ σ12 [t(t + k)2 + t2 (t + k)] + σε2 1{k = 0} + φk V ar(ηi,t )


1 − φ2(t+1)
2
2
V ar(ηi,t ) = φ V ar(ηi,t−1 ) + σν =
σν2
1 − φ2
(A.17)
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A.5.3. Identification
Suppose we have a panel of N households over T periods. With sufficient crosssectional variation in age and experience at each point in time, we can identify the
parameters of (A.16) as follows:
1. Since i,t ≡ ηi,t +εi,t has mean zero and is independent of t and t2 , we can identify
the household-specific trend parameters βi by a linear regression argument. This
in turn identifies the distribution parameters β and Σ.
2. To identify the persistence parameter φ notice from (A.17) that
φ2 V ar(ηi,t )
Cov(ui,t+2 , ui,t ) − [. . . ]
=
=φ
Cov(ui,t+1 , ui,t ) − [. . . ]
φV ar(ηi,t )
where [. . .] is shorthand for terms that depend only on t and elements of Σ
which are already identified.
3. The variance of persistent shocks σν2 can now be identified from any unused
covariance. For example:

σν2 = φ−1 [Cov(ui,0 , ui,1 ) − σ02 − σ01 − σ02 ]

4. Finally, any unused variance can serve to identify transitory shocks. For example:

σε2 = V ar(ui,0 ) − σ02 − σν2
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A.5.4. Estimation
The wage process given by (A.16) is a random-effects model with serially correlated
errors. I perform a two-step procedure to obtain estimates. In this first step, run the
pooled OLS regression:

log WAGEit = β0 + β1 EXPERit + β2 EXPERSQit + year effects + uit

This yields consistent estimates for the common trend parameters β. Collect the
residuals ûit .
In the second step, use the first-stage residuals to construct the empirical covariance
matrix. This matrix has typical element

−1
Ĉt,k = Nt,k

X

ûi,t ûi,t+k

i

where Nt,k denotes the number of individuals observed at both date t and date t + k.
The theoretical covariance structure given by (A.17) suggests a conditionally linear
regression model of the following form:

y = δX + γD + θg(λ)

where y is a vector of empirical moments and the regressors are:

x1 = 1

x2 = t(t + k)

x3 = t2 (t + k)2

x4 = 2t + k

x5 = t2 + (t + k)2

x6 = t(t + k)2 + t2 (t + k)
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(A.18)



 1 if t = k
D=

 0 otherwise

g(λ) = λ

k



1 − λ2(t+1)
1 − λ2



The coefficients of this model correspond directly to the remaining parameters of
interest. Obtaining the least-squares estimates is computationally easy since (A.18) is
linear-in-parameters for a given value of λ (that is, for a given value of the persistence
parameter φ). We can numerically optimize with respect to λ (that is, φ) by running
a simple OLS regression at each iteration.
One advantage of having rich panel data is that we can extract a large number of
empirical moments to use in the second stage regression. Indeed, the number of unique
elements in the variance-covariance matrix increases at an approximately quadratic
rate with experience.2 A remaining practical concern is deciding which moments
to exclude (if any). Somewhat arbitrarily, I cap the covariance lag at 45 years and
exclude moments to which fewer than 100 individuals contributed.3 This leaves me
with 932 empirical moments. The results of the estimation are displayed in Table 1
in the main text.

Pn
Recall that i=1 i = 1 + 2 + · · · + n = 12 (n2 − n).
3
I also ran the regressions using only moments to which at least 200 individuals contributed.
The results were robust to this change.
2
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A.6. Computation of the Models
This appendix describes the algorithms and other procedures that I use to solve the
model and perform tax policy experiments.
A.6.1. Discretizing the Wage Process
The Stochastic Trend The household’s stochastic trend consists of an autoregressive component and a transitory component. Since the innovations are Gaussian,
I employ a method based on Gauss-Hermite quadrature to discretize both shock
processes. I use seven states for the persistent component and three states for the
transitory component.
Let {xi (n)}ni=1 be the roots of the nth order Hermite polynomial. Then the Markov
p
chain nodes for the persistent shock are { 2σν2 /(1 − φ2 )xi (7)}7i=1 and those for the
√
transitory shock are { 2σε xi (3)}3i=1 .
The Deterministic Trend Recall that the heterogeneous trend parameters (the
βi ’s) are jointy drawn from N (β, σ) in an i.i.d. fashion. I approximate this distribution with a number of ‘types’, chosen in such a way that each is equally likey. This
is not necessary, but it is convenient since the same number of simulations can be
generated for each type.
I select three values for each trend coefficient, implying a total of 27 types. The
procedure for each coefficient is as follows:
1. Let the coefficient be (conditionally) distributed as N (µ, σ).
2. Partition the support into three intervals: (−∞, A), (A, B), (B, ∞) where A and
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B are chosen so that the probability mass in each interval is the same, that is,
1/3. Since the model is Gaussian, this means that:

Φ

A−µ
σ




=1−Φ

B−µ
σ


=

1
3

⇒

A = µ + σΦ−1 (1/3)
B = µ − σΦ−1 (1/3)

where Φ denotes the standard normal cdf.
3. The nodes for each partition are the conditional expectations. Recall the formula for the N (µ, 1) case:


φ(a) − φ(b)
E[X|a < X < b] = µ +
Φ(b) − Φ(a)



4. The selected nodes end up being {µ − 1.09σ, µ, µ + 1.09σ} whatever the values
of µ and σ.
Since β0 and β1 are uncorrelated (by assumption), I can select the nodes for these two
coefficients using the marginal distributions. When selecting the β2 nodes, I need to
use the conditional distribution where we are conditioning on the previously chosen
β0 and β1 . This adds an additional but straightforward step.
A.6.2. Computing Decision Rules: Labour Income Tax
I solve for the household’s decision rules by backward induction, beginning at age J
and using the endogenous grid method (EGM) to iterate on the Euler equation in
reverse. This approach requires very few root-finding procedures.
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Household’s Recursive Problem When the tax-and-transfer system is based on
earnings, the household’s problem is:

vt (j, a, m, n) = max0
h,c,a

h1+γ
c1−σ
−ϕ
+ βψj+1
1−σ
1+γ

Z

vt+1 (j + 1, a0 , m, ñ)π(ñ|n)dñ

s.t. c + a0 = λ(wt ρ(j, m, n)h)1−τ + Rt a + qt
c, a0 ≥ 0, h ∈ [0, 1]

Letting µt (j, a, m, n) denote the Langrange multiplier, the first-order conditions are:

c:

0 = c−σ − µt (j, a, m, n)

(A.19)

h:

0 = −ϕhγ + µt (j, a, m, n)λ(1 − τ )(wt ρ(j, m, n))1−τ h−τ
Z
d
0 = βψj+1
[vt+1 (j + 1, a0 , m, ñ)] π(ñ|n)dñ − µt (j, a, m, n)
da0

(A.20)

a0 :

(A.21)

The envelope condition is:
d
[vt (j, a, m, n)] = Rt µt (j, a, m, n)
da

(A.22)

Endogenous Grid Method The classic approach to solving Euler equations is to
fix a state (j, a, m, n) and solve forwards for the optimal choice a0 , supposing of course
that we know vt+1 . The EGM proposes instead that we fix a partial state (j, m, n)
and an optimal choice a0 , and then solve backwards for the initial asset position a
that rationalizes the presumed choice. Algorithm 1 details how to perform this bit
of ‘reverse engineering’ for the benchmark model. Algorithm 3 describes how to
operationalize the principle to approximate the household’s entire policy function.
Algorithm 1 (Unconstrained Case). Suppose we know the marginal value of wealth
in the next period, namely

d
[v ].
da t+1

Fix a partial state (j, m, n) at time t and consider
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a choice â0 . Then compute:
1. ṽ = βψj+1

R

d
da0

[vt+1 (j + 1, a0 , m, ñ)] π(ñ|n)dñ

and, using (A.19)–(A.21):
2. c∗ = ṽ

−1
σ

1

3. h∗ = (λ(1 − τ )ϕ−1 (wt ρ(j, m, n))1−τ ṽ) γ+τ
4. â = [c∗ + â0 − λ((wt ρ(j, m, n))h∗ )1−τ − qt ]Rt−1
These steps yield a complete set of decision rules for the ‘endogenous’ state (j, â, m, n):

ht (j, â, m, n) = h∗

(A.23)

ct (j, â, m, n) = c∗

(A.24)

at+1 (j, â, m, n) = â0

(A.25)

A valuable feature of EGM is that by implementing Algorithm 1 for â0 = 0, one
can precisely identify the binding threshold for the household’s budget constraint.
Suppose we do just that and back out ā such that at+1 (j, ā, m, n) = 0. Then we know
that the household is borrowing-constrained in all states (j, a, m, n) with a < ā. In
these states, the household solves what is essentially a static problem. Its decisions
in this case can be computed by implementing Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 (Constrained Case). Suppose at+1 (j, ā, m, n) = 0. Consider a state
(j, a, m, n) with a < ā. The household is borrowing-constrained so we ignore (A.21)
and combine the other two first-order conditions to get the following necessary and

164

sufficient condition:

g(h) = hγ+τ Γ̂σ − λ(1 − τ )ϕ−1 (wt ρ(j, m, n))1−τ = 0

where Γ̂ = qt + Rt a + λ((wt ρ(j, m, n))h)1−τ . The derivative of g is
g 0 (h) = hγ+τ σ Γ̂σ−1 (1 − τ )λ(wt ρ(j, m, n))1−τ h−τ + (γ + τ )hγ+τ −1 Γ̂σ

Notice that g(0) < 0, g(∞) > 0 and g 0 > 0. Thus, g is strictly increasing and
continuously differentiable with a known derivative g 0 and a single root on R+ , which,
not incidentally, happens to be the solution to the household’s static labour supply
problem. This means we can easily apply Newton’s method to find the solution. If the
constrained household has zero wealth (a = 0), then the numerical root-finding can be
skipped entirely as the solution has a closed-form:

ht (j, 0, m, n) = (1 − τ )ϕ−1 (λ(wt ρ(j, m, n))1−τ )1−σ

1
 γ+τ +σ(1−τ
)

It can prove useful to use ht (j, 0, m, n) to initiate Newton’s method for a > 0.
I am now in a position to describe the full EGM for solving the benchmark model.
Algorithm 3 (EGM: Labor Tax Model). Fix the model’s parameters and construct
the discretized versions of M and N . Also discretize the state space for the continuous
asset variable. Let A = {a1 , . . . , amax } denote the fixed asset grid.4 The objective is
to solve for the optimal decisions on Z ≡ {1, . . . , J} × A × M × N . Begin with j = J
and set vJ+1 = 0.
4

There are three important choices for the selection of A: (1) the number of grid points; (2)
the value of the maximal grid point; and (3) the spacing of grid points. I choose 300 grids points
and let the maximal grid point equal a multiple of the highest feasible earnings, high enough so that
simulated assets never exceed that level. I use a double-exponential grid so that the grid is much
finer at the low end where the decision rules are less linear.
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1. Set m = 1 and n = 1.
2. For all a ∈ A, apply Algorithm 1 with â0 = a as the presumed choice. Construct
the endogenous asset grid G = (â1 , . . . , âmax ) while looping through A along with
the associated decision rules.
3. Now we know the optimal decisions for states (j, â, m, n) where â ∈ G. But
we want to know the optimal decisions for states (j, a, m, n) where a ∈ A. To
obtain the latter, use the decision rules on the endogenous grid G to interpolate
for the decision rules on the fixed grid A. Note that it is possible—nay, likely—
that there exist a ∈ A such that a < â1 . Do not extrapolate below. These are
constrained states, so apply Algorithm 2 instead.
4. Select a different (m, n) and repeat steps 2 and 3 until M × N is exhausted.
5. Use (A.19) and (A.22) to compute

d
[v ]
da t

at every grid point in Z. Store this

for the next iteration.
6. Go to j = j −1 and repeat steps 1-5. Stop once the steps for j = 1 are complete.

Remarks:

1 Algorithm 3 is very efficient since it eliminates the need for numerical root-finding
except when solving for the household’s constrained problem. This is possible because
of the functional forms taken by preferences and taxes. For alternative parameterizations, Algorithm 1 would require numerical root-finding when computing the optimal
labor supply.
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2 An alternative approach is to store the decision rules on the endogenous grid,
not the fixed grid, and use these to generate simulated histories. If this option is
chosen, Algorithm 2 must be applied at the simulation stage whenever a simulated
household is borrowing-constrained. This means potentially many more calls to a
root-finding procedure, a disadvantage. The advantage is that the model-generated
data would be filtered through a single interpolation step (at simulation), possibly
reducing numerical error.
3 It is not necessary to compute the value functions {vt }, only their wealth-derivatives.
Moreover, it is only necessary to keep

d
[v ]
da0 t+1

in memory.

A.6.3. Computing Decision Rules: Consumption Tax
There is no substantive change to the EGM algorithm when T̂ is based on consumption instead of earnings. Only the equations used in Algorithms 1 and 2 are different.
These equations are derived from the optimality conditions of the household’s recursive problem, which is now formulated as:

vt (j, a, m, n) = max0
h,x,a

h1+γ
(λx1−τ )1−σ
−ϕ
+ βψj+1
1−σ
1+γ

Z

vt+1 (j + 1, a0 , m, ñ)π(ñ|n)dñ

s.t. x + a0 = wt ρ(j, m, n)h + Rt a + qt
c, x, a0 ≥ 0, h ∈ [0, 1]

Here, x denotes expenditures net of taxes. It proves convenient to formulate the
problem this way, with x as a choice variable instead of c. Letting µt (j, a, m, n)
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denote the Langrange multiplier, the first-order conditions are:

x:

0 = (1 − τ )λ1−σ x−(σ+τ −στ ) − µt (j, a, m, n)

h:

0 = −φhγ + wt ρ(j, m, n)µt (j, a, m, n)
Z
d
0 = βψj+1
[vt+1 (j + 1, a0 , m, ñ)] π(ñ|n)dñ − µt (j, a, m, n)
da0

a0 :

These conditions imply that under the consumption tax regime, steps 2-4 of Algorithm
1 are:
∗

2. x =



ṽ
(1−τ )λ1−σ

 σ+τ−1−στ
1

3. h∗ = (ϕ−1 wt ρ(j, m, n)ṽ) γ

4. â = [x∗ + â0 − wt ρ(j, m, n)h∗ − qt ]Rt−1
Similarly, for Algorithm 2 we now find the positive root of:

g(h) = hγ (qt + Rt a + wt ρ(j, m, n)h)σ+τ −στ − (1 − τ )λ1−σ ϕ−1 wt ρ(j, m, n)

A.6.4. Computing Decision Rules: Pseudo-Consumption Tax
In Subsection 9, I run two decomposition exercises to separate the efficiency and
insurance effects of the tax-base conversion. In the first of these exercises, the household is assumed to act as though it is subject to a consumption tax, but its actual
tax burden is assessed according to its earnings. The basic structure of the EGM
algorithm is the same as before, but the formulas for computing decisions and assets
are a mixture of the consumption-tax case and the labour-income-tax case.
Given ṽ, a pseudo-consumption taxpayer chooses expenditures and hours in the same
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way as a genuine consumption taxpayer. Namely:

∗

x =



ṽ
(1 − τ )λ1−σ

 σ+τ−1−στ

h∗ = ϕ−1 wt ρ(j, m, n)ṽ

 γ1

But instead of storing x∗ , which reflects expenditure net of tax, we store the associated
consumption level c∗ = λ(x∗ )1−τ . Also, we back out start-of-period assets in a way
that reflects the actual tax assessment on labour income:

â = [c∗ + â0 − λ((wt ρ(j, m, n))h∗ )1−τ − qt ]Rt−1

In writing the code for this algorithm, special attention must be paid to the computation of the marginal utilities. The household must believe it is paying tax on
consumption in the next period as well as in the present one, though of course it is
doing so in neither.
A.6.5. Computing Decision Rules: Pseudo-Labour-Income Tax
The pseudo-consumption tax isolates the impact of the tax base reform on labour
efficiency. To isolate the impact on social insurance, we perform the reverse exercise.
That is, make the household acts as though it is subject to a tax on earnings, but
assess actual tax burdens according to consumption.
In this case, the decisions for consumption and hours are per the equations described
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in Algorithm 1:

c∗ = ṽ

−1
σ

h∗ = λ(1 − τ )ϕ−1 (wt ρ(j, m, n))1−τ ṽ

1
 γ+τ

1

But we store the required expenditure x∗ = (c/λ) 1−τ and recover start-of-period
assets according to:

â = [x∗ + â0 − wt ρ(j, m, n)h∗ − qt ]Rt−1

A.6.6. Computing the Initial Stationary Equilibrium
There are seven parameters and equilibrium objects needing internal calibration.
Four, viz. (β, λ, b, q), can only be calibrated by simulating the model repeatedly
until specified targets are jointly attained. Two, viz. (A, B), can be normalized analytically at each iteration. The final parameter, viz. ϕ, can be normalized numerically
after the rest of the model is calibrated.
Algorithm 4 (Initial Steady State). To solve for the stationary equilibrium, iterate
on the following steps:
1. Fix r = 0.04 and w = 1.00.
2. Guess (β, λ, b, q).
3. Solve for decision rules (c, h, a0 ) using Algorithm 3.
4. Simulate a large number of histories. Set a specific seed for the pseudo-random
number generator so that the same shock histories are used at each iteration.
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5. Aggregate variables across simulated histories and compute equilibrium objects. In so doing, choose A and B so that the implied wage and implied debtto-output ratio match their targets exactly.5
6. Verify if the implied values of r, G/Q, and b/ȳ are sufficiently close to their
targets, and if the implied q is sufficiently close to the guess for q. If so, move
to the next step. If not, update the guess for (β, λ, b, q) and go back to step 3.
Here, ‘sufficiently close’ means that the absolute difference is less than a given
tolerance level.
7. The final step is to calibrate ϕ to the target for mean hours. This step is essentially a normalization since all we’re doing is re-scaling the economy. Adjust all
the level parameters and grids appropriately, then repeatedly apply Algorithm 3
for different values of ϕ until the target is attained. Bisection works fine here
as few iterations are typically needed.

Remark: In practice, I add another loop to Algorithm 4 by repeatedly calibrating
the model for increasingly stringent tolerance levels. This ensures that the solution
is approached in a comparatively uniform manner from all dimensions.
A.6.7. Computing the Terminal Steady State
I assume that the economy transitions to a new steady state after any change to the
policy environment. Certain calibrated parameters are kept fixed, namely b, B, A
and G. Certain equilibrium objects must be solved for, namely w, r, λ and q.

5

Let w and B/Q denote the steady-state targets. Let Ñ and Ã denote implied effective labour
and implied total assets, aggregated over simulated histories. Since labour’s share of income is
w̄N
wN = (1 − α)Q, it is straightforward to set B = B/Q · 1−α
. This implies a capital stock of
 α
w
Ñ
K̃ = Ã − B. Then, along similar lines, we obtain the technology parameter A = 1−α
.
K̃
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Algorithm 5 (Terminal Steady State). Fix a terminal public debt B 0 . Then iterate
on the following steps until convergence.
1. Guess (r0 , λ0 , q 0 ).
2. Assign w0 using the following function derived from the firm’s first-order conditions:

w(r) = (1 − α)A

r+δ
αA

−α
 1−α

(A.26)

3. Solve for decision rules using Algorithm 3.
4. Simulate a large number of histories.
5. Aggregate variables across simulated histories and compute equilibrium objects.
6. Verify that the implied values of r0 and q 0 are sufficiently close to their guesses,
and that the government budget is balanced. If not, update the guess for (r0 , λ0 , q 0 )
and go back to step 2.
A.6.8. Transition Path
Algorithm 5 assumes a particular level of public debt B 0 when computing the new
steady state. My algorithm for computing the transition path ensures that this choice
is consistent with the behavioural changes induced by the reform.
Algorithm 6 (Transition path). Suppose that the economy is in the initial steady
state at time t = 0 after which an unexpected policy reform is announced, effective t =
1. We are interested in computing the transition induced by this reform. Suppose that
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the economy converges to a new steady state in G periods or less. Pick G sufficiently
large.
1. Guess a terminal debt B 0 . Apply Algorithm 5 to find the terminal steady state.
2. Guess a sequence of interest rates {rt }G
t=1 .
3. Assign a sequence of wage rates {wt }G
t=1 using A.26.
4. Solve for the decision rules for each generation g = −(J − 1), . . . , G, where g
indexes the period in which the cohort enters the economy. That is, generation
g = 1 is the generation that is born in the first period of the new policy regime.
5. Simulate a large number of histories for each generation.
6. Aggregate variables across simulated histories and across generations for each
time period. Compute equilibrium objects.
7. Verify that the implied interest rates are sufficiently close to their guesses at
every point along the transition. If not, update the guess for {rt }G
t=1 and go back
to step 3.
8. Iterate on the governement’s period-by-period budget constraint to compute the
implied accumulation of public debt along the transition. Verify that the resulting
terminal debt is sufficiently close to the guess. If not, update the guess for B 0
and go back to step 2.
A.6.9. Model with Two Consumption Goods
Section 4.6 considers a variation of the benchmark model with two consumer goods,
a basic good and a non-basic good. Preferences over bundles of the two goods are
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ordered by a Cobb-Douglas aggregator, as specified in Equation (4.11). Consider the
optimization problem facing a consumer with resources x to allocate:

max (c − c)θ d1−θ

s.t. x − (1 + τc )c − (1 + τd )d ≥ 0

c,d

(A.27)

The first-order conditions of this problem imply the following relationship:

c=c+

θ
1−θ



1 + τd
1 + τc


d

(A.28)

Substituting for c in (A.27) yields the modified objective function:


γ
1−γ



1 + τd
1 + τc

θ(1−σ)

d1−σ
1−σ

(A.29)

which is just the usual CRRA utility function with a multiplicative factor. Thus, the
standard algorithms are easiliy adjusted to the two-good case, as long as sufficient
care is taken with the budget constraints.
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A.7. Empirical Mapping for Basic and Non-Basic Consumption
In Section 4.6, I extend the basic model to allow for two types of consumption, basic
and non-basic. In order to map the two-good model to the data, I use the 20062012 waves of the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). The CEX is a nationally
representative rotating panel administered on a quarterly basis by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. It contains detailed information on consumer activities, covering up to
95% of a typical household’s expenditures, as well data on income and demographics.
Households exit the panel after a maximum of four quarterly interviews.

Sample Selection Following the Sample B selection criteria in Heathcote et al.
(2010), I drop records if (1) there is no age information for either the head or spouse;
(2) the household head is younger than 25 or older than 60; (3) either the head
or spouse has positive labor income but zero annual hours; (4) either the head or
spouse reports an hourly wage less than half of the federal minimum wage; or (5)
quarterly equivalized food consumption is less than $100 in 2000 dollars.6 I also
exclude households that complete fewer than four consecutive quarterly interviews.
As such, each respondent in the sample reports expenditures over a full twelve-month
period. I add the four quarterly reports together and work with annualized variables.
Finally, I trim the top and bottom 1% of the total expenditure distribution to remove
the effect of outliers. The final sample includes 15,218 households.

Classifying Consumption The CEX contains 14 main expenditure categories, but
two of these—cash contributions and personal insurance and pensions—constitute
savings. I focus on the other 12. For each main category and the dozens of associated
6

I use the OECD equivalence scale, also known as the Oxford scale, which assigns 1 to the first
household member, 0.7 to each additional adult, and 0.5 to each additional child.
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subcategories, I run the following regression:

y = β0 + β1 texp + β2 texpsq

where y denotes the category of interest, texp denotes total expenditure and texpsq
denotes the square of total expenditure. Table 20 reports the point estimates from
these regressions. I classify a variable as a candidate basic goods if β̂0 > 0 and β̂2 < 0,
reflecting the idea that basic goods and services are those that must be consumed at
some minimal level (β̂0 > 0) and for which the excess expenditure share is decreasing
β̂2 < 0. Eight variables meet these criteria: food at home; rented dwellings; utilities;
gasoline and motor oil; vehicle insurance; prescription drugs; televisions, radios, and
sound equipment; and tobacco and smoking supplies.
Because the research goal is to quantify the transition to a two-rate consumption tax
regime, we must also consider which of these goods could be made tax-exempt in
a politically feasible tax reform. For instance, it seems implausible to consider the
elimination of taxes on tobacco products. In the end, I select four categories to serve
as my empirical counterpart to the model’s basic consumer good, namely: food at
home, rented dwellings, utilities, and prescription drugs. I choose these four variables
because they are already subject to preferential tax treatment in many jurisdictions
that levy indirect consumption taxes. With this empirical mapping in hand, basic
consumption accounts for 27.3% of aggregate consumer spending, but the share varies
greatly across the expenditure distribution, ranging from 55.8% in the bottom decile
to 15.4% in the top decile.
Table 21 presents expenditure shares for a wide range of consumer goods and services.
The columns represent different percentile bands of the total expenditure distribution.
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Only main categories are reported unless the subcategories exhibit different patterns,
in which case the subcategories are reported instead. For example, the food category
is disaggregated into food at home and food away from home because the former is
classified as a basic good and the latter is classified as a non-basic good.

Calibrating the New Preference Parameters Compared with the baseline
model, I need to pin down two additional structural parameters, c and θ. To do
so, I first run the following regression:

basic = β0 + β1 texp

where basic denote the sum of the four basic consumption categories. The output
from this regression is reported in Table 22.
Table 22: Basic Consumption vs Total Expenditure
Parameter

Estimate Std Error

t-statistic

P-value

CI0.025

CI0.975

β0

4601.75

59.39

77.48

0.00

4485.33

4718.16

β1

0.0914

0.0020

44.73

0.00

0.0874

0.0954

Note: The sample size is N=15,218.

I set θ equal to β̂1 , since the slope coefficient reflects the share of household expenditures in excess of the minimum level that is devoted to basic goods and services. I
subsequently chose c so that the model generates a ratio of non-basic to basic consumption that is consistent with the data, namely
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C
D

= 2.65.

Table 20: Expenditure Regressions, CEX categories and subcategories
Category
Food
Food at home
Food away from home
Alcoholic beveages
Housing
Shelter
Owned dwellings
Rented dwellings
Other lodging
Utilities
Household operations
House furnishing and equipment
Household textiles
Furniture
Floor coverings
Major appliances
Small appliances and miscellaneous housewares
Miscellaneous household equipment
Apparel and services
Clothing for men and boys
Clothing for women and girls
Clothing for children under 2
Footware
Other apparel products and services
Transportation
New cars and trucks (net outlay)
Used cars and trucks (net outlay)
Other vehicles
Gasoline and motor oil
Vehicle finance charges
Maintenance and repairs
Vehicles insurance
Vehicle rental, leases, licenses, and other charges
Public transportation
Health care
Health insurance
Medical services
Prescription drugs
Medical supplies
Entertainment
Fees and admissions
Televisions, radios, and sound equipment
Other equipment and services
Pesronal care
Reading
Education
Tobacco and smoking supplies
Miscellaneous expenditures

CEX Name
xfood
xfdhome
xfdaway
xalcbev
xhous
xshelt
xowndwe
xrendwe
xothlod
xutil
xhousop
xhouseq
xtextil
xfurntr
xflrcvr
xmajapp
xsmlapp
xmisceq
xappar
xmenboy
xwomgrl
xchldrn
xfootwr
xothapl
xtrans
xcartkn
xcartku
xothveh
xgasmo
xvehfin
xmainrp
xvehins
xvrntlo
xpubtra
xhealth
xhlthin
xmedsrv
xpredrg
xmedsup
xentert
xfeeadm
xtvrdio
xotheqp
xpersca
xread
xeduca
xtobacc
xmisc

β0
1223.5020
1426.9230
-203.4204
-109.5542
220.6914
-372.2168
-1432.1370
1145.6540
-85.7332
899.2348
-88.6086
-217.7181
-12.1975
-55.8144
-6.0990
-29.1083
-9.9318
-104.5671
37.4759
-6.5378
-25.2248
25.9518
14.7521
28.5345
-990.7137
-372.5258
-462.1273
-64.0510
229.0107
-33.4483
-101.7247
18.7863
-100.9157
-103.7179
-203.6542
-20.9040
-179.7946
9.8933
-12.8489
-329.6345
-151.5610
43.9065
-221.9800
-49.0375
-36.7294
146.0641
179.2456
-87.6557

β1 × 100
13.7045
7.0506
6.6539
1.4854
39.6951
26.9475
23.3068
3.2251
0.4157
6.4532
2.6088
3.6857
0.2379
0.8721
0.0693
0.6569
0.2060
1.6434
2.3256
0.7624
1.1333
0.0801
0.3105
0.0393
23.9283
0.7704
5.7089
0.5363
7.1151
1.2341
2.7987
2.9322
1.5137
1.3189
9.0048
4.7488
3.0307
0.9363
0.2889
7.7788
1.8475
2.7692
3.1621
1.0014
0.5080
-1.3468
0.4535
1.4614

β27
-0.4580
-0.4490
-0.0087
-0.0120
-0.1510
0.0952
0.0092
-0.3660
0.4520
-0.3580
0.0758
0.0360
0.0070
0.0527
0.0129
-0.0269
-0.0051
-0.0046
0.1620
-0.0082
0.0252
-0.0089
0.0069
0.1470
0.1630
1.2600
-0.1660
-0.0151
-0.5980
-0.1070
-0.1520
-0.2140
0.0197
0.1340
-0.5520
-0.3320
-0.1490
-0.0615
-0.0102
-0.0727
0.1180
-0.1420
-0.0487
-0.0204
-0.0205
0.9200
-0.0671
0.1080

Note: This table reports parameter estimates for regressions of expenditure categories on
total expenditure and its square. The sample size is 15,218 households. Categories are
bolded if β̂0 > 0 and β̂2 < 0.
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Food at home
Rented dwellings
Utilities
Prescription drugs
Basic goods and services
Food away from home
Alcoholic beveages
Tobacco and smoking supplies
Owned dwellings
Other lodging
Household operations
House furnishing and equipment
Apparel and services
New cars and trucks (net outlay)
Used cars and trucks (net outlay)
Other vehicles
Gasoline and motor oil
Vehicles insurance
Vehicle finance charges
Maintenance and repairs
Vehicle rental, leases, licenses, and other charges
Public transportation
Health insurance
Medical services
Medical supplies
Fees and admissions
Televisions, radios, and sound equipment
Other equipment and services
Personal
Reading
Education
Miscellaneous expenditures
Non-basic goods and services
Total expenditures

P0-P5
26.2
15.3
16.6
0.6
58.7
3.9
0.3
1.8
7.9
0.1
1.0
1.4
3.1
0.0
0.7
0.0
7.6
1.9
0.5
1.1
0.4
0.7
2.7
0.6
0.1
0.3
2.8
1.1
0.4
0.1
0.3
0.5
41.3
100.0

P5-P10
21.2
15.1
14.7
0.7
51.7
4.4
0.4
2.0
9.0
0.2
1.6
1.8
3.2
0.0
1.2
0.1
7.9
2.5
0.5
1.5
0.6
0.8
3.2
1.0
0.1
0.4
3.0
1.1
0.5
0.1
0.6
0.8
48.3
100.0

P10-P25
17.6
12.4
13.0
0.9
43.9
4.9
0.6
1.8
12.1
0.4
1.8
1.9
2.8
0.1
1.7
0.1
8.1
2.9
0.8
1.7
0.7
0.7
4.1
1.3
0.2
0.7
2.9
1.3
0.6
0.2
0.9
0.9
56.1
100.0

P25-P50
14.0
8.6
10.9
1.0
34.5
5.6
0.8
1.4
15.1
0.8
2.3
2.5
2.8
0.7
2.8
0.1
7.5
2.7
0.9
2.0
1.0
0.9
4.3
1.8
0.2
1.2
2.8
1.8
0.7
0.3
1.3
1.2
65.5
100.0

P50-P75
11.3
6.5
9.0
0.9
27.7
5.9
1.1
1.0
17.8
1.2
2.6
3.0
2.9
2.2
3.5
0.2
6.5
2.5
0.9
2.1
1.2
1.3
3.8
2.0
0.2
1.6
2.6
2.1
0.8
0.3
1.8
1.3
72.3
100.0

P75-P90
9.1
4.9
7.4
0.7
22.0
6.1
1.2
0.6
19.9
1.9
2.7
3.2
3.1
4.6
4.0
0.3
5.3
2.1
0.7
1.9
1.3
1.6
3.3
2.0
0.2
1.9
2.4
2.4
0.8
0.3
2.4
1.7
78.0
100.0

Table 21: Expenditure Shares, CEX categories and subcategories
P90-P95
7.7
3.9
6.4
0.6
18.5
6.2
1.3
0.4
20.3
2.4
2.5
3.6
3.1
6.7
4.3
0.6
4.6
1.9
0.6
1.9
1.5
1.7
2.9
1.8
0.2
2.0
2.1
2.6
0.8
0.3
3.3
1.8
81.5
100.0

P95-P100
6.0
2.4
5.3
0.6
14.3
6.5
1.3
0.3
21.2
3.4
3.1
3.6
3.6
8.2
4.0
0.2
3.3
1.5
0.4
1.6
1.4
2.1
2.4
1.8
0.2
2.5
1.9
2.4
0.8
0.3
5.5
2.1
85.7
100.0

TOTAL
11.2
6.5
8.8
0.8
27.3
5.8
1.0
0.9
17.7
1.6
2.5
2.9
3.0
3.5
3.3
0.2
6.0
2.3
0.7
1.9
1.2
1.4
3.6
1.8
0.2
1.6
2.5
2.1
0.7
0.3
2.3
1.5
72.7
100.0
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